560.AL/7–849: Telegram
The Ambassador in France (Bruce) to the Secretary of State
2814. From Martin, Schockner and Campbell.
1. As instructed Deptel 2381, July 1, 1949, aide-mémoire re MFN [Page 701] treatment Japan presented Foreign Office July 2. In view previous French position (Embtel 1217, March 24, 19491), following paragraph substituted for last two paragraphs Department’s draft (Department’s instruction 330, June 24, 1949): “In view, therefore, of the agreed commercial policy objectives which our respective governments have helped to establish, the Government of the US strongly hopes that the French Government will be prepared to adhere to an agreement assuring, under appropriate safeguards, most-favored-nation treatment to Japan.”
2. Accompanied by Terrill and Cameron of Embassy,2 we discussed MFN agreement Japan with Baraduc and staff of Foreign Office on July 6. After exposition US point of view, French reaffirmed their acceptance in principle of MFN treatment Japan (Embtel 1217, March 24, 1949); however, stated their belief that negotiation MFN agreement premature at this time on view.
- a.
- Uncertainty development French relations Indochinese Government (later in discussion French mentioned possibility that Indochina might be excluded from such agreement);
- b.
- Need for exploratory review Japanese tariff, trading and general economic policy affecting trade;
- c.
- Failure to line up countries of real importance Japanese trade. French thought that most GATT countries should be signatory to agreement rather than only few countries and preferred to have matter discussed at next meeting contracting parties. We emphasized to French importance world opinion acceptance of MFN principle by country like France even though trade with Japan not large and impossibility ever making progress if unanimity always required before action taken.
- d.
- Present dissatisfaction with German MFN agreement and economic policy affecting German trading position. Emphasized, however, that if German agreement could be clarified, it would assist government greatly in accepting agreement for Japan. (Policy statement binding German rates for period of agreement may possibly meet this point.) We endeavored to reassure French on prospects successful solution German problem. French may use Japanese agreement as bargaining point in influencing US economic policy in Germany. (For example, French complained against selling coke to France at higher prices than sold locally in Germany.)
3. Copies of Appendix A without 60-day clause or last interpretive note left with French.3 Urged them to review agreement, discuss with Embassy any problems it raises, and investigate as fully as they think necessary Japanese trade policy with their representatives in Tokyo and possibly in Washington. Also urged that action be taken at highest level on aide-mémoire but only after full opportunity for us to discuss with them any further difficulties.
[Page 702]4. Believe French will go along if UK and Benelux agree to MFN Japan. Will suggest possibilities of continuing action after discussions in Brussels, Hague, London.
Sent Department; repeated USDel Annecy 4; Department pass Tokyo unnumbered. [Martin, Schockner, and Campbell.]