501.BC Indonesia/2–1149
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth)
| Participants: | Mr. H. A. Graves, Counselor, British Embassy |
| Mr. W. Walton Butterworth, Director, FE | |
| Mr. Charles S. Reed II, Chief, SEA |
Mr. Graves called at his request to discuss new developments in the Indonesian situation, particularly the “Beel Plan” which he believed to contain certain elements which might serve to break the present apparent impasse in Indonesia. I said we had no great amount of information regarding that plan and he then made available a summary thereof. At the same time he communicated the texts of a number of telegrams exchanged between the Foreign Office and The Hague in which Mr. Bevin1 requested and received clarification of a number of the points in the plan. From this exchange it was noted that Mr. Bevin had expressed misgivings as to the successful implementation of the plan.
In the ensuing discussion I mentioned my own doubts as to certain points in the plan and it was evident that my doubts and Mr. Bevin’s misgivings related to the same fundamental issues, namely it appeared that the Indonesians were to have little choice in the matter and that the transfer of sovereignty was to be made contingent upon certain agreements and upon Dutch terms. I also pointed out that the plan did not go to the crux of the situation, which is how to bring about a cessation of hostilities, and that this essential cessation could not be effected unless and until the responsible Republican leaders were liberated and in a position to order a cease fire by the guerrilla forces operating in Indonesia and in a position to outlaw those who did not respond to this order. Furthermore, unless and until the Dutch took steps to carry out at least the initial requirements of the Security Council resolution I did not see how negotiations of a serious and binding character could be entered into, and without these there appeared to be little chance of the plan ever becoming operative.
[Page 226]Mr. Graves asked whether or not the short cut to the establishment of an interim government and eventual transfer of sovereignty, set forth in the plan, did not have much to commend itself, But with so much to be done, to conclude arrangements for the government, with so many agreements (Netherlands–Indonesian union, economic and financial matters, and defence) to be negotiated, I felt that the two-month period mentioned in the plan was much too short. And as regards those agreements I believed that the wording of the plan envisaged transfer of sovereignty only after those agreements had been finalized—and negotiations in regard thereto might drag on interminably.
Mr. Graves mentioned that one telegram from the Foreign Office contained Mr. Bevin’s desire to have our reaction to the “Beel Plan”, particularly whether or not we would go along with it, and I said that, despite any advantages the plan might offer, the United States being a member of UNCFI, an agency of the Security Council, could not take an active position vis-à-vis that or any plan in preference to the Security Council resolution so long as UNCFI did not recommend it, as it could do under the resolution. I said further that the greatest disadvantage of the plan so far as I could see was that it did not initiate any implementation of the resolution, such as release of political prisoners, freedom to negotiate, etc., and with [without] such implementation I doubted whether anything could be done with any measure of success as regards solving the Indonesian problem. I confessed that we were concerned that the lack of implementation might lead to an unfavorable report by UNCFI on March 1 with the attendant danger of some member of the Security Council bringing up the question of sanctions.
Mr. Graves then mentioned the aide-mémoire2 which the British Ambassador had left with the Secretary and we agreed that, as regards the final recommendations (1) to press the Dutch to take position with regard to the Security Council resolution and (2) to press the Indonesians to put their house in order, the first would have to take place before the second could be acted upon. In any event I said that we were anxious to cooperate with the British in any forward looking steps towards a solution.