893.00/3–1548
Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Chinese Affairs (Sprouse) to the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth)
It is believed that the information set forth below regarding certain aspects of U. S. policy toward China will be of interest to you.
At the time of my transfer from the Embassy at Chungking to the Consulate General at Kunming in June 1944, no action had been taken by the U. S. Government, in so far as I knew, to suggest to the Chinese Government that it admit Chinese Communists into the Government. The relation of the U. S. Government to the problem of Communist participation in the Chinese Government has always been a matter of some interest to me. (In this connection, it must not be overlooked that the Chinese Government—that is, the Kuomintang—has frequently stated that the Chinese Communist problem was a political problem to be settled by political means and that the Kuomintang’s aim was to end the period of political tutelage and establish constitutional government in which all Chinese groups would be represented.) Considerable light has now been thrown on this question by remarks made to me on March 7, 1948 by Mr. Clarence E. Gauss, American Ambassador to China during the period 1941–44. The following is the gist of his remarks:
The U. S. Government had made some effort in the military field in 1944 to bring about unity in China by having General Stilwell29 placed in command of the Chinese armed forces, but no efforts had been made along these lines in the political field. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek summoned Mr. Gauss (I gathered the impression that this occurred in July or August 1944) to his residence and during a long three-hour harangue intimated that Mr. Gauss was not keeping the American Government adequately informed of the situation in China. Mr. Gauss took the opportunity to speak with equal frankness to the Generalissimo and told him of the increasing criticism of and opposition to the National Government on the part of non-Communist groups in China and of the generally lowered prestige of the Government among the Chinese people. He also explained that provincial dissident elements had even approached U. S. officials with a request for military aid but that we had rejected such overtures and had made clear that we dealt only with the National Government. Mr. Gauss then suggested—pointing out that he was doing so entirely on his own responsibility and not on the instructions of his Government—that [Page 152] the Generalissimo might find it helpful to appoint two representatives from each of the dissident groups, such as the various provincial elements and the Chinese Communists, to sit on the Supreme National Defense Council (a Kuomintang organ). The Generalissimo, he continued, should then explain to them his problems and the difficulties under which the Government labored, listen to their criticism, and call on them to support a united war effort against Japan. The Generalissimo expressed his interest in and appreciation of the suggestion and indicated that he might take such action as a means of bringing about a united war effort against Japan. Mr. Gauss reported this action to the Department of State for the information of the President and about 10 days later was informed that his action had the approval of the U.S. Government.30
Shortly after these events General Hurley31 arrived in China as the President’s Special Representative. Following some talks with the Chinese Government leaders and Mr. Gauss, General Hurley informed Mr. Gauss that he was going to Yenan to see the Chinese Communist leaders32 and that he believed that he could settle differences between the rival Chinese factions. Mr. Gauss was dubious of such procedure since we had not previously dealt with the Chinese Communists on political matters and asked General Hurley whether Washington knew of his intentions. General Hurley replied that he had the approval of the White House for his proposed action. General Hurley also told Mr. Gauss that he had the Generalissimo’s proposals for a settlement in his pocket and that he was certain of success. This was thus the first time that the U. S. Government injected itself into the political picture in China and General Hurley was the first to deal with the Chinese Communists on political matters.
The foregoing is of considerable interest as indicating that the impetus for “coalition government” came not from the Department of State or from the Embassy but rather from General Hurley and the President.
- Lt. Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell, Commanding General, U. S. Army Forces, China–Burma–India, and Generalissimo Chiang’s Joint (Allied) Chief of Staff for China Theater.↩
- See telegram of August 31, 1944, from the Ambassador in China, United States Relations With China, p. 561, and telegram No. 1196, September 9, 1944, to the Ambassador in China, Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. vi, p. 567.↩
- Maj. Gen. Patrick J. Hurley.↩
- See Foreign Relations, 1944, vol. vi, pp. 513 ff., passim.↩