760C.61/11–1749: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Kirk) to the Secretary of State
2860. Rokossovsky’s elevation to CC Polish Workers Party clearly goes further than original Polish request that he be made available “for service with Polish Army”. This development, together with other changes top Polish Communist leadership (Warsaw’s 1491 to Department November 151), reflects both Kremlin’s current attitude towards [Page 520] Poland which it will be remembered since 1795 formed an integral part of Russian empire, and Politburo’s fears of nationalist deviations in this strategic land bridge to central and Western Europe. Since Poles have always displayed intense feeling nationalism even when partitioned, whether under either Russian, German (Prussian) or Austrian sovereignty, regard Rokossovsky’s new appointments as corrective or precautionary in character, and, as analysed Warsaw’s excellent 1488 to Department November 14,2 probably connected future Soviet moves Germany.
Re specific moves Germany, Embassy still feels most likely possibilities requiring stronger hold on Poland are withdrawal occupation troops from Germany and alteration Oder-Neisse line, or combination both. As indicated Embtel 2794 November 8,3 do not believe either step likely just yet, though as in all western attempts estimate future Soviet actions, surprises are always possible. Withdrawal troops (on general model Korean experience) would appear to necessitate further prior development paramilitary “police” forces Soviet Zone. Likewise, would not expect Oder-Neisse “ace in hole” to be played out unless national front movements position in Germany, including western zones, had improved to extent that such frontier alteration might bring decisive results in battle for Germany. Relative timing these possible moves also obviously difficult to predict. Thus possible that Moscow might find it safer not to monkey with Poland’s western frontier unless Red Army troops still located Germany. On other hand, troop withdrawal and resulting pressure on Western powers do likewise might be expected to boost national liberation front, together with evident Moscow hopes of growing economic difficulties Western occupation powers, to point that Oder-Neisse ace could be played. In any case, cynical language used August 29 Soviet note to Belgrade re Yugoslav-Austrian claims (Embdes 505 September 34) re changes Polish frontiers resulting from World War II suggests manner in which Soviets might claim future changes in no way contradict “integrity” Polish state or Stalin’s nationality policy.
Sent Department 2860. Department pass Warsaw 104, Frankfort 79, Paris 404, London 313.
- Not printed. It reported that the Polish press had announced the results of a plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers’ Party, November 11–13. The principal result was the expulsion from the Central Committee of Wladyslaw Gomulka, former Secretary General of the Polish Workers’ Party until August 1948 and Polish Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Regained Territories until January 1949, Zenon Kliszko, former member of the Politburo of the Polish Workers’ Party until August 1948, and Marian Spychalski, member of the Politburo of the Polish United Workers’ Party and Minister of Reconstruction (860C.00B/11–1549).↩
- Ante, p. 516.↩
- Not printed. In it Ambassador Kirk suggested that the Rokossovskiy appointment was probably a precautionary move by the Soviet Union to assure continued control in Poland in view of some contemplated actions in East Germany which might endanger Polish submission. The most obvious possibility would be some alteration in the Oder-Neisse line between Poland and East Germany (760C.61/11–849).↩
- The despatch under reference here is not printed. Regarding the Soviet note of August 29 and the earlier exchanges between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia on the same subject, see telegram 2042, August 13, from Moscow, p. 922.↩