893.00/7–3048
The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State
[Received August 12.]
Sir: I have the honor to comment on possible solutions for the Communist problem in China, more especially from the standpoint of the welfare of the Chinese people.
It seems now more apparent than ever that neither side can secure a decisive military victory. Even though the Central Government should collapse or disintegrate into regional units, there is enough anti-Communist sentiment to keep large areas at least in long-continued turmoil. Nor is it probable that the Communists themselves are eager to take over the administration of this huge country in the near future. As they insisted when you were here, the Chinese people are not prepared as yet for Communism nor do they have enough trained personnel for the task.
The whole nation is anxious for peace at almost any price. Among the more politically conscious there is not much to choose between the two parties, for among a rapidly increasing number the Kmt seems more selfish, corrupt and incompetent. Granted that this is in part the natural dissatisfaction with the party in power, there is no lack of evidence in support of their contention. The mood of despondency [Page 389] or discontent is penetrating steadily into all circles of the Government and the troops. The indomitable will-power of President Chiang and such measure of aid as we have already given or they look forward to hereafter are perhaps the principal factors in keeping up the struggle.
The basic issue is economic—or more broadly one of human welfare—rather than political. This has of course always been true of the masses. It is becoming more true of the intellectuals, including the students. It is probably more of a concern to the Communist leaders than is generally assumed. They are doubtless aware that forcible redistribution of farming land is not enough and that there must be increased industrialization and mechanization even in agriculture. They are already changing their tactics in an effort to win the local merchants and small-scale factory owners and even the capitalist and industrialists in the big cities.
Assuming that before very long the pressure for some form of negotiated peace becomes too strong to resist, what from the standpoint of a reasonably intelligent and patriotic Chinese would be the best—or the least undesirable—solution? There seem to be only two possible ones. For the idea of political parties, each with full rights and privileges, is one that the Communists could scarcely be expected under existing conditions to consider. There remain therefore a coalition, or a territorial division with some symbol of national unity. Quite possibly the actual result will be a fusion of the two. If one of these agreed-upon settlements is the only alternative to interminable political confusion and economic misery would it not be preferable—again from the standpoint of the typical Chinese citizen—to accomplish this without delay?
The Communists are supposed to wish to continue the conflict since they are winning and can be expected to secure a greater advantage in the final settlement. But even they must be disturbed over the problems of rehabilitation and the odium they will incur in proportion as they assume control and find themselves in turn unable to give a better livelihood. The present leaders of the Government have no reliance except on us now and in the future. In view of a possible change in our own Administration it would seem desirable to adapt our China policy to these latest developments so as to maintain a maximum of continuity.
We can be quite certain that no amount of military advice or materiel from us will bring unity and peace to China unless indeed there are reforms sufficiently drastic to win back popular confidence and esteem. That these could even be attempted by those now in power or that the improvements could be rapid and radical enough to reverse the prevailing attitude is scarcely to be hoped for. But without [Page 390] this assurance the intention to give increased military aid ought to be carefully considered in all its implications. Even under the most hopeful conditions such aid would probably require some two years or more from next January to accomplish its objective in view of the basic necessity of training new divisions and of recovering lost territory and morale.
Whatever our present opinion about a coalition government may be, would it not be the part of foresighted statemanship to be considering the advisability of extending military and economic aid to the new government on terms that would tend to obviate the dangers we fear in a Communist coalition? The military aid would naturally follow the pattern of the original P. C. C. proposals and include the reorganization and demobilization of all the armed forces without which there can be no hope of political stability nor economic recovery. The economic aid would include reconstruction projects which with peace achieved could largely be on a loan basis. If the present Rural Reconstruction Program21 develops as fruitfully as many of us hope it will, it would be another form of economic benefit reinforced by training for citizenship and other educational values. We might impose conditions such as those already guaranteed in the existing Constitution regarding free speech, free elections, etc., and carry on a vigorous publicity campaign, all aimed at neutralizing Communist attempts at minority control. The ultimate solution might well be independent political parties contesting by democratic processes for their respective policies.
The substance of all this argument is that if we Americans wish to continue to have an active part in influencing the course of Chinese political development this could be either one of the two rather sharply contrasted alternatives of perpetuating the present Government through increased military assistance hoping that this will produce the needed reforms, or assisting whatever national government or loosely federated regional ones may emerge from the present conflict by reconstructive processes calculated to produce economic betterment together with consequent contentment and more normal mental attitudes.
Respectfully yours,