760H.61/9–2249
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Perkins) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Rusk)1
Subject: Comments Relating to Yugoslav-Moscow Controversy
The following are my comments on the Yugoslav paper,2 omitting minor drafting changes which we would be glad to make to whoever works on the revision:
1. The use of force by the Soviet Union in either direct or indirect form would constitute a serious act of aggression, and we would be obliged in such circumstances, apart from our obligations as a member of the United Nations, to consider what the effects of such action would be upon the United States’ security interests, for example, in Greece, in Eastern Europe, and in the Free World. In determining our policy, we should weigh carefully what United States action would be justified even though the United Nations is unable to act. We mighty for example, if circumstances justified, wish to join with other nations willing to go along with us in furnishing military supplies and in imposing economic sanctions.
The most important question, in our opinion, is to insure that the Soviet Union is not able by the use or the threat of force to reduce Yugoslavia to the status of a Soviet stooge. When faced with attack, or threat of imminent attack, we believe it to be of major importance to United States security interests that Yugoslavia resist such attack with all her power, which, according to G–2, is probably somewhat greater than is reflected in this paper. The decision to make such resistance will depend, in our opinion, not so much upon Tito and his immediate colleagues, as upon the second-rank Communist leaders in Yugoslavia. Should a crisis arise, we believe it essential that Tito be able to convince his followers that he can obtain from the West the necessary Supplies, economic and military, to maintain an all-out resistance effort. We should be in the position to receive sympathetically any requests from him in such circumstances. The supplies needed would probably be small, and it might be possible that in the first instance at least the British would be in the best position to furnish them. The further we can go in preliminary planning along [Page 965] this line, the greater will be the chances of a firm Yugoslav position, and the greater the possibility that the Soviet Union will be deterred from any rash acts.
2. The section on Albania on pages 14 and 15 should be brought up to date. A paper on this subject is in the process of being cleared and if approved, this paper should be brought into harmony with it.3