893.00/11–348: Telegram
The Consul General at Peiping (Clubb) to the Secretary of State
[Received November 4—5:11 a. m.]
426. ReContel 421, November 2.31 In conversation yesterday Vice Minister of Information Tao Hsi-sheng indicated it was necessary for maintenance political entity Central Government [to] defend four strategic areas North China northwest and west (from Hsiangyang, north Hupeh, west) and region between Huai and Yangtze (that is from Hsuchow south). He said Gimo had shown increased support Fu Tso-yi by making him primarily responsible for North China and changing Peiping garrison to Chen Chi-cheng. Fu would be now chief authority this area, Ningsia chairman, Ma Hung-kuei, would be given authority in northwest (with his authority still apparently limited [Page 539] to Ningsia), Pai Chung-hsi responsibility for west China, while Huai River sector would be under direct control Nanking. Tao expressed confidence ability Fu maintain stability North China, indicated Fu would be supplied with munitions (but was unspecific this regard) but said matter of arming militia, although frequently discussed National Defense Ministry this year, was still undecided (note Suiyuan representatives in previous petition to Gimo reputedly requested arms for 100,000 additional Suiyuan troops and three cavalry regiments). Tao admitted, however, that fall Taiyuan would seriously endanger position Fu inasmuch as invasion northern plain in history frequently occurred after loss Shansi massif. Tao, surprisingly enough, indicated belief that weakest of four areas in question was west China: He said loss Nanyang (south Honan) had historically, generally, proven important for defense Hsiangyang and that when Hsuangyang fell Suchang, gateway to downriver area including Nanking, would be endangered. Tao showed full appreciation of present deteriorated state military morale and suggested that if offensive could be mounted within 2 months from west China and Huai River sector success would stimulate political morale of Nationalists located at strategic points, whereas, if contrariwise, Nationalists remained inactive, morale can be expected to decline further still. Tao, who is economist, likewise showed full appreciation significance economic factors for overall political and military situation. He seemed especially interested in American reaction to Gimo’s reply to Tribune correspondent Steele32 which ended expression hope American people and their statesmen would assume to themselves responsibility for salvation of Asia, of which crux of problem was China. Understand Tao was in large part responsible for drafting Gimo’s reply.
Sent Department 426, repeated Nanking 627, and Tientsin.