501.BC Indonesia/2–2549: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Baruch) to the Secretary of State 1
193. In our recent conversations with Boon (Embtels 171, February 19 and 180, February 212) we have found him for first time [Page 255] during protracted Indonesian crisis thoroughly gloomy. February 21 he remarked that conditions re Djocja mentioned by Hatta to Cochran for resumption negotiations had created consternation in Dutch Cabinet. Subsequently, Boon remarked that, contrary to impression left by Cochran in The Hague, he now seemed, after his talks on Bangka, to be backing Hatta’s third demand, viz., restoration Republic at Djocja. Parenthetically would like say that Boon is most reasonable, rational and straightforward Foreign Office official with whom Embassy deals on Indonesia and has complete confidence Stikker and Lovink.
Yesterday we had further talk with Boon with view seeing how firm Dutch are in rejecting idea Republic return Djocja, making clear our approach purely personal and without instructions. Boon said Netherlands Government fearful that with restoration Republic chaos would ensue and Republican leaders would pursue procrastinating methods characteristic in past and refuse to open negotiations until further conditions had been met.
We said rigid positions being taken by both parties re Republic’s return Djocja seemed likely result complete impasse, with Dutch in position of conflict with SC resolution, at time when UNCFI about submit March 1 report SC. Such development could have most unfavorable consequences for Netherlands, particularly in respect its efforts stage Indonesian conference Hague mid-March. We went on to state Dutch attitude re return Djocja was in some fundamental respects inconsistent with government’s proposal (Embtel 187, February 23) to transfer sovereignty as of May 1. Proposal must be viewed with some doubt if Netherlands not prepared work out means for Republicans to prepare soon to assume responsibility government, particularly law and order within federated state.
We said that SC resolution in our opinion aimed at restoration Republican Government at Djocja for two immediate purposes:
- (1)
- Give Republican leaders suitable opportunity call off guerrilla warfare;
- (2)
- Give them prestige and authority necessary embark on negotiations. No one could deny Republican leaders were impotent stop guerrillas unless they were released and restored to authority. Re second point, viz., prestige, we asked Boon if he thought compromise might be arranged whereby Netherlands agreed restoration but on condition Republicans agree to commence negotiations at round table conference Hague within early definite time limit.
Boon, after indicating early in discussion that Netherlands Government must absolutely refuse agree re Djocja, finally said, in his personal opinion, Netherlands Government could not take any initiative now resolve this problem but would certainly listen any “ingenious [Page 256] proposal” which Cochran or UNCFI might put forward to break deadlock. He indicated Netherlands Government pinning all its hopes upon convening round table conference Hague and went on to indicate Netherlands might be prepared “pay a high price in Djocja for agreement to negotiations The Hague.”
Foreign Office fully aware urgency this matter, particularly view approaching March 1 deadline and Embassy believes Dutch would not turn their backs if Cochran were to advance proposal for compromise along lines that would save Republicans’ face and same time give Dutch assurance law and order will not be jeopardized and Republicans are not simply given opportunity avoid negotiations and coming to agreements in sense contemplated both by Dutch and under SC resolution. This would involve something of a marriage between Beel plan and SC resolution, which, upon close examination, does not seem be out of question, but in fact has much to commend it. It might go long way to strengthen Cabinet’s shaky position.
Embassy suggests to Department these ideas may be worth exploration, particularly in view of urgency of solution which will be apparent from re-reading Embtel 190, February 23 and Brussels’ 269, February 243 to Department. Not repeated to Batavia.