501.BB Korea/2–1948: Telegram
The Acting Political Adviser in Korea (Langdon) to the Secretary of State
97. Cite Zpol 211.
(1) Confidential talks 17 February with Rhee and Kimm Kiusic separately by representative of command amplify information in Seoul PolAd’s 76 and 84, February 111 and 13, dealing with alleged three-man agreement.
(2) Rhee last week drafted 8 point declaration for all party approval. Point 1 affirms desire for national independence. Point 2 appeals to UN to intervene in setting up sovereign free nation. Point 3 recognizes need for US economic aid. Point 4 denies right of any foreign government to restrain any portion of people from taking part in establishment their government but point 5 promises to keep open in such government place for such restrained elements. Point 6 favors continuing efforts to bring about conference of northern and southern leaders. Point 7 expresses wish of new Korea state to join UN. Point 8 prays Little Assembly to make positive decision and announce it before March 1st.
(3) Rhee states Hankook Party and his 9 main groups signed and sealed declaration but Kim Koo and Kimm Kiusic did not. Adds that when Menon paid farewell call 12th, declaration bearing seals and signatures given to him with assurance Kimm Kiusic and Kim Koo had agreed to sign it also. Menon is said to have stated he did not need to see Kim Koo’s and Kimm Kiusic’s seals and signatures on document, said two men had already expressed views similar to Rhee’s. However, Menon reportedly added if two men adhere formally to [Page 1120] declaration fact should be radioed him although he was convinced such proof of unanimity was unnecessary since there was no doubt about in mind of himself and Koo [Hoo?]
(4) Doctor Kimm on 17th denied truth of above presentation of case and intention on his or Kim Koo’s part at any time to sign declaration because of implicit request to UN in point 2 to set up separate state in South Korea. He admitted there was agreement on 12th among three men as follows: he and Kim Koo would make effort to bring about joint conference with northern leaders and Rhee on 13th would issue press statement belittling conference so as to disassociate himself from it in minds of North Koreans because of his bad standing with them. It was understood further that no common decision on any further step would be taken until after final Interim Committee action. Doctor Rhee, in fact, on 13th declared publicly he had little use for proposed conference but was no longer opposed to it if it did not adversely affect a national election. Subsequently Stars and Stripes published interview with Rhee to effect inferentially three men were in agreement over separate South Korean Government. Accordingly on 17th Doctor Kimm issued public statement flatly denying he advocated setting up sovereign state in South Korea and declaring without reunion north and south independence for Korea is an economic impossibility and a political fiction. Statement added that for UN to give hasty blessing to a government in American Zone and call its mission accomplished would be an abandonment of clear moral duty.
(5) Command representative then showed Doctor Kimm translation of Pyongyang draft constitution of Korean People’s Republic (Seoul PolAd 94, February 182). Kimm was aghast and declared he now had no hope of joint conference project. He said formal request to Soviet commander to facilitate conference had, however, already been delivered to Soviet liaison officer here for transmission. Doctor Kimm continued, if US Government was serious about backing a national government in South Korea, with firm intention of giving it economic aid, military protection and arming it, he would support such government without reservation. He, however, would not commit himself as long as US was vague about its intentions. His idea of military protection was demonstrations of force such as carrier fleet visit to Greece whenever people’s army threatened South Korea. He indicated concern about his political position if he should express ideas as above publicly, as he holds followers on platform of no separate government and as they would suspect him of having sold out to Rhee. Doctor Kimm feels crisis as fateful as in 1905 faces Korean people. Therefore, he is prepared to abandon his objection to disunion if existence [Page 1121] of separate government in South Korea can be maintained. He projected calling of “secret council of war” by General Hodge to be attended by himself, Rhee, Kim Koo and one or two others, to go over grim realities of situation and adopt common policy. General Hodge proposes to look further into this proposal. An estimate now of how far US would go to maintain independence of South Korea would be useful guide to him.