Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V, Part 2

S/S–NSC Files, Lot 63D 351

Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Forrestal)

top secret

Washington, 29 October 1948.

NSC 27/2

As requested in your memorandum, dated 19 October 1948, dealing with the provision of a military or police force for Jerusalem, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the questions raised in the attached letter from the Acting Secretary of State¹ and have formulated the following statement of their views on the matters therein.

In a memorandum to you dated 18 August 1948² and for reasons fully discussed therein, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated that it would, from the military viewpoint, be seriously prejudicial to our national security either for Soviet or Soviet-satellite armed forces to be permitted to enter Palestine or for United States armed forces to be committed there. The entry of Soviet or Soviet-satellite personnel as individuals is likewise considered objectionable by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

However, with specific reference to the questions raised in the letter from the Acting Secretary of State, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that from the military viewpoint:

a. As a matter of national security, an international police force for Jerusalem should not be made up of contingents supplied by certain governments. (They note that it might be possible, as stated in the letter from the Acting Secretary of State, to exclude Soviet forces, but commitment of United States forces would, nevertheless, be involved.)

b. That an international police force for Jerusalem recruited as individuals by the Secretary General of the United Nations is less objectionable from a U.S. security viewpoint than a above, since Soviet personnel that might be recruited would enter Palestine as individuals and not as Soviet troops.

c. It is considered highly undesirable that American citizens be employed in a Jerusalem international police force, either as private individuals recruited by the Secretary General or as members of the United States armed services, although their employment as private individuals would be less prejudicial to United States security interests than the use for peace enforcement in Palestine of United States armed forces.

In order to mitigate the predominantly negative character of the above replies, the Joint Chiefs of Staff suggest the following possible alternative to the course of action referred to by Mr. Lovett. Jerusalem in the circumstances envisaged, would presumably be established as a “trust territory” as contemplated by the original United Nations General Assembly recommendation of November 1947, which, in this respect, the Bernadotte Plan merely confirms. Under the United Nations Charter, responsibility for maintenance of law and order in a “trust territory” is exercised by the “administering authority” under the supervision of the United Nations Trusteeship Council. It appears from the military viewpoint that a possible method of providing the necessary police force would be to have this force recruited and administered by the “administering authority” rather than by the Secretary General of the United Nations,³

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

William D. Leahy

Fleet Admiral, U.S. Navy, Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces

1. Dated October 18, p. 1488.
2. For text, see Mr. For rental’s memorandum of August 19 to the National Security Council, p. 1321.
3. Copy transmitted to the Secretary of State by Secretary Forrestal in a letter of October 30, the concluding paragraph of which read as follows: “In supplement of the enclosed views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I would like to say that the issues involved in the question which you presented are of such a far-reaching character that I believe they should be the subject of consideration and decision by the National Security Council. In view of the belief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the introduction of either United States or Soviet, or Soviet-satellite forces, in Palestine is incompatible with the security interests of the United States, I believe that we should at least explore alternative methods of dealing with the problem presented. In this connection, I believe most serious consideration should be given to the proposals of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as contained in the last paragraph of their memorandum of 29 October 1948.” (501.BB Palestine/10–3048)

   At Secretary Forrestal’s formal request of November 2, the National Security Council undertook consideration the following day of Mr. Lovett’s letter of October 18, Secretary Forrestal’s reply of October 30, and the memorandum of October 29 by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.