Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume V

711.61/8–349: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union ¹

top secret
priority

Washington, August 3, 1949—6 p. m.

553. We agree it wld be desirable for you to ask to be recd by Stalin prior his departure from Moscow for south (Embtel 1813 July 21) and you are accordingly authorized request Vyshinski arrange for you courtesy call on PriMin. You shld handle matter in routine fashion and not follow up initial request with any subsequent inquiries or in any way create impression proposed interview is other than routine.

It is improbable that any substantial advantage can be derived at this time from proposed mtg. Furthermore in view Sov predilection exploit for propaganda purposes opportunities provided by such mtg it is important Soviets not be given opportunity extract anything useful to their “peace offensive” and detrimental to ERP, MAP and our East-West trade policy. You will of course have to be prepared reply to any questions which Stalin may raise re broad problems of East-West relations and we agree with your statement that in treating such matters you shld carefully avoid any defensive attitude but make perfectly clear without adopting an aggressive manner the reasons for and objectives of our policies.

In particular you shld not take apologetic attitude assumed by your Brit colleague in his recent interview when Stalin charged western powers with aggressive intentions as manifested in NAP and MAP. If Stalin makes similar assertion as he probably will you shld instead point out defensive character of these policies made necessary by Sov pressure on Western Europe and explain that they are in fact a delayed reaction to the fear of Sov aggression resulting from the magnitude of the Sov Mil estab, hostile propaganda and indirect polit aggression directed against the West. (This is being spelled out in greater detail in separate msg.²)

In this connection you will find report of your predecessor’s conversation with Stalin in April 1946 most helpful particularly para 5 where Smith points out US faced with important decisions which wld depend to large extent on manifestations of Sov policy and you might wish to remind Stalin of this statement.

In gen it wld be preferable to avoid discussion of questions of multilateral character and you shld if necessary point out to Stalin that although you are of course glad to hear his views and transmit them to your Govt you can hardly enter into a discussion of these matters since they involve govts other than the Sov Union and US. Shld he take umbrage at this a pointed reference to Sov Govt’s propaganda treatment of Smith-Molotov conversations of May 4, 1948 would be apt.³

You will of course not fail to inform your Brit and Fr⁴ colleagues of your interview when appt made and assure them of its purely routine character.

Inasmuch as Stalin usually waits for visitor to take initiative in conversation you shld be prepared so to do. It is suggested that you might appropriately say you are making courtesy call and appreciate this opportunity make his acquaintance, that you are fully aware that the broader internatl problems dividing the eastern and western communities are of such a grave and basic character that there appears little hope that further discussion of them on this occasion wld contribute to their resolution, barring a basic change of attitude on part of Sov Govt; that there are however certain practical US–Sov problems, the solution of which wld be in the mutual interest of the two govts and that you are of course always at disposition of Sov Govt to do whatever might be useful in this regard.

If at this point Stalin shows no disposition to take up conversation you might wish him a good vacation and prepare to take your leave. Shld he on other hand ask what you mean by practical problems it wld then be opportune for you to discuss certain aspects of concrete current questions, the solution of which wld in fact make a specific and practical contribution to improvement of US–Sov relations. Such subjects of direct bilateral US–Sov character are lend-lease and jamming of VOA. Separate tels are being sent with material suitable for use this connection.⁵ In addition msg covering our position on German and Aus problems is going forward in order that you may be fully prepared if these subjects are raised,⁶ but it is not desired that you initiate discussion of them particularly because of their quadripartite character.

It is not believed any useful purpose wld be served by raising on this occasion questions of Sov wives, US dual nationals or Emb housekeeping problems, all of which have been subj of innumerable representations. Shld however Stalin inquire how you find life in Moscow you may simply reply that treatment of Emb is far from satisfactory, that Emb’s complaints are all matter of repeated record, and that this is an old story which US Govt can only interpret as indication that Sov Govt is not seriously interested in encouraging development of friendly relations. You shld not elaborate any specific complaints unless pressed by Stalin to do so, in which case it wld be well to mention among others the Tucker⁷ case as involving the kind of treatment incomprehensible to Amer public opinion. If he asserts that treatment of Sov reps in US unsatisfactory you might reply that Sov Govt shld not expect its own highly restrictive policies in these matters to go indefinitely unreciprocated.

Acheson

1. At the end of this telegram the Secretary of State has written: “Approved by the President. DA,”
2. Telegram 554 to Moscow on August 3, p. 639.
3. For documentation on the conversations between Ambassador Smith and Minister for Foreign Affairs Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov in May 1948, see Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. iv, pp. 834–866, passim. See also Department of State Bulletin, May 23, 1948, pp. 679–683.
4. Yves Chatigneau was the French Ambassador in the Soviet Union.
5. For telegram 567 to Moscow on August 8, 1949, with instructions regarding lend-lease, see p. 721; and for telegram 552 to Moscow on August 3, with regard to the jamming of Voice of America programs, see infra.
6. Telegram 555 to Moscow on August 3, p. 640.
7. Robert C. Tucker had been an Attaché in the Embassy at Moscow, married to a citizen of the Soviet Union, who had been denied an exit visa by that government.