893.00/6–1048: Telegram
The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State
[Received June 10—11:08 a. m.]
1056. Given the consternation with which the Chinese Govt received information of our intention to warn Americans in China of deteriorating [Page 289] military situation and our resulting belief that those who were not prepared to remain under Communist controls could consider evacuation while normal communication facilities exist,14 it occurred to us that we might use this situation to prod Chinese Govt into taking measures necessary to improve military situation in North China. We feel that our responsibility to the US as a whole to support National Govt outweighed our responsibility to warn individual Americans where we felt our warning, in any case, was unlikely to be heeded.
Accordingly on June 5 I called on Generalissimo and told him of our concern over deteriorating military situation in North China and of our determination to advise our nationals to withdraw from that area. Knowing, however, that Chinese Govt was opposed to such a move on our part as gravely detrimental to national morale, I said I hesitated to take that step without first consulting with him. If he could convince me that he was prepared to take the measures which my military advisors had informed me were necessary and possible to stabilize the military situation in the north, then I was prepared, I said, to defer issuing the warning. Chiang immediately expressed his complete willingness to accept our military advice to the fullest extent, saying that he would give complete authority to American planning and supervision and would authorize planner to assign personnel where necessary to see that their directives were carried out. He inquired what I would recommend. I reminded him of restrictions in AAG directives and our reluctance to assume responsibilities not properly ours. He indicated awareness of this problem and asked whether our policy in this respect might not be reconsidered. I replied that it seemed axiomatic that whatever the chances of reconsideration might be, they would be increased if there were more evidence that advice now being given was being acted on.
He then asked for concrete suggestions in military sphere. I said that as president he should delegate routine direction of military operations to Minister of National Defense in close association with General Barr and that they should report to him on all major issues. I also suggested that autonomous and independent commands should be established for various theaters of operations, in order to rationalize and regularize command channels and organization, these commands to be directed and controlled by supreme headquarters. Chiang concurred with both suggestions and agreed to consider naming supreme commander having full authority over North China and Manchuria.
On June 6 Philip Fugh15 called on Chiang, who reiterated his [Page 290] desire to have American advice, particularly on military matters. He stated his awareness that present situation of his Govt is very serious; that he was still trying to do his best for the country, but feels himself to be aging, without old nerve and fears he is accomplishing little. He expressed his desire to work closely with America, and, without saying directly, implied that such policy was opposed by influential elements within the Govt. He concluded interview by stating that he had his own reasons for having American relations kept as direct and confidential as possible.
From the above, and other interviews with Chiang which we have reported, the principal facts that emerge are Chiang’s unalterable determination to maintain firm stand against Communism, his recognition of his inability to do so without our assistance and his willingness to accept not only our aid, but our advice and direction as well. It is our belief that he is wholly sincere in these attitudes and that he is experiencing great difficulties from groups within the Govt which advocate an end to the civil war at any cost, and so oppose continued cooperation with the US. We have reported the extent, of this sentiment and the fact of its existence in influential quarters. While occasioned to some extent by war weariness, it is undoubtedly true that this sentiment stems mainly from the belief that the Govt’s cause is a lost cause, and that we lack either the intention of [or] the capability to provide the Govt with the quantity and quality of aid necessary for its survival.
Although we have no detailed knowledge on this subject, there are many indications that those advocating peace, and coalition with the Communists, have well developed plans for the removal of the Generalissimo and the end of the civil war by negotiation. While we are not saying that this threat is imminent, we are convinced of its existence. Should such an attempt be made and be successful, it would almost certainly result in return to regional autonomy at the expense of the stability of the present Govt, and would likely hasten the completion of Communist control over the entire country. In this situation, we are convinced that unless we are prepared to accept considerable expansion of Communist influence in China in near future with prospect of entire country eventually under Communist control, we must provide Chiang with character of support which he, by his own admission, requires. We are fully aware that the resources of the US are limited and that we have commitments elsewhere, and we are aware of the dangers of such action, yet we feel that we would be derelict in our duty if we did not point out the alternatives.
See also our 1044, June 9.