Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Far East: China, Volume VII

893.00/3–1848

The Minister-Counselor of Embassy in China (Clark) to the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth)

Nanking, March 18, 1948.

Dear Walt: At the time our last letter³⁹ was written, the Generalissimo had secluded himself at Ruling for a winter vacation. His absence from the helm of the ship of state lasted more than three weeks, and through this period he saw no one of consequence in his government. As may be imagined, this excursion in ergophobia gave rise to the wildest rumors, not the least sensational of which was that he had become convinced of his incompetency in governing, and so was selecting his successor. However, better informed and more knowledgeable persons agreed that he had retired to consult with himself as to what measures might be effective in the present exigency, and that on his return to the capital he either would or would not promulgate radical changes in policy. If the latter were true, it was held this could be taken as an indication that the Generalissimo is satisfied that his present policies are adequate to the task at hand.

Over two weeks have elapsed since the Generalissimo’s return. In this period he has made no notable policy statements, nor have we any indication that any are contemplated. He has exhorted his officials to improve and purify their administration of public affairs, and he has informed the nation of the government’s intention to defend Manchuria come what may, but he has in no wise indicated that he has any new solution for the tasks confronting him. If this be so, and we are of the belief that it is so, we take it as an indication that the Government has no new solution, and so we can see no reason to hope for a halt in the processes of decay and disintegration which have characterized the China scene these past several years.

We have not noted, since our last letter, any particularly spectacular examples of further disintegration in the Government’s over-all position. However, the decline continues, and there is little doubt but what the Government will soon be faced with new crises. What is, perhaps, the salient characteristic of the Government’s present situation is the fact while certain of its leaders have excellent and feasible plans for solving certain specific problems, there does not exist in the Government a complete and dynamic leadership to integrate such plans, implement them and carry them out. For example, Gen. Wei Li-huang, the Government commander in Manchuria, has an adequate plan for the continued defense of the Mukden area, yet the Government shows no signs of meeting Wei’s fairly modest requirements. At the same time, Manchurian leaders have advised the Government that much support could be won from the Communists in the Northeast if the people of Manchuria were given more responsibility and authority in the management of their own affairs, under their own leaders. By way of reply, the Government offered honorary titles to the Manchurian leaders, announced its intention to hold Manchuria at all costs, and seemingly paid no heed to this advice. Similar examples of the attitude of the Government to the problems of China proper could be cited at great length, an attitude expressed in a policy of passive resignation to the many vicissitudes confronting it.

As we have reported before, the people of China, both officials and ordinary citizens regard with increasing disfavor this government which does not govern, or at most governs through inertia. Bitter criticism of its leadership is commonly expressed. The Generalissimo, once regarded as the unfortunate victim of incompetent advisors, is now viewed as personally responsible for his country’s ills and feeling runs strong that any great prolongation of his leadership must certainly involve the entire country in ruin. In this situation many officials, particularly those outside the capital, believe that the time has come when they must look to their own interests as a matter of self-preservation, and are so proceeding to develop a direct and personal control in the regions where they are assigned. We have been informed that Dr. T. V. Soong now seeks to increase his military resources in Kwangtung, and to integrate Hunan, Kwangsi, Kiangsi, and Fukien into his province. In Hopei and Chahar there is some evidence to suggest that Gen. Fu Tso-yi may already have attained some degree of independence from Nanking control in the military sphere. Likewise, the Muhammadan leaders in Ninghsia show signs of questioning the authority of the Central Government, and in Shantung the provincial governor, Gen. Wang Yao-wu, has been openly critical of Government policies and has evinced a desire to seek American aid on a semi-independent basis. From these and similar indications, we conclude that local leaders in several parts of the country are, from lack of faith in the Central Government to continue to perform its functions, beginning to exhibit particularistic tendencies.

Besides this new growth of regionalism, we note, as we have reported, that the Government’s ineptitude, particularly as regards the prosecution of the civil war, has brought some officials to consider the advisability of a mediated settlement with the Communists. Despite official Government denials, through its recent military attaché, Gen. Roschin, the Soviet Government informally suggested to certain Government leaders that the good offices of the Soviet Union could be obtained to arrange a mediated end to the present civil strife. The fact that, subsequent to his having made this suggestion, the Government, aware that he had done so, accepted Gen. Roschin as the new Soviet Ambassador to China, leads us to believe that accommodation with the Communists must be favored by many influential persons within the Government as preferable to a continuation of the status quo. The Chinese with whom we talk are of the opinion that accommodation means coalition government, and that through participating in a coalition government the Communists might come to control all of China by political means. Yet, faced as they are with mounting defeats in the civil war, and with the most colossal chaos in the administration of the nation’s affairs, they cling to a forlorn hope that more can be salvaged from a mediated peace than would be saved if the entire country were to fall into Communist hands as the political disintegration develops.

