740.00119 FEAC/9–3048
The Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Sebald) to the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth)
[Date of receipt not indicated.]
Dear Butterworth: The recent statement by the Soviet Ambassador concerning “Level of Economic Life in Japan: Policy towards Japanese Industry”, made at the FEC meeting of September 23, 1948,1 has again focused attention on the Japanese situation and appears to be part and parcel of a continuing Soviet diplomatic offensive concerning Japan. There is no doubt in my mind but that the Soviets are on the offensive, in so far as Japan is concerned, and that our efforts, as seen from here, are defensive—even though by their nature our intentions may be constructive and designed to accomplish the emergence of a free, democratic, self-sufficient, and peace-loving Japan.
We have generally been, and are now, in the position of defending what we have done or intend to do; in contrast, the Soviets have fortuitously taken advantage of our announcements and actions, with the result that we have had to explain, deny, change, or defend our policies in consequence of the imputations made. An example of the Soviet method has been the recent shift in communist party line advocating an early peace treaty, with its implications of an early end to the Occupation, the withdrawal of Allied (chiefly American) troops, that the United States is stalling, and other propaganda lines designed for palatability to the Japanese people.
Now comes the Panyushkin statement which proposes a removal of limitations upon peaceful industry, although the real catch in the proposal obviously is the establishment of some sort of multi-power control. Were we to fall for the condition which is coupled with the proposal, it would naturally mean a greater share in the post-treaty control of Japan by Russia than is possible under the present regime of control.
I believe it is evident that we may look for further “surprises” from what appears on the surface to be an apparent reversal of Soviet policy and endeavors to indicate to the Japanese people a desire on Russia’s part to increase understanding and friendly and peaceful relations [Page 1027] between the two countries. Any encouragement by ourselves or other nations to this trend would merely foster the “kiss of death” so evident from recent events when Russia has had occasion to enter into equal control with ourselves or other nations anywhere in the world. I hope that everything possible will be done to prevent both the growth of Soviet influence in Japan and their desire to have a greater voice in Japanese affairs, especially if it should be at the expense of the preponderant voice which the United States now has.
You will undoubtedly recall my recent request for a policy statement concerning Japan and the Department’s reply to the effect that such a statement is under preparation and will be made in due course. I have had no information as to when this statement will be issued, but in connection therewith—perhaps it is already too late to do anything about it—I hope that it will set forth as a minimum United States policy in the present pre-treaty period, and that it will be a fearless and forceful presentation of policies which the United States intends to pursue in the accomplishment of its ultimate aims in and for Japan, which it hopes will eventually be worthy of admission as a full-fledged member of the United Nations. I would hope, as a minimum, that the policy statement will contain some reference to the following points:
- a.
- The rehabilitation of Japan, with United States assistance and as rapidly as conditions will permit, to a condition of self-sufficiency. In keeping with this objective the removal of those measures of control by the Occupation which restrict or retard rehabilitation.
- b.
- The elimination to the greatest possible extent of direct participation by the Occupation in governmental functions in order to prepare for Japan’s return to normal conditions of sovereignty.
- c.
- A radical reduction in Occupation costs by the elimination of all functions of the Occupation (other than security) which do not contribute directly towards the above-mentioned aims.
- d.
- The establishment of a foreign exchange rate.
- e.
- Removal with a stamp of finality of all the uncertainties of the reparations problem.
- f.
- A re-examination of the entire purge question, especially of the economic purge.
- g.
- Assistance to the Japanese for the establishment of an adequate and efficient police system capable of keeping order in Japan without outside help.
- h.
- A scrapping of the so-called level of industry formulae which are academic, unenforceable, and inconsistent with our basic policy.
- i.
- A reiteration of our determination that Japan shall not re-arm nor possess a heavy industry specifically adapted to rearmament.
- j.
- Rehabilitation of Japan’s merchant marine with permission during the pre-treaty period to engage in foreign trade and operations (with countries that will receive Japanese shipping) in order that Japan may thereby accumulate needed foreign exchange and rebuild, in part, its trading potential.
- k.
- Elimination of Occupation personnel as rapidly as their functions can be absorbed by the Japanese Government, which shall operate under supervision and guidance of the Occupation rather than as an adjunct to the Occupation.
- l.
