856d.00/12–848: Telegram
The Chargé in the Netherlands (Steere) to the Secretary of State 1
us urgent
834. We are seriously concerned regarding possible repercussions in Holland to aide-mémoire (Embtel 827, December 7).
Netherlands Government was divided within itself on advisability continuing negotiations when Stikker returned from his one-man effort break deadlock. Eventual despatch high-powered delegation including one other Cabinet Minister and accompanied by 5 parliamentarians was hard-won victory for Stikker. Unquestionably government believed it was entering into bona fide negotiations. Progress was made until Hatta weakened and drew away from his earlier position. Then in his last conversation with Netherlands Delegation (Gocus 4702) Hatta even suggested abrogation Crown’s sovereignty by gentleman’s agreement and turned down proposed unified command Netherlands and federal forces, the two fundamental principles from which Netherlands Government say they cannot and will not retreat. Cochrane (Gocus 4693) had previously told Soekarno he could not oppose Netherlands position now authority of Crown and command of forces as his own plan was “in comparable sense.” We do not think there are any good grounds on which to request Netherlands Government recede on these two points; sovereignty of Netherlands Government during interim period was specifically agreed in Renville Agreement, and unified command is essential to avoid retention of “private” Republican army with possibility chaotic conditions developing similar those in Burma today. Rigid though Netherlands Delegation’s instructions may have been, agreement with Hatta reached on number points, but Hatta was not supported by working committee Republican Parliament and therefore unable deliver the goods.
Emergency bill Indonesia passed late October was enabling act providing for creation interim government before January 1, 1949. Netherlands Government obviously all along has intended take this step, particularly if negotiations unsuccessful, though leaving door open for eventual Republican participation. If government decides accede to Department’s wishes regarding interim government, Prime Minister will not have easy time explaining to States General postponement [Page 540] of date set by law. Already there has been criticism in Parliament and press of US pressure on government regarding Indonesia. (Foreign Office officials have also frequently suggested to us that some pressure might be used profitably at Jogja.) We foresee possibility storm in States General and fear more serious accusations regarding US interference and pressure on Netherlands Government. The government might fall due to Parliamentary and public outcry.
Again it might fall because of internal dissensions as it is strange collection of bedfellows composed as it is of elements from all social structures and of all religious and political concepts, except communism.
The difficulty of getting Cabinet decisions from such heterogeneous group is obvious.
We view with concern contingency of country being without government for considerable time, as happened for six weeks last summer.
In our opinion situation in Indonesia could get out of hand, and Hague authorities and NEI government have great trouble in controlling more extreme elements among Netherlands officials in Indonesia. Furthermore, although permanent officials in Hague could make decisions on important matters involving ECA, Western Union, North Atlantic Pact, etc., such decisions would not have authority of government behind them nor would they be fully binding on new government.
It is also possible that our representations may solidify cabinet and spur it to taking step it considers necessary—namely, early inauguration of interim government—thereby facing consequences which were presented clearly in US aide-mémoire.
On the other hand, we cannot see the Cabinet, particularly in the political and economic circumstances in which Holland finds itself at present time, bluntly rejecting the Department’s desiderata.
We have not seen any definite statement that negotiations have been broken off, and perhaps government will announce their continuation. It may, in fact, endeavor to work out formula whereby interim government could be set upon very broad basis and subject to change in structure, always leaving place for Republic in government, and continue negotiations at the same time. It may even agree or propose that negotiations henceforth take place under GOC auspices.
We feel strongly, however, that some helpful step is needed ease situation for Netherlands Government. Heretofore advice has been proffered by US to Netherlands Government regarding concessions, but Cochran, entirely correctly as member GOC, has seemingly not put strong pressure on Hatta and Republican officials (Goc 4714). [Page 541] We suggest that Livengood might be injected into the picture and, acting as Department official, point out to Republicans the necessity of observance and implementation Renville Agreement, particularly regarding sovereignty in interim period, which Dutch insist, and we believe, is cardinal principle from which they cannot withdraw. With some such concession Netherlands Cabinet might be willing resume negotiations at once.