Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V, Part 2

501.BB Palestine/12–1348

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Chairman of the United States Delegation at Paris (Dulles)

secret

[Paris,] December 13, 1948.

Participants:	Mr. Riad Bey Solh, Prime Minister of Lebanon
	Dr. Malik
	Mr. Dulles
	Mr. Kopper

With Mr. Kopper, I called on Mr. Riad Bey Solh, Prime Minister of Lebanon, and Dr. Malik, Ambassador to Washington, at the Hotel Bristol on December 10 at 9:00 p. m. I said that I came to talk in relation to the pending resolution to establish a Conciliation Commission to settle the points of difference between Israel and the Arab States. I hoped very much that that resolution would be adopted by the necessary two-thirds vote because if it were not adopted the future in that area might be one of very great difficulty. I wanted to make clear that in my opinion the attitude of the American people and the Government with reference to Israel did not reflect a pro-Jewish, anti-Arab sentiment. The American people and the Government were, however, convinced that the establishment of the State of Israel under livable conditions was a historical necessity and the United States was determined to go through with it. We realized that doing so involved certain injustices to the Arab States. The situation was not one where there was any solution that was totally just to all concerned. The situation was so mixed with so many cross-interests that any solution would involve some injustices. Nevertheless, there had to be a solution, and, we believed, a peaceful solution. We believed that the pending Resolution with the seven-power amendments would pave the way to that kind of a solution, and it could mean the beginning of closer and happier relations with the Arab States than ever before because the American people would feel that the Arabs in accepting the establishment of the State of Israel had made a sacrifice for the cause of peace. Therefore, our present action could be looked upon not as inaugurating a continuing policy of supporting a Jewish State as against the Arabs, but rather as completing one phase of a historical development which, when completed, would permit of better relations than ever before with the Arab States.

I did not, of course, have in mind any concrete proposals for the future. I knew that if I came offering a certain number of dollars in the way of economic aid in exchange for votes my proposal would be, and should be, indignantly rejected. My purpose was merely to indicate that a certain course of action on the part of the Arab States could, in my opinion, open the door to better relations with the United States than ever before. The United States was, after all, the most powerful nation in the world and it was better to have the United States feel that the Arab States had made a sacrifice and accepted, to them, a painful result in the interest of peace, and to an extent at the behest of the United States, rather than to have a reverse situation.

The Prime Minister said that he greatly appreciated my call and the lofty spirit in which I had presented the situation. I had presented the matter in a form which would appeal most effectively to the Arab States. He would consider carefully what I had said and would communicate with his associates in the Arab League.