740.00119 Council/10–2249
Summary Record of the Meeting of Ambassadors at Paris, October 21–22, 19491
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Mr. Perkins2 stated that the Dept and the US Govt generally agreed that Tito must be kept afloat. To this end he read the conclusions of a paper recently prepared by the Policy Planning Staff3 and inquired whether the Ambassadors concurred therein. There was general concurrence but the thought was advanced that the Pentagon Building was not in step with the rest of the administration on this matter and that it might therefore be helpful to the Secretary if the meeting dispatched a telegram indicating its agreement with the conclusions of the Policy Planning Staff paper.
[Page 973]Mr. Bohlen4 pointed out that our general support, economic and Otherwise, of Tito in order to exploit his break with the Kremlin should never be allowed to extend to the ideological field. It was highly important that we should not cross this ideological line and find ourselves giving moral approval to what was essentially a Communist totalitarian dictatorship. With that one important qualification we should go the limit. The Tito heresy was the most important recent development, striking at the very roots of Kremlin domination, and may prove to be the deciding factor in the cold war.
Mr. Harriman agreed. The victory or defeat of Tito may be our victory or defeat in the cold war. If Tito is No. 1 business for Stalin, it should be No. 1 business for us. A strong statement to this effect should go forward to the Dept from the meeting.
Mr. Perkins stated that in spite of disagreements of a secondary nature in connection with the approval of the transfer to Yugoslavia of a blooming mill there had been no real difficulty in Washington in providing Tito with such economic help as was available for distribution. This aid was now sufficient to see him through the rest of the year. The ways and means for helping him in 1950 were under active consideration but no decision had yet been reached. Military aid was another matter. It was generally agreed that in the event of hostilities from the east, Tito could hold out for a very long time in the mountains if he were supplied with small arms from the U.S. Staff studies were now being made and active consideration of the extent and timing of possible U.S. military aid to Yugoslavia was underway. A strong statement from the present meeting of the importance of supporting Tito would be helpful to the Dept at this time and should go forward.
(Note: The statement referred to was dispatched to the Dept as Paris telegram No. 4424, Oct. 22, 1949, and appears as an Annex to this record.)5
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- For information
regarding the meeting of Ambassadors at Paris, see editorial note,
p. 27.
This summary record was prepared by Woodruff Wallner, First Secretary of the Embassy in France.
↩ - George W. Perkins, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs and chairman of the meeting. The discussion begun by Perkins at this point occurred midway in the morning session of October 21. Earlier in the morning session, other conference participants had alluded briefly to the Yugoslav-Cominform conflict. Lewis W. Douglas, Ambassador in the United Kingdom, had stated that the British Government was not overly worried by the possibility of hostilities emerging from the conflict and that the British public opinion on the whole took a calm view of the situation. James C. Dunn, Ambassador in Italy, observed that the Italian Government and people had no faith in Tito. While agreeing that the rift between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union should be exploited, Italians generally watched the development with skepticism and even anxiety. Alan G. Kirk, Ambassador in the Soviet Union could add nothing to what he had reported in telegram 2537, October 7, from Moscow, p. 968 ↩
- The reference here is presumably to document P.P.S. 60, September 12, p. 947.↩
- Charles E. Bohlen, Minister in the Embassy in France.↩
- The telegram under reference here is printed infra. ↩