Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, National Security Affairs, Foreign Economic Policy, Volume I

560.AL/6–2949: Telegram

The Chairman of the United States Delegation (Willoughby) to the Secretary of State

confidential
priority

Annecy, June 29, 1949—5 p. m.

292. From Willoughby, Martin, Schockner and Campbell.¹

1. In discussion among ourselves purpose and tactics proposed meetings French, Belgian, UK and Dutch Governments on MFN for Japan attention given following recent developments:

a. Belgium in midst change of government. Hence impossible for some weeks to get policy reversal required to authorize negotiation of agreement. Pressure now apt to result in confirmation previous position as easiest way to dispose of problem.²

b. UK in midst of trade crisis leaving little time for Cabinet to reconsider position and strongly prejudicing any decision likely to affect adversely trade position any part of sterling bloc. Informal checks Board of Trade and Foreign Office officials by Martin indicated no disposition reconsider position seriously at this time.

c. Dutch about to start negotiations respect new government for NEI whose trade principally involved MFN principle and unlikely want to commit that new government on such matter in advance such negotiations.

d. From reaction Canadian delegation here exploratory talks held with Canadians did not soften Canadian opposition to MFN for Japan.

2. In light these factors question wisdom presentation aide-mémoires³ to Belgian and Dutch Governments. Moreover feeling here is that success unlikely without kind of pressure that can only come from personal talks between Secretary of State and respective ambassadors. Undesirable present unless appropriate and likely to be useful to follow through promptly and vigorously for Cabinet level decision on policy which will permit negotiation of agreements. Political decision at Cabinet level must precede negotiations of agreement. In all circumstances consider unwise to seek such decision now. Prospects of success along lines previously contemplated highly doubtful. Unfavorable Cabinet decisions at this time would make difficult another approach for six months to year. Question whether desirable press French if other action to be delayed.

3. Desirable to follow up removal from Annecy agenda. Schockner, Martin, Campbell visits might be made as scheduled with these purposes:

a. Make clear continuing interest US Government this problem.

b. Explore proper timing Cabinet review.

c. Discuss alternative forms of agreement, nature of escape clauses useful, etc.

Such discussions would be primarily with top civil servants, though ministerial level useful where possible without embarrassment. Do not propose that case be reargued in view Canadian experience and past discussions Geneva, etc., which have fully covered matter.

4. In UK would do as above and also express willingness postpone answer to aide-mémoire until more propitious time.

5. Insofar as Washington expected this delegation to negotiate agreements, believe under circumstances described in paragraph 1 this not practicable within any reasonable time period. In circumstances this mission⁴ does not carry necessary diplomatic stature to bludgeon through reversal of present policy positions these governments. Attempt to press for detailed negotiations in absence political decision at Cabinet level on central policy issue would do more harm than good. If you still desire to have aide-mémoires presented prior our visits, we would propose to do the following:

a. By our personal presence from Washington and Tokyo reemphasize importance US attaches this question.

b. Urge that answer to aide-mémoire receive full Cabinet review and not be handled in routine fashion.

c. Discuss concrete illustrations of kind of agreement we want and possible provisions to meet their problems, as agreement may look less formidable in concrete than in abstract.

6. Will continue discussions here with Annecy delegations in case can pick up any pointers and to indicate further our continuing interest.

7. Request delay presentation aide-mémoire at Paris, Hague and Brussels if not too late pending new instructions from Department. Please repeat messages this subject Willoughby at Annecy and Martin at Paris.

Sent Department 292, repeated Paris 22, London 27, The Hague 2, Brussels 2. Department pass Army. [Willoughby, Martin, Schockner, and Campbell.]

Willoughby

1. Carl C. Campbell, SCAP expert on Japanese commerce and trading practices, arrived at Annecy from Washington on June 28. It is presumed that Campbell carried with him the draft agreement for most-favored-nation treatment for Japan that is mentioned in several documents beginning with this telegram. The draft has not been found in either the central indexed files of the Department of State or in the Annecy Conference lot file (57D284). It is known that the draft agreement was still being cleared in the Department on June 24; it was available at Annecy on June 29.
2. Several telegrams from Brussels, none printed, had emphasized the problem arising from the change of government then taking place in Belgium, especially telegram 919, June 28, noon (560.AL/6–2849).
3. Drafts had been sent from Washington under instructions dated June 24.
4. That is, the U.S. Delegation at Annecy.