893.24/10–2548
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State
Dr. Wang had lunch with me today and remained about an hour afterwards talking about the general situation.
He made a special appeal for the United States not to issue a public warning to Americans in North China to withdraw, stating that this would have a devastating effect on public opinion. He assured me that his people would give ample warning of the real danger. I told him I had been advised that Dr. Stuart had withheld such an announcement in response to the Generalissimo’s request.28
Dr. Wang expressed special concern over the problem of the withdrawal of American troops from Korea. He referred to the conversations his people had had with our representatives here. I told him that we were well aware of the dangers and were not inclined to evacuate Southern Korea if it was apparent that the Communist movement from the North threatened to overwhelm the Southern Korean Government. He talked at considerable length regarding this problem.
In a very mild or rather embarrassed manner he asked me if he could inform the Generalissimo that our Government would support China with both military and economic aid. I asked him what he meant by “military aid”. He said that he meant “principally” matériel. I then discussed at considerable length and with great frankness the United States position in the matter,—that we could not involve the Government and the American people with a responsibility probably vast and long-continuing, particularly when the authority with which to despatch that responsibility would be completely lacking. I stated that so long as inefficient or corrupt officials were in places of high responsibility there could be no assurance of recovery, and that the only way this weakness apparently could be overcome would be literally for the United States to take over the [Page 184] Government of China, which, of course, was utterly out of the question from every point of view, particularly the Chinese. I recited” my own experiences, with which Dr. Wang was familiar and with which he took no exception. I stated that when I was in China I secured favorable American action on many things of great importance to the recovery of China, that, in effect, I obtained what I could from our Government, having almost solely in mind the recovery of China. I failed to secure a beneficial result. Now my responsibility was to protect the interests of the United States Government which put me in quite a different position from that I occupied in China.
We did not discuss the currency situation because I told Dr. Wang I did not care to do that without the presence of the currency experts, in which he acquiesced.
Before he left he again voiced the hope that the United States could give military assistance to China. Incidentally, Dr. Wang” discussed the ineptitude of certain officials, notably the Chief of Staff. He also referred to the efficiency of General Fu in command of North China.
(In order that the foregoing may be better understood, I should state here, and most confidentially, that Dr. Wang in China was my principal supporter and privately and frequently strongly advocated the continuance of my effort there along the lines I was then following. This was not at all in accord with the political advice and military advice the Generalissimo was receiving from his officials, but was very reassuring to me. Naturally, I had to be very silent on this point, because any publicity would be the ruination of Dr. Wang.)