895.00/4–248: Telegram
The Acting Secretary of State to the Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs)
priority
101. On basis info set forth your excellent telegraphic reports Dept sees cause for grave concern over possible effects proposed Pyongyang conference on forthcoming elections in south Korea.
Should Kim Koo and Kimm Kiu Sic join forces with north Korean group (urtel 200 Apr 21) it would appear not unlikely that increasing number of their followers and sympathizers would boycott elections in south, which would then tend to assume to increased extent appearance of being staged for Dr. Rhee’s private benefit. Quite apart from this possibility, it would appear to Dept that if astute propaganda from north distorting relative aims of Pyongyang conference and [Page 1171] UNTCOK is not promptly and effectively countered, popular support for elections in south Korea, together with prestige of US and UN, may in any event be expected sharply to decline during coming crucial weeks.
Whether provoked by defection of south Korean leaders or by cumulative effect of pro-Communist and anti-US–UN propaganda from north, substantial flight of popular support away from scheduled elections in south Korea would serve to strengthen hand of those members of UNTCOK who oppose UN observance of elections in south and might well result in decision by UNTCOK to disassociate itself from such elections. In addition, aside from question of UN participation, any factor contributing to lessening of popular support for elections in south cannot but contribute equally to instability of resulting govt and to difficulties which that govt will experience in withstanding Communist domination.
Dept believes neither US occupation authorities nor UN can afford to remain silent in face of this development and that aggressive propaganda campaign on behalf of Pyongyang conference must be matched by equally forceful campaign on our part, emphasizing in particular following points:
- 1)
- that primary objective of US in Korea has been and is to achieve unification of country on independent and democratic basis and that UNTCOK was voted into being by majority of free nations of world as means of accomplishing that purpose;
- 2)
- that efforts of UNTCOK to achieve that aim have so far been rendered fruitless by refusal of Soviet occupation authorities to permit participation of people of north Korea in elections to be held under UN supervision for purpose of creating freely-elected govt for all Korea;
- 3)
- that it is still our hope that avowed desire of people of north for united Korea will lead Soviet authorities to permit them to pursue that desire thru participation in UN-observed elections;
- 4)
- that if Soviet authorities are truly interested in unification of Korea a logical first step would be for them to relax rigid controls along 38th parallel and to permit economic unification of country long advocated by US and which they alone have prevented.
Foregoing points should be (and doubtless have been) emphasized also in your conversations with south Korean invitees, particularly Kim Koo and Kimm Kiu Sic, who might in your discretion be encouraged to make any approval of Pyongyang program on their part contingent upon UN observance of elections in north. Suggestion might also be made that they propose continuation of conference in Seoul in order to allow adequate expression of views of people of south Korea. You have undoubtedly already sought to impress upon Kim Koo and [Page 1172] Kimm Kiu Sic inevitable fate of those who believe it possible to cooperate with Russian-dominated communist movements.
Dept interested in any info indicative of attitude of UNTCOK members toward Pyongyang conference or suggestive of any action which UNTCOK may contemplate in response to that development (urtels 202 and 204 Apr 32). For your info, question of desirability of public statement by UNTCOK or by UN Secretariat is being informally considered by latter. Altho direct inquiry on subject should be avoided, Dept also interested in knowing whether any UNTCOK member likely to propose reference of Korean question to special session GA this month. In this connection Dept is in general opposed to inclusion in agenda of substantive matters extraneous to Palestine issue, and would favor consideration of Korean question at that session only if developments in Korea should make such consideration imperative.