The fact that at least some members of the Government look with favor on a Soviet offer to mediate an end to the civil war does not, in our opinion, necessarily indicate a firm trend for the Government to orient itself toward the Soviet Union, rather than the United States. Soviet mediation would, we feel, be accepted by non-Communist Chinese only with great reluctance, and only if it were clear that the negotiations with the Communists could come no other way. Except in very limited circles, the U. S. S. R. has no following in non-Communist China, and it is almost universally feared, disliked and mistrusted there. However, the possibility remains that the Soviets may succeed, perhaps through the insistence of their Chinese party, in forcing the Government to accept them as mediators.

In this situation, the slow increase of anti-American sentiment in the country is noteworthy. The origins of this sentiment are complex. In its most vocal expression, as it occurs in the statements of such public personages as Dr. Sun Fo, it is but little more than irresponsible and malicious talk. In other instances it is probably the result, direct or indirect, of Communist propaganda which reiterates the simple, but effective, theme of the Alliance between American imperialism and the rapacious and corrupt reactionary, Chiang Kai-shek. Effective as the Communist propaganda is, it largely serves to reinforce a common conviction, which we have referred to elsewhere, that the Generalissimo is, in fact, leading the country to ruin and chaos, and that he could not do so if it were not for the support which the American government has given him. Regardless of the validity of this idea, it is, as we say, commonly held. Although it is not, of course, found in the Government controlled press, this opinion is held by the intellectuals who staff the press, and so causes them to attack us and our policies for other matters, not directly pertinent to this issue.

As we have suggested above, the main political issue before most non-Communist Chinese today is how a settlement with the Communists can be reached which will leave a maximum of political control with non-Communist elements. It seems clear now that even those Chinese who are most strongly anti-Communist feel that this must be achieved by political means since it cannot be done by military methods. At the moment, the principal barrier to a political settlement is the Generalissimo and some of his closest followers, for, even though they might be inclined to accept such measures, there is no likelihood that the Communists would negotiate with any government led by the Generalissimo and participated in by some of his associates. In these circumstances, the question arises as to whether the Generalissimo would retire so as to make such negotiations possible. We feel sure that he will not do so as long as he has any hope that our military assistance to him will be of a scale and scope sufficient to allow him to gain a military decision or to prolong the civil war until such time as other events may force us to intervene decisively in his favor.

However, regardless of the fact that the Generalissimo may himself decide to depend on a military decision for a settlement of the civil war, there are some strong indications, as we have suggested, that he may not be allowed to do so, for opposition to this course of action continues to mount, and is becoming concrete and organized. It is in this connection that the vice-presidential candidacy of General Li Tsung-jen is significant. Gen. Li’s candidacy was announced without reference to the Generalissimo. He has attracted support from Dr. Hu Shih, from other academicians and intellectuals, and, we believe, from many political personages of importance. There is some evidence to suggest that he will have a large amount of support from army circles, and possibly from Marshal Li Chi-shen and his followers. Gen. Li’s principal opposition lies in the C. C. Clique, which will support Yu Yu-jen. It is likely that Yu will have the Generalissimo’s backing as well. Since the election will be held in the Legislative Yuan, which is almost entirely packed by the C. C. Clique, it is likely that Yu will be elected. However, this cannot be taken as a certainty, for provincial leaders will exercise much influence over provincial delegations, and a real contest may develop. In any event, dissatisfaction with the activities of the Government’s leadership will be freely expressed.

As will be noted from the foregoing, we are now entering an era of political change in China. Not all of the forces which make for this change are immediately clear. Though some of the larger outlines are beginning to emerge, any comments as to how current trends will work out must be highly speculative. However, we are on relatively sure ground when we point out, as we have above, that present Government leadership is in the process of being repudiated by those who have formerly supported it; that opposition to this leadership is becoming concrete and organized, and is primarily based on opposition to the Government’s policy of settling the Communist question by military means; that the present leadership must almost certainly go unless actively sustained in power by us; and, that if there is a change in leadership, the new leaders will reach a political settlement with the Communists which may very likely result in some form of coalition.

Sincerely yours,

Lewis Clark

39. February 17, 1948, United States Relations with China, p. 901.