501.BC Indonesia/2–1749: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Netherlands (Baruch) to the Secretary of State
159. In amplification main points government statement re Indonesia (Embtel 156, February 161), Maarseveen2 said:
Government had repeatedly declared it would continue to act toward resolution in accordance Van Royen SC statement. (He quoted resolution and Van Royen statement). Netherlands’ policy including military action “had same aim as SC resolution, i.e., maintenance of law and order. If good relations between parties are to be gradually restored, care will have to be taken that their basis internal quiet is maintained and not threatened anew. Break between UN and Netherlands would only be possible—as to procedure—and then only differences about procedure which is to be carried out in a relatively short time.” He said that UN and Netherlands pursuing same goal.
Referring first recommendation of resolution Netherlands confining itself to “active defense” against murdering, plundering guerrilla bands. If Republican leaders “want to show that they are prepared to comply with first recommendation and cooperate with Netherlands for restoration peace, law and order, an important act would have been performed which could be built upon.” Federalists without abandoning national aspirations have understood that quickest, surest, safest way of attaining sovereign Indonesian regime is way of order and consultation.
Netherlands prepared to offer Republican leaders a proper place in federal interim government but they have so far shown no inclination to enter such government. They prefer compliance with second recommendation. “Anyone who considers this demand objectively will be forced to admit that it is demanding the impossible of Netherlands Government, the more so because Republican leaders have not made it [Page 236] perfectly clear that they are also prepared to comply with first recommendation of SC, namely, that they will cease guerrilla warfare and will cooperate with Netherlands for restoration peace and maintenance law and order. Netherlands authority in Indonesia is for time being the only support for law and order in those areas. This would be dealt irreparable blow if Republican leaders [apparent garble] by close friends at home and abroad—to release the political prisoners in compliance with resolution of SC. This release is not among four points to which Van Royen objected. As I said earlier, this is not criterion by which to judge whether release can take place or not. Criterion is whether release is compatible with responsibility of Netherlands for maintenance of freedom and order.
“Whether that is the case will be immediately discussed with HRC. It is clear that we shall do so if it accords with our responsibility.”
The Governments of Netherlands and Indonesia are faced with two difficult problems: On one hand, to prevent chaos in Indonesia and, on other, to avoid a complete break with UN. These two problems partly overlap. A complete break with UN is not a condition for salvation of Indonesia. On other hand, strict compliance with resolution of SC would in our firm conviction mean chaos in Indonesia. It is understandable that in such critical situation some have wondered whether we ought to go [on?] making tremendous sacrifices for Indonesia and whether we are not obliged to leave Indonesia to its fate. The government could not entertain such a thought. The government would not abandon Indonesia. It was government’s duty to lead the people.
Maarseveen then referred to Beel’s “constructive proposals” which government had approved in principle. Government was prepared to cooperate in transfer sovereignty as soon as representative federal government for whole of Indonesia had been established. Simultaneously with transfer, statute of Netherlands–Indonesia union would have to be created and treaties on various subjects concluded. After that USI could organize their regime independently and democratically in observance of union statute and agreements concluded. If this plan to be realized, a federal interim government would have to be established soonest which up to transfer of sovereignty would exercise powers laid down BIO decree with exception of changes to be made in consultation. After creation of federal interim government it can appoint delegation which together with Netherlands delegation can draft union statute and further agreements at round-table conference to be held in Netherlands [if Republican leaders?] were to be restored to their authority in Djocja. But if Republican leaders are willing to cooperate with Netherlands fully and completely, then they will be [Page 237] given a share not only in administration of Djocja and its surroundings but in the government of the United States of the whole of Indonesia.
“Resolution of SC for the realization of Dutch aims wishes to make use of United Nations Commission for Indonesia. Leaving aside for the moment whether parties concerned arrived at agreement without this Commission, there can be no objection that this Commission use its influence with both parties for realization of program drafted by Netherlands and recognized by SC as effective for the rapid development of Indonesia into sovereign federal state united with Netherlands in a union.
“According to SC resolution, however, this Commission and also SC has wider powers. The Commission and SC can according to resolution concern itself with those areas being administrated by participating governments who in harmony with Netherlands Government have succeeded in realizing order and a restoration of property and economic well-being. This and other presumptions of SC cannot be accepted by Netherlands Government and constitute an intolerable violation of the internal sovereignty of the States of the UN.”
Van Maarseveen recalled that this point was stressed by Van Royen in SC. He quoted the four points in draft resolution to which Van Royen said Dutch Government had “fundamental objections.”
Maarseveen recalled Van Royen’s statement as to extent to which the resolution insofar as it is compatible with responsibility of the Netherlands for maintenance of genuine freedom and order in Indonesia, [“] a responsibility which at this moment no one else can take over from us.”
“There,” said Maarseveen, “is the formula which, is the foundation of the further policy of Netherlands Government, a policy which maintains unchanged the attitude that SC has exceeded its authority.
“Perhaps I may explain the signficance of this formula with an example. [”] The Netherlands Government has been urged—also all [apparent garble] with view to speediest possible transfer sovereignty. Netherlands regards this Beel plan suitable to bridge existing differences and reach common goal including Security Council’s. He said it would be necessary for Republican Government to join in discussions.
He thought it better for success of talks that parties did not first try to reach agreement about their respective positions because latter should be result of the consultations. He believed necessary consultations could take place only if Netherlands did not ask Republican Government first to recognize a certain formulation of its position just as Netherlands could not accept a demand by Republican Government that Netherlands agree with view that any discussion should [Page 238] be preceded by restoration of certain rights. Only real condition for consultations was that they take place in full freedom and frankness and Netherlands prepared to create that condition.
If parties’ wish discussions including those on establishment interim government to be held in Netherlands, and if UNCI should find occasion to come to Netherlands for this purpose to exert its influence in helping parties reach agreement, Netherlands would agree to this.
Above summary was taken from semi-official Aneta news bulletin and is stated by Foreign Office press section to be accurate.
Chairman second chamber announced yesterday that government hoped be able to make further statement on Indonesian policy on Friday following consultations with HRC Beel.
Not Repeated to Batavia.