Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume V

711.61/8–349: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union

top secret

Washington, August 3, 1949—6 p. m.

555. ReDeptel 544 Aug 1.

1. Germany. The German question and results of Paris CFM may be touched upon.¹ Pending observance of Sov performance under the modus vivendi,² we wish you to avoid a detailed discussion of Ger problems. Shld Stalin desire to set forth Sov position on some Ger issue, you cld say that you have not been directly involved in Ger affairs but wld be happy to note the Generalissimo’s remarks and to transmit them to Washington. Shld Ger topics be mentioned in a gen way, you may, however, in your discretion, comment as fols:

You may state that both parties have cause to welcome the Paris Agreement as it served to alleviate tension and to place relations between East and West in Ger on a more rational basis. We are, of course, fully determined to maintain our position in Berlin as a victor and occupying power. The state of blockade and counter-blockade and the piling up of restrictions and counter-restrictions created a dangerous situation. FonMins in Paris were in agreement that a return to this state of affairs shld be avoided. It is regrettable that the unification of Ger cld not be achieved at past sessions of CFM, but this continues to be an important objective of ITS policy. We wish to continue in consultation with the Sov Union re Ger questions and for our part we will maintain conditions which will render these consultations useful. If Stalin raises the question of estab of federal Ger govt in Western Ger, you shld emphasize that this is a matter which admits of no misunderstanding. Both before and during CFM in Paris we made it perfectly clear that we authorized the Germans in our area to proceed with their arrangements. The absence of agreement on all of Ger increased the burden we are carrying and threatened to create chaos. We cld not postpone indefinitely the need of reestablishing Ger administrative and governmental responsibility and of permitting the Germans to develop their own org[anization] along democratic lines. In our view and theirs, this represents progress toward unification. We are most desirous of promoting a solution which will permit Ger to live in peaceful association with its neighbors and we trust that unification can be pursued along these lines. The Paris Agreement provided that efforts shld be continued toward bringing about Ger polit and econ unity and we trust that the present relationship can be employed to advance this objective.

2. Austria. Shld Aust Treaty question arise, it might be well to express gratification for progress which has been made by Deputies fulfilling the agreement in principle which was accepted by the Mins in Paris.³ Certain difficulties have been encountered, however, since the Sov Del⁴ to the London Conf continues to insist on reproduction in Treaty of exact wording in Paris communiqué. Naturally Paris communiqué was intended to serve as an agreement in principle and guide to the Deputies in reaching precise agreement in detail for inclusion in the Aust Treaty.

We hope that an agreed report on the Treaty can be made by Sep first. This objective would be facilitated if the Sov Del in London understood the basic US position and did not continue to insist upon acceptance of its sole interpretation of the Paris agreement. Such understanding is necessary if final agreement is to be reached on Ger assets settlement. Three powers have agreed in principle to Sov interpretation of its rights accruing from Potsdam.⁵ The Western Nations, however, have similar rights but have renounced them in favor of Aus. In order that Four Power responsibilities in that country may be effectively discharged, we urge that in all aspects of the Ger assets settlement these responsibilities be recognized.

We agreed in the Moscow Declaration that Aus shld be an independent and viable state.⁶ It is obvious that our agreement cannot be carried out if the Aust Treaty places restrictions and obligations on Aus which are inconsistent with the objective we accepted in 1943. The fulfillment of this objective will require that Aus be master in her own house and that Aust law apply within Aus except only for the two limited fields in which the Mins agreed in the interest of Sov Union that an exception from the operation of Aust law was valid. (These fields concern the freedom from alienation without USSR consent for Ger assets to be transferred to the Sov Union and the right to export net profits and net income which are in turn determined by Aust law.) In order to create a viable Aus which can discharge its obligations under the Treaty it is necessary that no restrictions be placed on the Aust economy which will cripple its econ life. If this principle be maintained we are convinced that an Aust Treaty can be achieved which will be of mutual advantage in that it will recognize the Sov rights to Ger assets and create an Aus capable of discharging its obligation to the Sov Union.

Acheson

1. The sixth session of the Council of Foreign Ministers was held in Paris between May 23 and June 20, 1949. German and Austrian questions were discussed and the decisions of the Council (the Paris Agreement) were contained in the communiqué of June 20. For documentation on the session, including the text of the communiqué, see Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. iii, pp. 856 ff.
2. The modus Vivendi was that portion of the communiqué of June 20 which confirmed the terms of the four-power agreement on the ending of the Berlin blockade.
3. This “agreement in principle” comprized part II of the communiqué of June 20 of the Council of Foreign Ministers. For documentation on the participation of the United States in the negotiations for an Austrian peace treaty, including records of the meetings of the Deputies for Austria of the Council of Foreign Ministers at London between July 1 and September 1, see Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. iii, pp. 1097 ff.
4. Georgy Nikolayevich Zarubin, Ambassador of the Soviet Union to the United Kingdom, served as Soviet Deputy for Austria at the Council of Foreign Ministers.
5. In regard to the decisions made on the disposition of German assets by the Heads of Government of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union at the conference at Berlin between July 17 and August 2, 1945, see the “Report on the Tripartite Conference of Berlin” part IV, August 2, 1945, in Foreign Relations, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945, vol. ii, pp. 1505–1506.
6. The text of the Declaration on Austria, signed on November 1, 1943, at the close of the Tripartite Conference at Moscow of the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union is printed in Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. i, p. 761.