Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V, Part 2

501.BB Palestine/11–1548: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

top secret
niact

Paris, November 15, 1948—noon.

Martel 134. Personal eyes only for Lovett. Douglas came from London to see me this afternoon and reported as follows:

Begin Douglas Report.

1. Prime Minister Attlee sent Douglas word November 12 that he would like to see him on a matter of grave importance at Chequers November 13. Douglas, accompanied by Lewis Jones, kept this appointment and found that Attlee had asked Lord Tedder and Michael Wright to be on hand for talk which lasted for three-quarters of an hour.

2. Attlee opened by stating that British Government is gravely perturbed about Palestine and sees situation there as presenting dangers as great and immediate to world peace and to Anglo-American cooperation as Berlin or any other present problem.

3. Only hope, said Attlee, lies in close Anglo-American cooperation. If this cannot be achieved over Palestine it will become much more difficult to achieve in other fields. Moreover, Palestine question contains seeds of possible impairment, if not impotence, of UN and of serious Anglo-American divergence. It is, therefore, essential that US and UK should maintain common ground.

4. Palestine problem has two aspects: (a) preservation of the truce, and (b) nature of a permanent settlement. Without preservation of truce there can be no settlement.

5. Re truce British Government has scrupulously observed conditions of truce and has refrained from delivering arms to Arab countries in spite of their treaty obligations to do so. However, truce has not been observed by Israel, which in breach of truce has built up a considerable modern fighting force largely with material from Czechoslovakia. Fact that truce has operated to advantage of one party has stretched relations of British Government with Arab countries almost to breaking point.

6. Attlee said that under SC resolution of November 4 Acting Mediator is about to fix a time limit for withdrawal of forces from their present positions so as to maintain principle that neither side benefits from breaches of truce. British Government considers this issue is crucial. If Jews refuse to comply and SC is unwilling or unable to take any action under chapter seven, way will be open for further unlimited breaches of truce by either side. When Arabs broke truce British Government publicly stated that it was willing to take part in application of measures against Arab countries under chapter seven and voted accordingly. Arab governments bowed to authority of SC. If Jews refuse to comply, same issue arises, but in respect to other party.

7. Speaking with great feeling Attlee said that in this matter British Government believes future of UN itself is at stake. Failure of League of Nations to take action on a similar issue was beginning of its downfall. Same is likely to be true with UN. Apart from specific issue, it seems to British Government essential that UK and US should do their utmost to secure action by SC if Israel flaunts [flouts] its authority. Among possible first steps would be strengthening arms embargo on party which fails to comply and lifting of arms embargo on other party; denial of loans; severance of financial and commercial relations, and of communications; and possibly at a later stage, blockade.

8. Meanwhile, said Attlee, British chiefs of staff have advised British Cabinet that, as a result of recent Jewish advances, security of Transjordan, who is Britain’s ally, is threatened. Consequently, British Govt is bound to consider what action it should take if Jews, in further violation of truce, were to attack TJ forces which have never entered any part of Palestine which, under November 29 UNGA resolution, would have gone to Jews. If Jews attack TJ territory as they have already attacked Lebanon (Jewish forces are now in occupation of sixteen Lebanese villages) British Govt would be obliged to give armed assistance to its ally. Same would apply in case of Egypt, but British treaty with TJ does not specify that assistance should only be given when TJ territory is attacked. British Govt would, therefore, be in grave dilemma. Objections to assistance by British armed forces to TJ forces in Palestine are obvious and serious, and British Govt has no desire to find itself embarked on this course. If, on other hand, British stand aside and allow TJ forces to be driven back across Jordan, their assistance may come too late, and the blow to value placed by other countries on any treaty of alliance with UK may be irreparable. It might be, said Attlee, that whole British and perhaps western position in Middle East might be lost. The more British Govt considers this dilemma, the less it likes it. It concludes that every possible step should be taken to avoid dilemma arising, always bearing in mind that at some point (e.g. TJ frontier) HMG would be obliged in any case to intervene with armed forces.

9. Attlee said it is hope of British Govt that if SC shows that either party which defies its authority will have measures taken against it, the dilemma will never arise.

10. Attlee then turned to what he described as an “immediate question” and said the British Govt has to consider not only threat to Transjordan but threat to safety of UK airfield at Amman, remembering that Jewish forces have already crossed Lebanese frontier and in an earlier stage of operations bombed Amman. UK airfield Amman is virtually defenseless at present. Consequently, British Govt has decided that reinforcements should be sent to UK airfield Amman (at present garrisoned by 150 men of the RAF regiment (training) with six armoured cars but without any AA defense). These reinforcements will be confined to RAF personnel, some light anti-aircraft equipment and necessary supplies, including some 30/50 tons of ammunition which could be held available at Amman under RAF guard for despatch to Arab Legion in event this is ordered as result Israeli attack.

11. Attlee said British Cabinet has also decided that if Jews refuse to comply with orders of Acting Mediator, it is intended to send UK detachment to Aqaba to forestall any possibility that Jews might attempt to occupy Aqaba.

12. Douglas reports that Attlee asked him in spirit of US–UK cooperation to advise me without delay of British Cabinet decision described paragraph 10 above since, as Tedder confirmed, British military are most anxious to begin airlift reinforcement Amman November 15 or 16. Douglas promised to deliver message to me and to report to Attlee any comments I might wish to make. Attlee said he would welcome these.

