Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V, Part 2

501.BB Palestine/11–1648

Report by the National Security Council on Provision of a Police Force for Jerusalem¹

top secret

[Washington,] November 16, 1948.

NSC 27/3

The Problem

1. To determine the type of United Nations police force for Jerusalem which the United States could accept if Jerusalem is placed under United Nations control.

Analysis

2. The Palestine resolution adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on November 29, 1947, recommended with respect to Jerusalem that:

a. The city should be placed under a special international regime to be administered by the United Nations.

b. The Trusteeship Council should discharge the responsibilities of “administering authority”.

c. A governor of the city, appointed by the Trusteeship Council, should organize a police force, the members of which should be recruited outside Palestine.

3. In his final report on Palestine, the United Nations Mediator, the late Count Bernadotte, recommended that:

“The City of Jerusalem which should be understood as covering the area defined in the resolution of the General Assembly of 29th November, should be treated separately and should be placed under effective United Nations control with maximum feasible local autonomy for its Arab and Jewish communities, with full safeguards for the protection of the Holy Places and sites and free access to them, and for religious freedom.”

4. The present session of the United Nations General Assembly, which is now considering the problem of Palestine, may recommend for Jerusalem an international regime under UN control. The Department of State is of the opinion that this Government must in one form or another support a proposal to establish a United Nations police force in Jerusalem.

5. It is estimated that a police force of from 4,000 to 6,000 men, initially recruited outside Palestine, will be required if the territory of Jerusalem is to be placed under effective international control. Two general methods of supplying such a police force are open to the United Nations:

a. The force might be composed of contingents of troops or police personnel supplied by interested governments.

b. The force might be a quasi-military organization composed of persons recruited as individuals. Such recruitment might be effected by:

(1) The Secretary-General of the United Nations.

(2) The proposed “administering authority” for Jerusalem. (Under the United Nations resolution the Trusteeship Council was recommended as the “administering authority”.)

6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion from the military point of view that:

a. As a matter of national security, an international police force for Jerusalem should not be made up of contingents supplied by certain governments.

b. An international police force for Jerusalem recruited as individuals by the Secretary-General of the United Nations is less objectionable from a U.S. security viewpoint than a above, since Soviet personnel that might be recruited would enter Palestine as individuals and not as Soviet troops.

c. It is considered highly undesirable that American citizens be employed in a Jerusalem international police force, either as private individuals recruited by the Secretary-General or as members of the United States armed service, although their employment as private individuals would be less prejudicial to United States security interests than the use for peace enforcement in Palestine of United States armed forces.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have also suggested that, from the military viewpoint, a possible method of providing the necessary police force would be to have this force recruited and administered by the “administering authority” rather than by the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

7. Should there be adopted the alternative of forming the Jerusalem police force from contingents supplied by governments, it might be possible, through proper selection of such governments, to exclude Soviet forces. But it would be extremely difficult to exclude also both United States and satellite forces, unless one or a few “neutral” governments were chosen as “administering authority” and sole suppliers of contingents. It is unlikely that any countries acceptable to the United States could be induced to assume this responsibility.

8. Serious difficulties could be anticipated if individual recruitment of members of a Jerusalem police force were decided upon. For obvious reasons, a force initially composed only of Arabs and Jews would be unsatisfactory. Should the force be recruited by the United Nations on the same basis as that on which the Secretary-General has employed members of the UN Secretariat, there would no doubt be a number of Soviet and satellite nationals in the force. Should a different basis be proposed, such as recruitment restricted to nationals of selected “neutral” countries, applicants in sufficient numbers might not be forthcoming. In any case the problems of enlistment, command, language, training, equipment, and budgetary support, if they could be satisfactorily solved at all, would involve long delays in the face of the immediate need for a police force in Jerusalem.

Conclusions

9. There appears to be no practicable way of providing a UN police force for Jerusalem which would meet the requirements of UN administration of Jerusalem and which would also be consistent with the security interests of the United States.

10. In the event the present session of the UN General Assembly recommends establishment of a UN police force for Jerusalem as part of a plan for UN control of the city, a police force constituted as follows would be least objectionable to the United States:

a. The police force should consist of persons recruited as individuals, and not of contingents supplied by governments.

b. The members of the force should be recruited and controlled by the governor of Jerusalem (or by whatever agency is designated to exercise local administrative authority on behalf of the United Nations).

c. Recruitment of members of the police force should so far as practicable exclude nationals of the United States, the USSR, and the Soviet satellites and would, in so far as points a and b are concerned, be in general harmony with the pertinent provisions of the resolution passed on November 29, 1947 by the General Assembly of the United Nations.

11. In any event the United States should not accept any proposal for a Jerusalem police force which calls for the provision of armed force contingents by any of the following: the United States, the USSR, or the Soviet satellites.²

1. For the background on this paper, see footnote 3, p. 1525, and Mr. Lovett’s letter of November 4 to Secretary Forrestal, p. 1547.
2. President Truman approved the conclusions contained in NSC 27/3 on November 24 (memorandum of November 24 from Sidney W. Souers, Executive Secretary of the National Security Council, to the Secretary of State, 501.BB Palestine/11–1648).