501.BB Palestine/11–1048: Telegram
The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Paris
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Telmar 148. Eyes only for the Secretary from Lovett.
1. President discussed our Palestine policy over weekend with Douglas and Lovett. For your information Douglas urged strategic advantage to US of providing Transjordan with a port on the Mediterranean. Douglas also gave considered opinion that (a) British were serious in their talk of rearming Transjordan and Egypt if warfare in violation of truce continued; and (b) that Bevin was now prepared to concede part of northern Negev to Israel.
2. President has established our basic Palestine policy along terms of Democratic Party platform as reaffirmed his statement Oct 24 as follows: “We approve the claim of the State of Israel to the boundaries set forth in the United Nations resolution of Nov 29 and consider that modifications thereof should be made only if fully acceptable to the State of Israel.” This position would mean that US would not support a claim by Israel to Jaffa and western Galilee now in its military occupation, the cession of which latter territory to Israel was recommended by Count Bernadotte. It thus seems possible that Israel, as was recommended by Mediator, might well consider relinquishing part of Negev to Arab States as quid pro quo for retaining Jaffa and western Galilee. Effect of this would boil down to territorial suggestions to PGI approved by President after discussion with Secretary of State on September 1, as set forth in Deptel 72 that date to Tel Aviv.1 These suggestions read as follows:
“The United States feels that the new State of Israel should have boundaries which will make it more homogeneous and well integrated than the hourglass frontiers drawn on the map of the November 29 resolution. Perhaps some solution can be worked out as part of any settlement with Transjordan which would materially simplify boundary problem. Specifically, it would appear to us that Israel might expand into the rich area of Galilee, which it now holds in military occupation, in return for relinquishing a large portion of the Negev to Transjordan. This would leave the new State with materially improved frontiers and considerably enriched in terms of natural resources by acquisition of Galilee in return for the desert Negev.”
The President feels that inducement to the parties to negotiate a settlement of the boundary problem will be strengthened by our standing firm on the November 29 boundaries except as modifications may be agreed between parties. If there is no agreement, then the US position will be that the Israelis should relinquish Galilee and Jaffa and the Egyptians should relinquish the Israeli portion of Negev.
3. In light of foregoing basic policy, Delegation should review draft resolution transmitted Delga 351, Oct. 16,2 which would have given effect to original Bernadotte Plan. We feel that events have overtaken many aspects of original plan and solution of boundary matters on practical basis in present circumstances is urgently needed. We recall also that President in his statement of Oct 24 said that in UN “a plan has been submitted which provides a basis for a renewed effort to bring about a peaceful adjustment of differences. It is hoped that, by using this plan as a basis of negotiation, the conflicting aims of the parties can be settled”.
Problem is therefore to combine fundamental position which President has consistently taken on Palestine—the territorial dispositions of the Nov 29 resolution—with Secretary’s general recommendation of Sept 21 on the Bernadotte Plan and with conditions as they exist today. Fortunately we are able to continue to subscribe to all the seven basic premises in the Bernadotte Plan and all his specific conclusions, with the exception of his recommendations regarding the boundaries of Israel. Even on this point, as the record makes clear, Dept expressed reservations with respect to Bernadotte’s recommendations on the Negev.
We feel a convenient starting point would be to revert to Bundle’s statement before Committee One on Oct 15, when he recapitulated Bernadotte’s seven basic premises and stressed that Bernadotte regarded his conclusions as designed principally to afford a basis for negotiation between the parties.
The Govt of Israel has for some time proclaimed its desire to achieve peace in Palestine by direct negotiation. There is now an opportunity for such negotiation. From this Govt’s point of view, base line is territorial recommendations of Nov 29 resolution modified by negotiation between the parties if they so desire. Since point at issue is how boundaries of Israel are to be defined by mutual agreement, Israelis and Arabs have choice between Nov 29 boundaries, which will be regarded as having disadvantageous elements from both Jewish and Arab point of view, or some new negotiated frontier.
In plain language, the President’s position is that if Israel wishes to retain that part of Negev granted it under Nov 29 resolution, it will have to take the rest of Nov 29 settlement which means giving up western Galilee and Jaffa. We feel that there is room for a mutually [Page 1567] advantageous arrangement—Israel to retain western Galilee and Jaffa in return for relinquishing part of Negev to Arab States, presumably Transjordan and Egypt.
We feel that it would be contrary to the President’s wishes if US Del came up with a plan of its own at this stage. He feels that our efforts should be directed toward having the two parties settle the matter or stick to the Nov 29 boundaries.
4. For your most secret information, if negotiations are undertaken, our feeling here is that our views on Negev outlined in Deptel 72, Sept 1, to Tel Aviv were then a more equitable and, because of recent developments, are now a more practical, solution. We are inclined to feel that the southern Israeli border, in trade for western Galilee and Jaffa, might be either a line running (a) from Gaza through Beer-sheba and thence southeasterly to Dead Sea, or (b) if necessary to expand area still further, that portion of the Negev allotted to Israel under the Nov 29 resolution lying north of the thirty-first parallel. Since the Nov 29 resolution provided a port for the Arabs on the Mediterranean, we feel this principle should be retained and either (a) or (b) above would seem to accomplish this objective. We think the thirty-first parallel as the negotiated southern frontier of Israel will be found to be the simplest.
5. This telegram has been personally approved by the President.3
- Ante, p. 1366.↩
- Ante, p. 1481.↩
- Mr. Lovett transmitted the text of this telegram in draft form to the White House Signal Center, with a memorandum of November 9, which requested that the telegram be sent to Clark Clifford for the President’s approval or comments (501.BB Palestine/11–948). The Acting Secretary, on November 10, suggested to Secretary Marshall that he might wish to send Ambassador Douglas the contents of Telmar 148 (telegram Telmar 151, 501.BB Palestine/11–1048). For the Ambassador’s account of the meeting with the President, said to have taken place on. November 6, see telegram 4849, November 12, from London, p. 1570. It was not until November 24 that the Department sent excerpts of Telmar 148 for background information to Paris, Moscow, Rome, Ankara, Arab capitals, Tel Aviv, and Jerusalem (telegram 441 to Damascus, 501.BB Palestine/11–2448).↩