Policy Planning Staff Files
Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Webb)
Members of Atomic Working Group:
- Mr. Nitze
- Mr. Fisher
- Mr. Arneson
In a discussion on November 30 between the Secretary and Mr. Lilienthal, the problem of how to implement the President’s assignment of work to the NSC subcommittee was raised. Secretary Acheson expressed the view that the working group and the NSC subcommittee probably should not direct its efforts toward the ultimate moral question [Page 600] at this time but should express as much fact and analysis as possible along the following lines:
- (1)
- That the destructive force of the “super” is limited only by the capacity of the carrier—that if the maximum carriage of a B–36 is involved a certain area is affected. Same data for ship and for submarines.
- (2)
- That when we start to build our plants this will be known and will have effects here and abroad. What will these be?
- (3)
- That we should spell out the effect on other programs of the Government which will be caused by a decision to go ahead. Will other expenditures have to be reduced? Can they be reduced? Will they have to be expanded? Can they be expanded?
- (4)
- If we succeed in making the “super”, what strategic use can we make of it. Example: against troops? against military installations? How many targets really require this quantity of destructive force? What bearing does it have on the command of the air, as, for example, ability to wipe out air fields and such installations? Generally, what can the soldiers do with it?
- (5)
- What are the problems of use as effected by retaliation? If both sides have it, will either use it?
- (6)
- A variety of situations should be considered. What would our problem be if we have it and others do not? What would the situation be if others have it and we do not? If both we and the Russians have it?
- (7)
- Another type of subject which should be explored is the effect on the Russians of going forward with the project; also the effect of not going forward. The same for other people.
- (8)
- When we come to conclusions, it would be necessary to weigh out and evaluate the various factors. (Somewhere, we should make a review of what we have said about not using atomic weapons and about controls. At the same time, review what has been said by the military with respect to its plans to use the weapon.) In the conclusions, we should balance the results of this program against other uses of the facilities and money. We should examine the moral questions involved. We should study carefully all factors which might seem to link this decision with the program for international control and should probably attempt to keep the two completely separate. We should examine all phases of the question of whether, in connection with this decision and using it as a possible platform, we might expect to have effective talks with the Russians looking towards some modus vivendi that would stabilize world conditions. We must consider also whether we could catch up if we don’t go forward now but discover that other countries have gone forward and made progress.
I believe that the Secretary thinks the military position will probably be that it cannot afford to take any risk of finding itself without this weapon if others have it. I believe, also, he is troubled about the possibility that a decision to go ahead would be interpreted all over the world as a decision that war is inevitable and that we have reached this decision, with all its implications and effects on all types of future decisions.