Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Far East and Australasia, Volume VI

856d.00/12–1048

The Netherlands Embassy to the Department of State ¹

On December 9th, 1948, an aide-mémoire² was left with the Secretary-General of the Department of Foreign Affairs, in which the United States Government expressed certain views concerning the situation in Indonesia which were based on available information from Batavia. In this aide-mémoire which the Netherlands Government has attentively studied the United States Government states that it is presuming upon long and tested friendship by giving an expression of certain views with the intention that the Netherlands Government should take these views into account when reaching a decision concerning the policy to be followed in Indonesia. The Netherlands Government is deeply convinced that the ultimate aims of the policy which the Netherlands Government has so far followed with regard to Indonesia, and the objectives which the United States Government has in mind are the same. The contents of the aide-mémoire of December 9th, however, show unmistakably that a considerable difference of opinion exists concerning recent developments and the possibilities to arrive at a settlement of the dispute satisfactory to both parties. The Netherlands Government, while appreciating the efforts made by the United States Government to assist in a peaceful settlement of the Indonesian dispute through the Committee of Good Offices, can understand that if no results were obtained the United States Government would consider resignation from this Committee to which it was elected by the members selected directly by the parties to the dispute. The suggestion that in these circumstances the United States Government would consider itself free to take certain unspecified measures, might indicate that the possibility is envisaged of taking measures which could be harmful to Netherlands and Indonesian interests. The Netherlands Government is confident that an open and frank explanation of the difficulties of the present situation will lead the United States Government to the conclusion that the Netherlands Government has tried scrupulously to carry out the commitments which it had undertaken and that even if in certain instances divergences of opinion have come to light, no sufficient reasons exist to envisage measures which might cast a shadow on the friendship which has always linked the Netherlands and the United States. If by unjustified outside intervention the future development of the Indonesian dispute would lead to the weakening of the emerging West-European structure and would have severe repercussions on Western influence in the Far East, the Netherlands Government must disclaim responsibility.

2. The Netherlands Government is convinced that the conclusion and views contained in the United States aide-mémoire are based on an insufficient understanding of the circumstances which have led to the present situation. The Netherlands Government hopes that the following analysis based on the actual facts will contribute to a better understanding of the position.

3. On behalf of the Netherlands Government the Committee of Good Offices was informed by letter of October 28th, 1948, that the Netherlands Government was willing to resume negotiations on the basis of the proposals of Mr. Cochran and the Netherlands amendments thereto, provided that the violations of the truce would constitute the first item on the agenda, because the Netherlands Government deemed that negotiations could not successfully be concluded before the effect of Republican measures to stop infringements of the truce had become evident. The Republican delegation agreed by letter of November 3rd to resume negotiations on the understanding that the implementation of the truce and the political issues would be discussed concurrently. In the course of the informal discussion between parties which have taken place since, it has become clear that effective cooperation on the part of the Republic to combat the infringements of the truce cannot be expected, because the Republican Government is powerless to exercise effective control over its armed forces, which according to Dr. Hatta’s own statement still number about 300,000. The discussions between the special Netherlands delegation and the Republican Premier have nevertheless not been limited to the question of the violations of the truce, but they have covered the whole range of pending political issues. During these latter discussions a fundamental and basic difference of opinion has come to light. In the first series of informal discussions between the Netherlands Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Premier of the Republic, Dr. Hatta declared that as a consequence of Netherlands sovereignty which he explicitly confirmed, the Netherlands Government retained joint responsibility for governing Indonesia during the interim period. Consequently the High Representative of the Crown would have certain powers in case of emergency, the right of veto etc.

On the basis of the expectations, created by Dr. Hatta’s declarations, that a settlement might be achieved, the Netherlands Government sent a Cabinet Delegation to Indonesia. During the discussions of this delegation it became clear that the Republic had gone back on the views previously expressed by her Prime Minister. The Republic intimated that the recognition of Netherlands sovereignty during the interim period should only have a purely formal character and that a gentleman’s agreement should confirm that the Netherlands would never make use of the powers emanating from its sovereignty. It would follow that the authority of the High Representative of the Crown, and especially his authority with regard to the supreme command over the armed forces, would be recognized in name only, and that the Netherlands representative would not be able to exercise these powers without the previous assent of the interim government. The Netherlands armed forces would also have to evacuate gradually the territories occupied by them at present, while the Republican army would provisionally remain completely intact and the settling of its position postponed until a later date. In practice this would mean that the present intolerable situation of two opposing armies under separate command would be continued, and that it would be a practical impossibility for the Netherlands to have responsibility for the Government in the interim period. This Republican point of view is also irreconcilable with the sovereignty of the Netherlands as formulated in the first additional Renville principle accepted by the Republic.

