893.00/3–2248
The Ambassador in China (Stuart) to the Secretary of State
[Received March 31.]
Sir: I have the honor to report some of the most recent Chinese political developments.
Perhaps of primary interest to you will be the most intimate revelation I have yet had of the Generalissimo’s thinking. He had no illusions as to the rapid military deterioration and its attendant problems. In fact he summed the situation up in the phrase, “Since peace is unattainable and war is unsuccessful, what can be done?” He commented on his perplexity over your attitude to American aid for China as reflected in the press reports, but said that from his association with you here and all that he had observed of your character and aims he was convinced that your intentions were friendly and constructive. I of course assured him that this was entirely correct and explained again what I understand to be your position consistently held from the time you left China. He admitted that he had failed to take your advice but found a certain satisfaction in having been proven right in his belief that compromise or cooperation with the Communists is impossible.
He said that he really wanted to reform but did not know how to go about it. He asked me to help him without hesitation. It happens that I had been aware of some suggestions of this nature drafted by a few Chinese close to him. Some of these are matters which I have myself advocated on various occasions. I am enclosing a rough translation41 for your reference. They quite understandably shrink from presenting this to him. But when they will have done so I can follow along with similar ideas if he continues to be receptive.
If or when the China Aid program will have been approved by Congress I shall have specific suggestions more or less based on its terms. I am still strongly of the opinion that what they need primarily from us is advice with enough material assistance to supplement their own efforts to carry out the advice. What General Barr is already [Page 164] discovering and accomplishing is a confirmation of this opinion in military affairs, and the same will doubtless hold equally true throughout.
The Gimo raised the question of a Sino-American Anti-Communist pact which I did not encourage. In any case it gives insight into his present state of mind.
As to the coming National Assembly he feels that despite all the difficulties it should be held on the date already fixed. His election as President is treated as a foregone conclusion, but he is not entirely sure that this is best for the country. Others, especially in the Political Science Clique, have been quietly discussing his becoming Premier. His popularity has never been so low throughout the country, and now even in the Government and Party. But no one is able to suggest any one else who can compare with him in strength. General Barr would like to have him less active in military matters, giving his time to broad issues of national policy and general administration while leaving operational details to a competent Chief-of-Staff. He seems undecided as to the choice of Vice President, seeing the objections to other candidates, but observing that Americans in their admiration for Li Tsung-jen do not know everything about him.
These and other details concerned with political, economic and military trends we of the Embassy are endeavoring faithfully to report. But with the prospect of American Aid becoming more probable I should like once more to express my confidence that, wisely conceived and carried out, this can go far toward accomplishing all that we desire. The friendliness toward our country and their trust in our intentions are almost universal and very deep. The occasional waves of anti-American sentiment are due to ephemeral causes and can easily evaporate. Even among Communists this is a deliberately incited party weapon. The great majority of Chinese of all classes do not want their country to be communized and I get the impression that the brutal methods currently employed in the areas where Communist forces are now operating are intensifying this hostility. The Government leaders are at last beginning to realize that their methods for combatting Communism have been ineffective, that both in military operations and in popular support they are losing steadily. They cannot win the war without winning the people. They are therefore humbled and frightened and more ready to respond to practical advice. American Aid may well prove to be the catalyst that will restore hope and self-confidence to the leaders while improving popular morale. There are constant attempts even now at progressive reforms which are perhaps chiefly valuable as indicating a new awareness of their necessity. There are also movements among intellectuals or non-partisan liberals not as yet articulate nor representing any [Page 165] cohesive or substantial volume of public opinion but prophetic of what may be expected with further encouragement. The Gimo embodies in his own personality many of these stirrings and latent potencies, as well as the inhibitions to their realization. I remember your remarking once or twice to me that he always seemed to do the right thing too late. It may be almost too late now but perhaps not quite. At any rate for all the reasons mentioned above I continue to feel a tempered optimism and am watching the reports of action by Congress with eager interest. What may be happening soon in China has a significance far beyond the resistance to Communism as a global problem. We are helping this vast, amorphous population to adjust itself to modern conditions after the shattering of its ancient political and social patterns and the series of internal and external disorders which have so seriously hindered the transition. They have a great heritage and are in no sense a decadent race. Many among them are of the finest human quality and as a people they have enormous potentialities. They need understanding sympathy and firm but kindly guidance almost more than material assistance. The triple effort of the Government attempting improvements, the intellectuals at last becoming more coherent and concerned, and American advisory personnel, with money or equipment largely supervised by us in its use, may reverse the present trend. Once that begins the recovery ought to be fairly rapid. All of this may read like repetitious platitudes. But with the indications of American Aid coming at a time when the outlook seems all but hopeless I am reviewing my own ideas with the result that I have a sense of exhilarating expectancy despite all the questionable obstructions and uncertainties. In any case I shall do my utmost to help the program to succeed whenever your instructions arrive.
Respectfully yours,
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