Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union, Volume V

711.4027/8–2249: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

secret

Washington, August 22, 1949—4 p. m.

2998. NSC 15/1 (Depcirins Jan 5, 1949¹) has been amended by addition new para 2(i) Recommendations as follows:

“In view of the breach between Tito and the Kremlin and the evidence at hand that Sov control of Yugo civil air operations has been eliminated, Yugo shld be exempted from the above restrictions so long as the present breach is maintained.”

Urgently so advise UK, and inform them that as result thereof, US proposes fol course action which it hopes UK will accept earliest possible:

(a) Exports aviation equipment to Yugo, including major overhaul wld be classified as 1A² and governed by established criteria aircraft between govts for processing such commodity requests.

(b) US believes that as long as relations Yugo and USSR family remain in present state of breach, and as long as no apparent Sov influence Yugo civil aviation, any non-curtain state that believes that polit and econ advantages outweighing on balance similar disadvantages inherent therein might result from exchange civil air rights with Yugo may appropriately exchange civil air rights with Yugo on reciprocal basis provided, however, that any such exchange be subj short term termination clause.

(c) US itself at present time perceives no danger US interests dealing with Yugo on such basis and proposes implement this new position on ad hoc basis as circumstances may indicate.

(d) However US fully appreciates certain countries will have own reasons not entering such agreements Yugo which may outweigh aspects of gain from pursuing relaxed policy in certain cases and affirms US position as not favoring exchange rights Yugo by any particular country unless balance all aspects exchanged indicate beneficial result to friendly state concerned.

Ask UK earliest accord this policy and indicate strong desire US and UK immed cabling instrs to action addresses Depcirins Jan 5 to notify immed govts to which accredited verbatim paras a to d above. Recommend discretion be given UK and US missions whether to make conjoint or separate approaches.

US proposes consider new policy in effect immed after US has notified like-minded govts.

Urgently cable UK reply.

Acheson

1. See editorial note, p. 184.
2. In the United States program for the security control of exports to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, the export of commodities designated 1–A was completely prohibited. See footnote 2 to telegram 96, January 19, from Bern, p. 65.