4. This refusal to recognise the sovereignty of the Netherlands during the interim period, moreover, nullifies the acceptance by the Republic as a basis for negotiations of the draft-agreement submitted by the United States representative and accorded the status of a working paper on November 10th, because this draft-agreement was based on the Renville principles of which the recognition of the Netherlands sovereignty during the interim period is an essential element.

In the light of Dr. Hatta’s statements the following assumptions in the United States aide-mémoire must be considered unjustified:

A. The assumption that by frank discussions the critical points mentioned sub 2 in the United States aide-mémoire might be solved.

B. The assumption that there still exist avenues of possible agreement with the Republican Government, particularly with regard to obtaining Republican participation in the federal interim government as mentioned in par. 5 of the United States aide-mémoire.

C. The assumption that the Republican Government is willing to enter into and abide by an agreement in accordance with the Renville principles as mentioned in par. 13 of the United States aide-mémoire.

5. The Netherlands delegation was informed by Dr. Hatta that he was not able to act against the wishes of extreme political parties and to restrain army influence. When Dr. Hatta is therefore denying; practical application of certain sovereign rights during the interim period, he is following a policy which is dictated to him by irresponsible and extremist elements. The making of further concessions to reconcile basic differences of view between the Netherlands delegation and certain Republican groups (not Dr. Hatta himself) would, not strengthen the position of Dr. Hatta as a moderate force in the Republican Government, but would inevitably lead to increased demands by irresponsible extremists leaders and army groups. It would in effect be a surrender to the demands of those in the Republic who have opposed the signing of the Linggadjati and Renville agreements and who have consistently and openly proclaimed their refusal to cooperate in the implementation of these agreements.

6. The Netherlands Government has during the past two years made every effort to carry out its pledge to establish a United States of Indonesia before January 1, 1949. The refusal of the successive Republican Governments to cooperate forced the Netherlands Government to continue the coordination of the areas outside the Republic. The non-republican federal areas cannot be expected to acquiesce in definitely in the postponement of the establishment of a sovereign federation, which has been promised to them as well as to the Republic, The Netherlands Government has undertaken to enact the law for the federal interim government before the first of January 1949. On this formal undertaking which was ratified by the parliament of the Netherlands, the Government cannot go back because of the unwillingness of the Republic to participate in Such a government on any reasonable basis. However, the Netherlands Government will insert an article in this law by which appropriate amendments can be made immediately if as a result of further consultation with the representatives of all peoples of Indonesia such amendments should prove to be desirable. Therefore the Republic can still participate in the federal interim government after its creation. The Republican Government and the Committee of Good Offices have been informed concerning this possibility of accession.

7. The disintegration of organised government and the deterioration of economic conditions in the whole of Indonesia is proceeding at an increasing rate. Complete information on these conditions, which can be made available by the Netherlands Government proves beyond doubt that the disorganisation in the Netherlands controlled area is the work of armed terrorists, acting under orders emanating from organisations in Republican territories.

8. To prevent a disastrous development in the immediate future the Netherlands Government is faced with two alternatives.

A. The Republican Government either spontaneously or subsequent to suggestions from other quarters should approach the Netherlands Government and confirm its willingness to recognise Netherlands sovereignty during the interim period in principle and in practice. In any case the unified command of all armed forces under the High Representative of the Crown should be assured. In order to prevent that the T.N.I. in practice would become the federal army and would dominate the whole future federation it is equally essential to exclude expressly the possibility that the T.N.I. as such will become incorporated in the newly created federal army.

B. Unless assurances to this effect are received forthwith the Netherlands Government will be obliged to make a final decision concerning the manner in which it can best implement the formal pledges to the peoples of the Netherlands and of Indonesia. In case this second alternative will have to be followed the Netherlands Government is fully aware of the hardships and sufferings which may be their peoples share, but it trusts that the foregoing has convinced the United States Government that no other course would be compatible with its responsibilities and obligations.

Washington, December 10, 1948.

1. Left at the Department on December 10 and transmitted in telegrams 635, December 10, 6 p. m., Usgoc 230, to Batavia, and Gadel 739, December 11, 1 p. m., to Paris (for Jessup only). In telegram 637, December 10, 8 p. m., Usgoc 232, to Batavia, the Department asked for comments by Mr. Cochran and authorized him to take any beneficial action he considered feasible in regard to paragraph 8(a) of the Netherlands communication.
2. See text dated December 7, p. 531.