800.00B Communist International/12–949: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State
3062. Though Chinese victory stands out as main achievement world Communism during 1949, it seems likely as year’s end approaches that Kremlin also views European scene with considerable optimism and anticipation.
As the Secretary pointed out on recent German visit,1 problems facing Western democracies outside actual curtain areas in Europe are largely ones “which exist whether Soviet Union existed or not”. At same time, recent Soviet press treatment Western Europe, together with key pronouncements such as Malenkov’s November 6 speech, Cominform Resolutions and Stalin’s message to Pieck,2 show Moscow is well aware of these serious problems, in fact, mainly economic and result of continuing disunity, is hopeful of exploiting them to full and even possibly considerably over-estimates its chances of so doing, as result of Bolshevik’s Marxist “blinders” which have so often before led them to unjuistified conclusions and hopes in their assessments of hostile capitalist world.
While it is impossible to know with certainty what Kremlin really thinks of much-mentioned “Western economic crisis”, we inclined [Page 682] to view that top Soviet policy planners actually believe such crisis, which they hope comparable 1929–33, already began at end 1948 and is rapidly, inexorably deepening. They may well expect it will reach climax about time ERP runs out in 1952, also counting on possibility US Congress and public may force latter’s effective curtailment even before then. Thus, despite Western recovery and integration achieved since 1945, Soviet planners may be anticipating more rapid, progressive weakening of capitalist foundations next few years and that they will be able exploit resulting revolutionary situation Western Europe.
[Some paragraphs touching upon the assessment of the relative position and aspirations of the Soviet Union in Germany, Austria, Yugoslavia, and satellite countries in eastern Europe, are here omitted.]
Thus, in sum, we suggest Kremlin’s year-end estimate European picture is probably characterized by: satisfaction on the whole regarding satellite control and evolution; continuing anger and concern over Tito tempered by belief incipient Titoism effectively quashed remaining satellites; and real hopes Germany and Western Europe based expectations regarding deepening economic crisis, “contradictions” between Western Powers and wind up ERP at least by 1952. While conscious of and stung by set-backs suffered through NAT–MAP, degree Western integration achieved and losses to Communist control of labor in both national and international fields, Soviets nevertheless may well expect these Western gains to be wiped out eventually by economic developments and intensification meanwhile of Communist counteraction tactics stressed Cominform Resolutions.
In light above analysis, we conclude Moscow may again be considerably over-estimating its prospects outside Iron Curtain in Europe, but would emphasize that answer depends primarily upon Western democracies themselves and their ability surmount present difficult problems and continue press forward.
Sent Department 3062; pouched London, Paris, Frankfort, Rome.
- Secretary of State Acheson visited West Germany and Berlin on November 11–13. For documentation on this visit, see vol. iii, pp. 267 ff.↩
- For further comment on these topics see telegram 2791 from Moscow on November 7, p. 671, and telegram 3004 from Moscow on December 3, and footnotes, p. 39.↩