- Prompt return to the Japanese economy of buildings, housing, and facilities resulting from the reduction of Occupation personnel.
- m.
- A re-examination, in the light of experience gained to date and in view of the changed world situation since the end of hostilities, of all United States interim directives and FEC policy decisions adopted to date.
- n.
- A thorough examination, with a view to obtaining concrete results, of ways and means of enabling Japanese scholars and students to study in the United States—including the possibility of an amended Fulbright Act, or possibly by setting aside for this purpose a small percentage of the proceeds of foreign exchange.
Additionally, consideration might well be given to an announcement to the effect that it is in the national interest of the United States that Japan shall remain a free, sovereign, and independent country. This principle would appear so obvious, in the light of world conditions, as to require no further justification or elucidation. At the same time, it would offer to Japan the choice of road which they should follow, irrespective of how attractive Soviet propaganda might sound.
I believe that unless we are specific regarding our aims and objectives in Japan, we shall continue to remain on the defensive, to the delight of Soviet Russia and to our own detriment in the Far East. I realize, of course, difficulties which might arise with other FEC nations, but the above considerations are fundamental and basic. In any event, the springboard for the policies enunciated might well be the desire of the United States to hasten the rehabilitation of the Far East by accelerating a return to normalcy of an important nation in this area, so that mutually satisfactory and beneficial exchange of goods between all Pacific-area countries can be increased and the prospects for future peace strengthened by a healthy trade.
There is another aspect of this general problem. We see here, among the Japanese, a certain confusion of mind not unlike that which has grown up in some other parts of the world where the contrast between the pre-war and post-war roles of the United States is so sharp as to be uncomprehended. To many who formerly thought of the United States as the haven of liberal causes and principles it is far from easy to welcome present American-backed measures which are necessary concomitants of being the world’s dominant power. We used to cling to a national policy of disarmament; now we are in the midst of rearming. There was a time when American influence in the British Empire was felt as an anti-imperialist factor; the upholding of Commonwealth stability, and our own far-flung order-maintaining responsibilities, [Page 1029] are now the foundation rocks of United States policy. The United States formerly pressed for outlawing mass weapons; now we look upon the most destructive one of all, in our sole possession, in quite a different light. Earlier a country advocating the maximum commercial penetration of international channels of intercourse, we are now involved in exercising strict governmental controls in these matters. Once generally opposed to military power, the United States is now potentially the greatest military power on earth and proposes to remain so.
I think it would be a major error of policy to allow the impression to become general among the Japanese that all our principles, of which I have enumerated only a few, are subordinate to the ultimate defeat of communism. To do so would give rise to suspicion that we have abandoned much for which we have stood and which the Occupation has accomplished.
We are urgently interested in a going and healthy Japan resistant to the enemy, and I fully recognize that we cannot be too selective in our ideas as to how Japan gets on her feet for the purpose; but there is actual force in the hold of ideas, and the idealistic appeal which the United States made to the world previously is something which we should not, and certainly not in Japan, by inanition allow to lapse. Our policy in drawing up the scattered potential for the containment of Soviet power should not be permitted, it seems to us, to appear as the sole dominant of the American harmony. In standing strong against Soviet coercion it would be a mistake to give their false propaganda the opportunity to step in and assume squatter’s rights to the liberal causes; we must, therefore, also be articulate about those principles for which we stand, additional to the stopping of the Soviet Union.
In writing the above, I am, of course, mindful of the probability that everything herein has already been well considered in the Department. But even so, the matter appears to me to be of such vital importance to the future well-being of our relations with Japan and the Far East, that I write at the risk of repetition. I feel that only by reiteration of the fundamentals involved will our foreign policy for the Far East become crystallized, the issues openly discussed, and the American people and the peoples of the world become cognizant of our aims and objectives in this part of the world.
There is also the important point of educating the Japanese people regarding their own future. I would be bold indeed to attempt to prognosticate Japan’s future course of action. But come what may, I feel it most important that the record be clean and that the fog and mists created by irresponsible acts, statements, and announcements of some [Page 1030] of our officials regarding our motives in Japan should be swept away. Finally, it is obvious that the details of policy are not immutable but must be elastic and subject to change in a world of changing conditions. The policy itself, however, if clear and unequivocal and honest in its motives and aims will be just as valid a century hence as it is now.
Sincerely yours,