893.00/1–948: Telegram
The Vice Consul at Changchun (Siebens) to the Secretary of State
[Received January 14—12:06 a. m.]
3. Military situation Changchun–Kirin area remains calm. General Li Hung, commanding officer new 7th Army defending Changchun, informed Assistant Military Attaché yesterday not more than 10,000 Communist troops within 50 mile radius city.
However, on night December 3 one small band Communists took advantage absence 38th Division, mainstay Changchun defense which then engaged in covering eastern flank Nationalist forces proceeding Mukden area (reContel December 26, 2 p. m. [noon]40) to raid southeast suburb Changchun beyond outer defense perimeter and there demolished two police stations, captured and killed several police, opened grain shops to depredations poor, and raided and attempted set fire cigarette factory. Lawlessness sparked by thin raid has resulted in separate small mob actions past few days in area outside defense perimeter and two within city limits. Grain shops, incoming rail and fuel carts, and buildings which can be destroyed for fire wood [were] targets these actions though stringent action may prove remedy, increasingly critical economic situation plus departure substantial elements army from city might render it difficult for authorities here prevent spread this type activity. Police force of 2,500 gross is underpaid and of doubtful loyalty.
In countryside surrounding Changchun bandit groups on horseback becoming increasingly active and weighty factor keeping roads closed in absence large Communist forces in area. Leadership these groups reputedly centered in wealth elements disposed by Communists. Two French Catholic Fathers arrived Changchun December 29 from parish about 20 miles northeast Changchun reporting their village stripped December 25 by consolidated group 30 bandit bands totaling between 800 and 900 men. Fathers lost almost everything including shoes. Banditry apparently snowballing in area not completely controlled by Communists as members victimized villages join bandits for raids on other villages. Bands usually well armed with small arms and few hand grenades, well mounted, and avoid conflict with Communists, who reputedly hunt them down ruthlessly when time permits. Certain proportion bands consists deserted soldiers both sides.
No amelioration food and fuel shortage here. Estimated half population now eating indigestible dry beans and bean cake. Government competing for latter to use as fuel very small scale operation [Page 23] local thermal electric plant serving vital military needs and selected grain mills. Though prices here generally at least half those Mukden recently, widespread and increasing unemployment caused by closed communications, and absence sources fuel and electricity, and retrenchment Government civil organs plus inability most Government organs meet payrolls due lack incoming cash placing commodities beyond reach many. Though food supplies in city plus limited incoming grain adequate at least for winter, authorities thus far unsuccessful in effecting adequate distribution.
Korean (approximately 1,500) and Japanese (approximately 1,000) minority groups at bottom of ladder suffering and destitute.
Railway guards here yesterday ordered integrated with army. Preparations for street fighting resumed with fortification railway station and other points.
Above described situation and rumors apparently unfounded that elements Communist forces Mukden area proceeding northward creating atmosphere increasing disquiet here.
Evidence here continues indicate Nationalist intent hold Kirin-Changchun for present (reContel December 22, 3 p. m.41). Best of troops at Kirin which reputed scheduled proceed Mukden (re Mukden situation report December 3142) and which would presumably come through or near Changchun as yet not seen and local commanders profess ignorance move to weaken Kirin, which would be tantamount to gift to Communists. However, such move requires time and it remains possible Nationalists intend evacuate best troops and equipment at Kirin.
With Communist whittling of Nationalist position Manchuria to its core and desirable targets increasingly restricted to relatively well defended areas, war Manchuria entering new phase for Communists in which progress may become more difficult. Total Communist strength Manchuria estimated by Assistant Military Attaché 350,000, of which approximately 225,000 well experienced. Total Nationalist strength Manchuria estimated by Assistant Military Attaché at 250,000, of which 40,000 veterans Burma campaign, 120,000 others relatively good troops by virtue equipment, and balance poor due inadequate training and equipment.
As indicated Contel November 25, 3 p. m43 Nationalist position and tactics Manchuria facilitating impressive Communist cross-country raids and occasional concentration forces certain points has tended make them appear stronger than they are. Communists not exempt from logistic and loyalty problems, especially if losses mount, and [Page 24] occasional errors judgment. Concentration their forces becoming Necessary for ultimate victory Manchuria should create circumstances in which superior Nationalist fire power effective and especially with onset warmer weather Nationalist air force more telling factor. Indications are air force not used within maximum limitations in past except in critical defensive situations. Overall Nationalist air resources and commitments unknown this office, but believe that, in spite difficulties suggested Contel December 22, 3 p. m. when warmer weather permits Mukden become major operational air base air force should still be able make substantial contribution aggravation Communist problems, especially view short distances involved, and possibly circumstances forcing Nationalists realize this and will inspire commensurate air effort their part.
At best these factors would only retard progress retrogression Nationalist position Manchuria, tempo of which now being set by logistic and economic difficulties created by Communists and potentialities spectacular Nationalist debacle in northeast still exist, especially in view precarious morale factor and apparent impossibility Nationalists muster permanent reinforcements.
Weight economic factor in forcing ultimate Nationalist withdrawal Manchuria difficult assess. Army presumably could enforce existence largely apart from population but political effects such procedure serious. Maintenance overland communications Mukden area with Liaotung gulf ports or on Peiping–Mukden railway essential this respect as resources China proper dominant need such project, and these communications now major Communist targets.
Situation Changchun–Kirin remains substantially as described Contel [December] 22, 3 p. m. Changchun still in position offer substantial resistance to Communist attack if air support given. Unless Nationalists return strong forces to Ssuping, only method rapid reinforcement would be by air. Mukden telegram December 31 (relayed by Department January 2, noon) indicates Nationalist thinking perhaps placing preservation forces above desire hold Kirin–Changchun, and in face difficulties or added pressure to south crack 38th Division might be evacuated. This would be tip-off re Nationalist intent abandon Changchun. Feel, however, that at present Nationalists would abandon Changchun with great reluctance and only under pressure, real or fancied.
Re Nationalist withdrawal majority force Ssuping, believe that even if that point not reinforced soon, Communists will not be able profit from east-west railroad, so long as Nationalists hold Mukden as road extremely vulnerable and now wrecked from Liaoyuan to Hsian.