393.1115/11–3048: Telegram
The Consul General at Shanghai (Cabot) to the Secretary of State
[Received November 30—11:50 a.m.]
2580. Questions of priority re my 2529, November 26 and 2489, November 22 are being more insistently raised every day among American business community here. I must therefore again respectfully request [Page 901] Department to instruct me as to what I may say when inquiries are made of me re individuals who must reach decisions re their personal plans. Local head of Caltex has today called to ask whether Caltex American representatives in Tientsin will get any special consideration in last-minute evacuation or repatriation subsequent to anticipated Communist takeover. Standard Oil has evacuated all foreigners out of Tientsin, leaving Chinese in charge.
Majority opinion among American business leaders here is that Communists cannot be counted upon to adopt policy permitting them freedom of movement or of continued business operations but instead will sooner or later expropriate or strangle their business. They are, therefore, loath to take risk to stay behind to protect capital investment unless they have some assurance from US authorities. Without such assurances a number of enterprises may decide to move out even if they must abandon property. Typical is willingness of Shanghai Power Company officials to abandon entire enterprise unless assured full protection since they believe plants will be unable to get fuel and therefore to operate in any case. Most businessmen consider themselves already slaves of their employees and see little hope of carrying on business, meeting payrolls, et cetera, since they expect to be cut off from home remittances, raw materials, supplies, et cetera, and doubt Communists will have many exports to offer or much exchange for purchases in US. Most businessmen, in view of our program to aid Nationalists and widespread talk of increasing it, stories of reviving American Volunteer Group, et cetera, see dim possibility Communists permitting them continue in business on any basis. This viewpoint strengthened by reports home offices oil companies already approached by Department re possibility embargo on oil shipments any Communist areas China. Net result is many American businessmen see themselves left behind in China as virtual hostages of Communists at considerable personal risk with little prospect gain themselves.
US Chamber of Commerce already understood preparing list so-called essential business community to remain behind if we prepared to offer suitable guarantees of protection or evacuation if situation deteriorates to point where that proves necessary. Such guarantees as they see them should include armed intervention to assure their safe evacuation.
Only other alternative as they see it today is to get out with their families. Americans do not consider themselves in same position as other foreign nationals as result of our aid to Nationalists. Assurance US Consulates will be maintained not sufficient since they feel ConGen personnel may have some official immunity. Many unwilling face such situation in light 1941 experience. They consider situation not essentially different today even though US not now at war and feel any [Page 902] financial sacrifice worth making to avoid possible detention for long period. Unrest expected to accompany or follow turnover this area relatively unimportant consideration.
I fully appreciate Department unable to give any strong guarantees at this time. Nevertheless, I feel attitude these businessmen by no means wholly unreasonable. Considering our extensive aid to Nationalists, increasing tension between Communists and non-Communists throughout world and fact that we have no Communist Chinese or interests in US against whom we might retaliate if Chinese Communists should decide to use Americans and American interests in this area as hostages to accomplish any political aims, these business leaders may well be right.
With regard to possibility of doing business after Communists take over, I am hopeful Communists will pursue moderate lines at least for while and will encourage foreign business to continue operations but businessmen would again appear right in noting practical obstacles to such continuance. It may also be pointed out that Communists are not likely for long to tolerate work of American educators in China and that in view of Communist attitude toward religion and obsession re spies, American missionaries may well soon find themselves squeezed out.
It is apparent that our hand would be strengthened in persuading dependents of missionaries to leave exposed areas if the head officers of the principal mission boards in New York were better informed as to hazards involved for dependents who remain here. Mission secretaries in New York in certain instances have criticized unjustly local mission representatives who have supported evacuation program for dependents. It is recommended Department consider advisability of passing on to a suitable mission liaison man at frequent intervals latest available information on situation in China as it bears on evacuation matters and that for all the Protestant mission groups, Wynn Fairfield, Secretary of Foreign Missions Conference, New York, might be an appropriate channel of communication. It is understood a similar procedure was successfully used in 1940 and 1941 for keeping principal mission groups currently informed on political and military situation as it affected their field missionaries. Consulate General is stressing evacuation of dependents but is not encouraging departure of key mission representatives.
I reiterate problem is to persuade those who should go to do so and do what we can to induce those in key positions to stay. There is real danger of many cases arising in which key people will go because of bitter experiences in 1941 and now [non]essential people belittling risks since they have had no bitter lessons will remain to weaken our hand in any dealings we may have with Communists as well as complicate by numbers any emergency evacuation.
[Page 903]Giving all of above consideration, I feel we should (1) assure byname certain people in key positions who expressly request last minute evacuation we will do everything in our power to provide them with such last-minute evacuation, (2) give general oral assurances through leaders of community that in making any arrangement for subsequent repatriation those key persons who have remained behind will enjoy priority over individuals who remained for purely personal reasons. As I have mentioned, this will both help to reassure key individuals and to induce an early evacuation of others. In protecting our interests in Shanghai area we must confront necessary risks involved both political and personal with realism and steadfastness but I feel we must also prudently try to cut unnecessary risks to a minimum.
Sent Department; repeated Nanking 1946.