501.BC Indonesia/1–2349: Telegram
The Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to the Secretary of State 1
confidential us urgent
Batavia, January 23, 1949—7 p. m.
104. Gocus 560.
- 2.
- Consideration recent reports conditions here and various
discussions lead to following conclusions.
- a.
- After 5 weeks military action immediate withdrawal Netherlands troops would cause general chaos and strengthen forces which thrive thereon. Believe this now recognized by moderate Republican leaders.
- b.
- There is little possibility negotiation, restoration moderate Republican leadership, popular acceptance in Republican areas of any settlement reached unless some type relinquishment by Netherlands forces of fruits of military action.
- c.
- Leaving situation as it is would result positively in months, possibly much longer period, guerrilla warfare and its normal consequences. Even if moderate Republican leaders would join in Federal program, believe it unlikely law and order can be restored for long period.
- d.
- There must be no vacuum of power. Even with gradual withdrawal Netherlands authority Jogja, and then other areas, restoration Republic authority must go pari passu.
- e.
- US resolution meets this in providing withdrawal Netherlands authority only as Republic in position take over.
- f.
- Moderate Republican leaders with whom we are locally in contact, Leimena, Sjahrir, Darma, Supomo, have not yet had opportunity full study and unwilling commit themselves officially pending consultations with Republican heads but agree on US resolution as best solution that can now be offered. Critchley now won to this viewpoint also.
- g.
- Any further delay in adoption US resolution will be dangerous. Although Netherlands may become more amenable international pressure as more and more aware of local military and economic difficulties, everyday sees growing strength extremist elements and problem moderate Republicans will become greater. Leimena puts great emphasis on this.
- 2.
- If US resolution is adopted and there is at least nominal
Netherlands compliance therewith, new UN committee will face
tremendous problems.
- a.
- There will be great difficulty in getting people to accept again legitimate authority of moderate Republican leaders (Gocus 5512).
- b.
- Even if general tendency is to accept such authority Jogja and other areas thereafter returned Republic administration, there will be problem maintaining security those areas high of extent which forces disorder have been unloosed.
- c.
- Presumably penultimate sentence paragraph 4(F) of US resolution providing for temporary retention Netherlands forces in any [Page 190] area is intended apply not only to the areas outside of Jogja generally dealt with in that paragraph but also to city itself in situation described in paragraph 2. To avoid controversy it might be desirable insert phrase “including city of Jogjakarta” between the words “in an area” and “in order to” in 4(F).
- d.
- However, if Netherlands forces are retained for more than briefest period after Republic administration is set up Jogja, there is grave danger administration would be looked upon as puppet agency. There will be immediate problem then organizing police force large enough maintain order to take place Netherlands troops. Leimena felt that international UN police force, at least 1,000, would be necessary or, failing that, a greatly augmented group military observers to perform this function. USDel explained impracticability these proposals. It might be possible, however, to organize a trustworthy police force on short notice out of disarmed’members TNI and presently cooperating and noncooperating civil police but under precautions that would prevent recreation of TNI not fully subordinated to government itself. This technique could be used as other areas are progressively turned over to Republic civil administration as a means of gradually effecting withdrawal Netherlands troops.
- e.
- Problem of getting scattered guerrilla forces cease hostilities will be far greater than year ago when forces were more closely organized in larger units, when there was operating Republican Government in continuing authority with coherent territory subject to its jurisdiction, and greater trust in international organization. Problem might even be greater in light underground statement that present military situation is one they had waited for with Netherlands military strength spread out too thinly over too wide area. Meeting this problem will require every possible technique of planes dropping leaflets, radio appeals (Sukarno can be particularly, effective here if reputation can be restored), special contacts in field. In this connection, thought should be given to temporarily augmenting number military observers. Might be advisable to consider having them headed by one or two star general officer. Netherlands are stated to be very rank conscious in military affairs and it is believed neutral military direction can be most effectively exercised, at highest possible level of rank. Immediate attention will have to be given to means of restoring to civil life farmed adherents” of Republic who cannot be utilized in federal armed forces and police forces or perhaps temporary “reconstruction battalion” to take up slack.
- f.
- There will remain grave problem arising from personalities. As previously stated (Gocus 5203 paragraph 6C), difficult to have Republicans adhere to a federal interim government in which powerful forces will be Beel and Spoor. Moderates like Leimena emphasize this. Recognize practical difficulties involved but note some tendency on part Netherlands political groups to use Beel as scapegoat. This might be worthy of all possible encouragement.
- g.
- Will tentatively explore these problems with local Republicans. As soon as Department can give any indication resolution is likely become operative, USDel either individually or with whole GOC, if possible, [Page 191] could begin preliminary discussions with Sukarno, Hatta and possibly with Netherlands delegation with view to doing as much preparatory work as possible for UN committee. Only most complete technical preparation can minimize possibilities of failure in program which would have gravest consequences.
- h.
- In light all that must be done before even initial steps are taken to implement resolution, it is suggested timetable is too finely drawn. Suggest paragraph 3C of resolution should provide that with respect date in paragraph 3A committee should report not one month before 15 March but on 1 March. Seems impossible there can be sufficient restoration stability for agreement on federal interim government on 15 February. Would be unfortunate for committee to begin career by being unable meet first deadline calling for premature statement inability parties agree.
Signed Lisle.
Livengood