Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume V

861.00/10–2249: Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Barbour) to the Secretary of State

secret

Moscow, October 22, 1949—5 p. m.

2650. Re defectors from west (Deptel 763, October 17¹).

(1) Embassy believes Soviet authorities eager for defectors specially qualified for intelligence, psychological and technological exploitation. Though almost any could be used at least for psychological [exploitation?] large numbers would probably not be encouraged indiscriminately due to suspicion any foreigner might be espionage cover. Also those useful to Communist cause abroad would be told stay there unless more desirable exploit or train here (Embassy’s A–1014, October 7²).

(2) Position of defectors: Soviet authorities probably grant status requisite for exploitation plus decoy others, but always regard with suspicion, at times ill-conceived, maintain careful surveillance and some degree segregation. Position tends deteriorate with time. When exploitation ended, defector at best drops to status second-class citizen, at worst liquidated as security precaution. Even during exploitation more liable than ordinary citizen to castigation as wrecker if makes mistake in work, and to loss of status if Soviet individual responsible for his exploitation replaced, e.g. Polish chemist came here during war, opted Soviet citizenship, enjoyed ample facilities, then was arrested recently.

Soviet people probably view defectors from west with mixture of kindness, curiosity and credulity tempered by police-inspired fear of foreign contact.

(3) Exploitation of defectors in psychological field not only public statements and books; probably also used for language skills, knowledge foreign customs and psychology. Intelligence field given top priority, thoroughly exploited; some possibly groomed as long-range foreign agents. Exploitation scientific-technological skills also important, given Soviet deficiencies this field (Embassy Naval Attaché reports 145–49, September 21); e.g. Embassy radio man was approached with statement he would be “big man in USSR, well provided for” if elected remain here.

(4) On treatment see paragraph (2). Psychological reactions to it as varied as mental patterns leading to defection. Final regret virtually inevitable for all except those with protective neuroses.

(5) Believe Soviets make no efforts to assimilate because results never trusted; efforts are to watch and keep under control. Economic “security” impossible for anyone except Stalin in USSR, since status subject to change without notice. People with foreign backgrounds known to be handicapped in finding employment. Hence when exploitation of defector ended, his prospective earning power varies from below average to zero.

(6) Measures to ensure against re-defection vary from normal Soviet restrictions on movement plus special police surveillance and warning against suspicious moves (such as talking to Embassy officials of former country) with threat of dire consequences for self and local friends, to death.

Barbour

1. Not printed. The Department of State explained that it was collaborating with other interested government agencies on a national policy for handling Soviet defectors, leading eventually to the development of a program for the admission into the United States of some defectors of high potential. The Embassy was asked to furnish its views and information on several questions, which are set forth in this responding telegram.
2. Not printed.