893.00/1–848
The Consul General at Peiping (Clubb) to the Secretary of State
[Received January 23.]
Sir: I have the honor to refer to this Consulate’s despatch no. 2 of January 3, 1947 [1948] to Nanking on the subject of “Conditions in Communist Controlled Areas” and to enclose as of possible interest in this general connection a copy of a “Manifesto by the Chinese Peoples Liberation Army”30 as obtained by the External Survey Detachment. That manifesto was addressed to the American Chamber of Commerce at Tientsin under cover of a note dated Tientsin, December 23, 1947. The manifesto was received in the English text transmitted herewith.
The manifesto begins by stating that the “Communist liberation Army”, having smashed the Nationalist Government’s offensives, has launched large-scale counterattacks resulting in routs of the Nationalist armies. The Communist aims are set forth as being: to overthrow Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, and to establish a democratic coalition government, “thereby attaining the object of the liberation of the whole nation”. The manifesto condemns the Generalissimo for alleged responsibility for the civil war and for the major domestic developments leading up to it. Asserting that the Chinese people had “once more” forgiven the Generalissimo on the occasion of the Japanese surrender in 1945, and had called upon him to stop the civil war and introduce a democratic form of government, the manifesto goes on to charge that “the perfidious Chiang” disavowed his various pledges and, “backed up by the American Imperialists”, determined upon launching a new offensive. The manifesto charges that Generalissimo Chiang took from the Communists various towns and vast rural regions, and followed this by promulgation in March 1947 of the “bogus ‘constitution’”and thereupon issued the National [Page 19] Mobilization Order.31 It is charged that the Generalissimo’s policy is one of suppression of minority peoples, and that “in the regions under his tyranny” corruption prevails, secret service men are rampant, taxes are exorbitant and the national economy has generally become bankrupt, the while “the clique of corrupt officials and the notorious gentry class headed by Chiang himself are accumulating enormous wealth”. The Generalissimo is condemned for betrayal of national interests, “inviting the United States armed forces to be stationed in Tsingtao and other cities, and importuning the American Imperalists to send the Military Advisory Mission32 to China for the direction of the civil war and training of troops to be engaged in the slaughtering of his fellow countrymen.” The manifesto sums up the indictment by charging that Chiang in the course of his 20 years rule in China has committed treason, instituted a dictatorship, and acted against the will of the people.
The “Peoples Liberation Army” sets forth its policies as being: (1) to form a national united front; (2) to try and punish “civil war criminals[”] with Chiang as the ringleader; (3) to bring “Chiang’s dictatorship” to an end and introduce democratic government; (4) to put an end likewise to the present “corrupt and graft-making administration system” and build up a pure administration; (5) to confiscate the property of the four families, Chiang, (H. H.) Kung,33 (T. V.) Soong,34 and Ch’en (Li-fu)35 for use in connection with development of industry and commerce and improvement of the livelihood of the people; (6) to effect a redistribution of landholdings; (7) to acknowledge the autonomy of minority peoples and “grant them free choice of incorporation in the Federal States of China”; and (8) to cancel the traitorous diplomacy of Chiang’s dictatorial government; to denounce all traitorous treaties; to repudiate all foreign loans raised by Chiang during the civil war; to ask the U. S. Government to withdraw its troops from China, which are threatening the independence of China; to oppose any foreign aid to Chiang intended to help him fight the civil war; to oppose to Japan’s revival as an aggressor state; to conclude equal or reciprocal commercial and friendship treaties with foreign countries; and to unite with all nations who treat them on an equal footing in a common struggle.
[Page 20]The manifesto ends with an exhortation to the Communists’ fellow countrymen in Nationalist-controlled areas to rise up and develop guerrilla warfare, and in the “liberated areas” to carry through the land reform, consolidate the foundation of democracy and carry on other acts to develop the Communist strength. The manifesto calls upon the officers and soldiers of the Communist Army to improve their strategy and march forward with a will to victory, ending with the charge that it should be remembered that those soldiers and officers are the great army of the people—“the army led by the great leader of the people, Comrade Mao Tse-tung. So long as we follow closely the instructions of Comrade Mao, we are sure to win the victory.” The manifesto purports to be signed by Commander-in-Chief Chu Teh and Vice Commander P’eng Teh-huai of the “Peoples Liberation Army”.
It will be observed that the tone of the manifesto was not as violent, at least insofar as concerns the United States, as Mao Tse’tung’s speech of New Year’s Day. That manifesto, nevertheless, reflects the same confidence that is discovered in the later speech.
An informed official source told me on January 5 that the Communists were presently making a new approach in their propaganda line as used in North China, using the contention that “Northeasterners should not fight Northeasterners, and Northeasterners should not fight Hopeh People”. That source was certain in his interpretation that the reputed new Communist line was without reference to other parts of North China than Hopeh Province; it did not have reference, for instance, to Shantung or Shansi. The inference to be drawn from that propaganda line would be that Hopeh people are to believe that their province is to have—by Communist intent at least—an autonomous rule, divorced from both Nationalist Government and Communist authority. Powerful factors of course make it improbable that Hopeh could maintain such an isolated political position even if it would, but it is perhaps of interest to speculate upon the possibility of the Communists making an offer of “autonomy” to important political areas in China in an effect to win support away from the National Government. The immensity of problems that the Communists would meet in the event that they achieved victory in Manchuria, with reference to both economic reconstruction and political consolidation in that area, could well lead to a slowing down of the Communist advance elsewhere, or even some alteration of the direction of political approach. It is believed probable, for instance, that the Communists will by necessity in due course of time be compelled to introduce into their ranks various political administrators formerly serving under the Kuomintang authority,36 and to treat with various powerful military [Page 21] leaders (particularly in South and West China), such as, perhaps, Li Chi-shen, Ts’ai T’ing-k’ai,36 and perhaps the adamant Moslem warlords of the Ninghsia–Kansu–Chinghai border regions.
Respectfully yours,
- Not printed.↩
- The mobilization resolution for the suppression of Communist rebellion was passed by the State Council, July 4, 1947; for text as contained in telegram No. 1465 of July 5, 1947, 5 p. m., from the Ambassador in China, see United States Relations With China, p. 746.↩
- For correspondence, see vol. viii , “U.S. Military Assistance to China” (Ch. III).↩
- Former Chinese Minister of Finance.↩
- Governor of Kwangtung.↩
- Secretary General of the Kuomintang Central Political Council.↩
- See despatch no. 2 of January 3, 1948, to Nanking. [Footnote in the original.]↩
- Member of the Kuomintang Revolutionary Committee.↩