501.BC
Indonesia/12–548: Telegram
The Acting Secretary of
State to the Consulate General at
Batavia
1
secret
us urgent
Washington, December 6, 1948—7 p. m.
616. Usgoc 218. Re Gocus 471,2 following aide-mémoire will be presented Neth FonOff by AmEmb Hague morning Dec 7
local time and simultaneously to Neth Amb here:
- “1. US Govt, having been encouraged by resolute
efforts statesmanship exerted by Neth Minfonaff to clear
way to earliest consideration essential issues dispute
between Neth Govt and Govt Repub Indonesia, has been
deeply disappointed learn conversations Indonesia
between Neth Fonmin and Neth Min Overseas Territories on
one hand and
[Page 528]
Prime Min Repub Indonesia on other, have been abruptly
terminated mid-course with return Neth Mins to Hague.
Decision by Neth Mins to bring these conversations to
such hasty close has been particularly surprising and
regrettable inasmuch as expectations had been raised
that full delegation of Repub would be invited Batavia
participate with reprs Bandung group in comprehensive
discussion difficulties that appear lie in way final
political settlement. This prospect had been regarded by
US Govt and its repr with GOC as offering unusual promise fruitful
negotiations looking toward such settlement, which, as
Neth Govt aware, have been subject unconscionable
delays. Hopes entertained by this Govt of successful
outcome had derived in no small measure from excellent
impression created on everyone concerned by Neth Fonmin
whose attitude appeared particularly well calculated
allay Repub fears Neth intentions, which otherwise would
continue make full cooperation impossible.
- 2. While aware critical points contention which arose
in exploratory talks between Neth Mins and Repub Prime
Min, US Govt considers it is precisely such points as
these which might well be resolved by full and frank
discussions among three parties concerned future
Indonesia.
- 3. US Govt convinced that to postpone any longer
resumption bona fide negotiations will be more than ever
dangerous. It may point out that ready basis for such
negotiations exists in draft agreement submitted
informally to parties by US Repr Sep 10 and accorded
status working paper GOC
Nov 10. Understanding this Govt that draft agreement
was, indeed, taken as point departure recent informal
talks between reprs parties.
- 4. Neth is asked take special heed weakening position
of Govt Prime Min Hatta, who, while acting with skill
and fortitude against Communist revolt, has so far been
able offer his supporters neither amelioration Repub’s
economic plight nor any degree satisfaction its
nationalist aspirations. US Govt confident Neth Govt
will agree Hatta has in recent interchanges given
persuasive evidence his desire cooperate in reasonable
solution political differences between Neth and Repub
and that fall his Govt could only exacerbate, perhaps
disastrously, conditions under which settlement must be
reached.
- 5. This connection, it would appear undeniable that
creation fully formed Prov Fed Govt without
participation Repub, should such action be taken before
all avenues possible agreement with Repub have been
definitely exhausted, would not only discredit in eyes
of Repub elements moderate and conciliatory policy which
Hatta has sought promote, but would in itself be
unwarrantable view assurances given by Neth Govt this
step would not be taken so long as reasonable hope
remained achieving Repub’s participation interim govt
all Indonesia.
- 6. US Govt hopes Neth Govt will be able agree earliest
possible resumption negotiations, with or without
participation GOC in
preliminary phases and that it will not jeopardize
success such negotiations or render them futile by
proceeding with creation Prov Fed Govt of non-Repub
territories.
- 7. US Govt may venture take this occasion reiterate
certain its views on character situation confronting
parties to Indo
dispute.
- 8. Successive US Reprs on GOC together with other neutral observers
whose opinions this Govt has reason respect have reached
identical conclusions re this situation. These may be
summarized: (1) Welfare Indonesia vitally dependent upon
continued availability to Indonesia of experience,
judgment and technical and administrative proficiency of
Dutch. (2) In long run, influence Neth and economic
stake it retains in Indonesia will be proportional to
confidence and goodwill accorded Dutch by Indo people. (3)
Preponderant desire Indo people govern themselves finds chief
expression in Repub Indonesia, which must be considered
not as geographical concept but as political
force.
- 9. US draft agreement was conceived with aim outlining
pattern reasonable and workable settlement between Govt
Neth and Govt Repub Indonesia. As such, it calls for
concessions by Repub which would provide basis for
continuation Neth indispensable role Indonesia and for
concessions by Neth to nationalist movement which must
probably be incorporated any agreement Repub Govt could
accept without loss essential political support and
which Neth may offer without impairment its essential
interests. As has been affirmed several occasions by
officials US Govt, draft agreement was never meant to be
regarded in any sense as fixed or unalterable in
specific provisions. US Govt of opinion, however, that
negotiations should be resumed on understanding their
object is not provide occasion for substitution by
either party of wholly different design which other
could not accept but to effect such alterations draft
agreement as both sides, faced with extreme costliness
of failure negotiations, may consider possible
acceptance or as GOC may
be convinced are reasonable and advantageous, and with
assurance both sides mean carry out in cooperative
spirit undertakings entered upon.
- 10. Should final position taken by Neth be one which
Repub Govt, even with end its political and physical
resources in sight, would consider it could not meet,
present truce could scarcely be expected endure. Further
weakening Repub Govt could only further impair its
ability restrain extremist elements, whose activities
have already been source natural concern to
Neth.”
- 11 to 15. Same as paras 6 to 10 preceding draft
(Usgoc 212 and
2163).
- “16. Neth Govt will understand that US Govt in
presuming upon long and tested friendship in stating
frankly expression these views, is seeking only give
Neth Govt benefit its perspective so that Neth Govt will
embark upon no course action which, while undertaken
with most unexceptionable motives, could result
weakening newly emerging Western European structure to
lasting disadvantage component nations.”
