Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V, Part 2

501.BB Palestine/10–2748: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

top secret   urgent
niact

Paris, October 27, 1948—2 p. m.

Martel 90. For Lovett eyes only from the Secretary. During his call this morning Bevin said the British Government was finding itself in an increasingly difficult position with the Arab States, in particular Transjordan, because of the complete embargo which Great Britain had imposed following the UN truce in Palestine and because of his understanding with the US on the sale of any munitions, arms, etc. to the Arab countries.

Bevin said that Great Britain had been instrumental in persuading the Arab States to accept the Security Council cease-fire order in the expectation that its provisions embargoing arms to the parties would be effectively honored. For this reason the British Government had gone so far as even to cancel certain pending contracts for munitions which had already been negotiated with Transjordan. It was now apparent to all that the Jews during this period had been able to violate the arms provision of the truce arrangement with impunity and had been receiving all types of arms, and in particular planes, from Czechoslovakia and elsewhere while the Arabs had been unable to obtain any munitions whatsoever. With the defeats inflicted upon the Egyptian Army and the present position of the Jewish forces, Abdullah’s Arab Legion might become exposed to annihilating attacks on the part of the Jews. Bevin said he was under great pressure to let Abdullah obtain at least some arms in order to permit the Arab Legion to survive. He dwelt in some length on the importance of the Arab Legion as the only disciplined Arab force for the implementation of any Palestine partition solution. He made it quite plain that Great Britain could not stand by and see Transjordan and the Arab Legion placed in a position where it would be unable to defend itself against possible Jewish attack. He went so far as to state categorically that if the Israel forces should attack Transjordan proper at any time, the treaty of assistance with Great Britain would be immediately operative.

Cadogan, who was present, stated that the Security Council tomorrow is taking up the Palestine question and he believes that the Chinese would agree to join UK in introducing a resolution under Article 41 of Chapter 7 to induce parties to comply with provisions of truce.

Bevin agreed to withhold any decision on the arms question until the Security Council had considered this matter and until it was clear whether or not Israel would abide by the decision reached in the Council.

Bevin was fully aware of the effect upon US–UK relations of any departure from the present arms embargo in favor of Transjordan, but he made it quite plain that because of the discrimination in the manner in which the arms embargo had operated due to the successful evasion of its provisions by Israel, if matters continued as they were now the British Government would feel bound in fairness to let Abdullah acquire some munitions in England.

Under the present arrangement we would not be able to speak in support of a resolution under Article 41, but after my talk with Bevin, I believe acceptance of Security Council authority in regard to observance of truce is the only chance of preventing the British Government from taking the action indicated by Bevin in regard to arms for Transjordan.¹

Marshall

1. Mr. Bohlen, who was present at the conversation, reported on this aspect as follows: “The Secretary told Mr. Bevin that we were fully aware of the fact that Israel was obtaining arms from Czechoslovakia and that we had been making great efforts to attempt to control this illegal traffic or at least to obtain sufficient facts to make them public but that, as Mr. Bevin could understand, it was difficult to obtain any satisfaction in Czechoslovakia at the present time. The Secretary said that we were fully aware of the dilemma in which the British Government found itself and of the great significance of this matter.” (Memorandum of conversation drafted by Bohlen, October 27, 501.BB Palestine/10–2748)