13. Speaking generally of arms embargo, Attlee said British Govt has scrupulously refrained from supplying any arms to Arab countries and are not proposing to do so now, but if Jews refuse to comply with SC, a new situation will have arisen. British Govt feels that in event non-compliance Jews SC should agree that arms embargo as a general measure should be lifted in respect of other party. In any case it would be very difficult for British Govt to continue to withhold arms which it is bound under its treaties to deliver.

14. Re permanent settlement to be worked out in UNGA Attlee said both US and UK have publicly supported Bernadotte proposals. He hoped UK would soon receive comments of US on draft resolutions which it is proposed US and UK jointly should introduce in UNGA in support of Bernadotte proposals, and that US and UK would soon agree on their tactics in matter towards other delegations. In British view Bernadotte proposals are not only those of Mediator, but are only common ground for a settlement on which UK and US have been able to agree. Attlee said “we are most anxious to make our area of agreement as solid as possible”.

15. After Attlee had finished Douglas reports that he took up with him following points.

16. Re desire for close US and UK cooperation in connection with both truce and final settlement (paragraph 3 above) Douglas assured Attlee that US is also anxious that this be maintained. Flexibility on both sides would contribute to this. Be truce (paragraph 6 above) Douglas presented forcefully my thoughts as embodied in Delga 717 and 618 [718], November 12¹ (repeated London as 1259 and 1251) with omission those parts inappropriate for discussion with UK. It was clear from replies of Attlee and Wright that while British Govt is somewhat skeptical as to its effectiveness UK would welcome conversion truce into armistice provided new resolution mentions November 4 resolution. UK feels that omission this reference would vitiate “psychological impact” mentioned paragraph 2 Delga 717. Douglas informs me Delga 739, November 12 [13]² accurately reflects highest level British thinking in this connection and, comparing resolution text in Delga 718 with text Delga 740³ Douglas is surprised and gratified at distance UK has gone to maintain common front with us.

17. Re immediate reinforcement RAF airfield Amman (paragraph 10 above) replying to Douglas questions Tedder confirmed solemnly that UK had sent no military equipment—not even necessary spare and maintenance parts to Arabs since imposition of embargo and stressed fact that present movement would be only from one UK military base in Egypt to another UK military in TJ. Tedder and Wright said that UK entertains no doubts re its legal rights in this connection. Attlee said UK action in advising me in advance and affording me an opportunity to express my views before movement begins is to be faithful to general spirit of US–UK cooperation in common problems. Douglas stressed fact that reinforcement steps could probably only be kept secret for few days and asked whether UK proposed to inform Mediator and have UN observer check fact ammunition flown in remains in RAF stores under RAF guard thus protecting UK against any charge that it is rearming Arabs. Tedder said there was no military objection to this being done. Wright said consideration is being given to parliamentary question on subject but presentation problem would be discussed November 14 with Hector McNeil. Douglas urged importance of presentation problem.

18. Re compliance by Jews with November 4 resolution (paragraph 13 above) Wright inquired whether US is exerting its great influence on PGI to this end. He said UK pressure on Arabs is unremitting and pointed out that if Jews do comply the serious contingencies mentioned by Prime Minister would never arise.

19. Re US comments on US–UK draft resolution (paragraph 14 above) Attlee added that UK can hardly put pressure on Arabs along any lines (see London’s 4818, November 10 to Dept⁴ until it has a ready answer to inevitable Arab question “does US agree with UK on settlement you are recommending?” End Douglas Report.

20. I wish to comment immediately to British Govt on specific point of reinforcing British military units and installations in Arab states. An important factor in problem is that early advent of rains will make it difficult or impossible to postpone reinforcement to a later date if reinforcement is to become necessary. Please notify me immediately whether you see any objection to my commenting as follows:

“I have considered carefully the considerations advanced by the British Govt on the subject of Palestine which Ambassador Douglas discussed fully with me today. The United States recognized that the British Govt must insure the security of its own armed forces and military installations. We assume, however, that in assessing the nature of the threat to such armed forces and installations in the Arab states, the British Govt will take into account the attitude of Israel toward the effort of the Security Council to maintain a truce and establish an armistice in Palestine.”⁵

Sent Dept as Martel 134 from Marshall, repeated London 1264 eyes only for Douglas.

Marshall

1. Latter not printed, font see footnote 1, p. 1582.
2. Not printed; but see ibid.
3. Dated November 13, not printed; but see ibid .
4. Not printed.

5. Mr. Lovett’s reply, on November 15 stated that he saw “no objection your comments to British Government as outlined. You may wish consider clarifying drafting third and last sentence, particularly ‘attitude of Israel toward the effort, etc.’

   “Assume this would be personal and secret communication from you to Attlee not to be released by British in support their contemplated action, which may be widely misunderstood here unless most carefully handled by them.” (Telmar 159 to Paris, 501.BB Palestine/11–1548)

   Ambassador Douglas delivered Secretary Marshall’s message to Prime Minister Attlee on the morning of November 17 and concluded that, unless the situation deteriorated seriously, the British would not send reinforcements to Amman before the Israeli reply to the Acting Mediator (telegram 884, November 17, 7 p. m., from London to the Secretary, at Paris, 501.BB Palestine/11–1748).