Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume V

711.61/3–349

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of European Affairs (Hickerson)

secret

[Washington,] March 25, 1949.

Subject: Retaliation for Soviet-Imposed Restrictions and Difficulties

Problem

Secretary Krug¹ at a recent Cabinet Meeting raised the question of possible retaliation for the treatment accorded this Government and its officials by the Soviet Union. It was agreed that the Department of State would thoroughly review this situation.²

Discussion

A fundamental obstacle in the way of any program of retaliation for the difficulties caused us by the Soviet Government lies in the differences in the forms of governments in the two countries. To retaliate fully and effectively, we would be obliged to institute controls of a totalitarian nature which, it is believed, would harm us more than it would the Soviet Union. For example, one of our greatest difficulties in the Soviet Union is that of obtaining adequate housing and similar facilities, all of which are controlled by the Soviet Government. We clearly lack means with which to cause similar difficulties to the Soviet Government in this country.

Another major obstacle in the way of retaliation for acts of the USSR is the fact that the Soviet Government would probably see to it that any practices adopted were not confined to the Soviet Union alone but would probably also extend to all satellite states. In nearly all the satellite countries, a program of retaliation would in many cases react to our disadvantage. In numbers of official personnel, for example, we are at a distinct disadvantage, since we now maintain in the satellite states missions many times larger than those states maintain in this country.

A third objection to a program of retaliation is the fact that it would end in either a break in diplomatic relations or at least the reduction of our operations in the Soviet Union and the satellite states to a very limited skeleton staff. Operating through the Communist Party, foreign nationality groups, fellow-travellers and even sympathetic Americans, the Soviets could carry out many of their objectives here in a manner which we would find impossible to block without jeopardizing our system of individual liberties. For example, in the field of propaganda one of the most vicious proponents of the Soviet thesis in the United States is a magazine which includes in its sponsors such people as the Honorable Joseph E. Davies.³

It should be noted that in many fields we are already using the weapon of retaliation. For example, we have successfully in many cases withheld the issuance of visas to Soviet and satellite nationals until we obtained visas to the Soviet Union which we particularly desired. We have found by experience that this is a game which to be successful must be played with considerable skill, and that a heavy-handed, blunt approach causes the Russians to feel that their national pride is involved and that they will go to almost any lengths rather than give in.

One method by which we can partially overcome the disadvantages of our lack of totalitarian controls is to apply restrictions on Soviet personnel in this country and to declare any officials violating them as persona non grata. We have for some time been holding in abeyance a plan to use this method in order to apply travel restrictions upon Soviet officials in this country.⁴ Our chief reason for not doing so is that while the Soviet Government has tightened its travel restrictions upon our people, it has in practice recently become more liberal in allowing both our civilian and military personnel to take trips in the Soviet Union. In this connection it should be noted that the Soviet Government is able to control travel of our personnel to a considerable extent by their control of transportation and hotel facilities even where no formal travel restrictions were in existence.

Memoranda discussing specific current difficulties with the Soviet Government are attached.⁵

Recommendation

It is recommended that we continue to deal with the question of retaliation for Soviet and satellite practices on an ad hoc basis, the determining factor in each case to be the net advantage or disadvantage to the United States.

1. Julius A. Krug was Secretary of the Department of the Interior.
2. On March 3, Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs Dean Husk requested the Director of the Office of European Affairs John D. Hickerson to have a problem paper drafted and coordinated with other areas of the Department. (711.61/3–349) This present memorandum was directed to Mr. Rusk and to the Under Secretary and Secretary of State. It appears to have been drafted by Llewellyn E. Thompson, Jr., the Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs.
3. Ambassador to the Soviet Union for part of the years 1937–1938.
4. A marginal notation at this point by Mr. Hickerson reads: “I have grave doubts about the wisdom of doing this. JDH”. In regard to the reimposition of travel restrictions by the Soviet Union in a note of September 30, 1948, and the consideration of the advisability of taking retaliatory measures by the United States, see Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. iv, pp. 921–937, passim.
5. These attachments are not printed. They were apparently prepared in the Division of Eastern European Affairs and were described by the Associate Chief of that Division, Robert G. Hooker, Jr., in a memorandum of March 14, 1949, as “brief statements of some of the difficulties encountered by United States Government representatives in the USSR, from which it will be clear that in all cases but one [travel restrictions] equivalent retaliation is not feasible for this Government, except at a wholly disproportionate cost, both in money and in our democratic principles.” (711.61/3–349) These statements summarized the difficulties being experienced with the travel restrictions, customs troubles, housing shortage, foreign exchange controls, and some miscellaneous matters.