Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V, Part 2

501.MA Palestine/10–548

Draft Position Paper on Relief for Near Eastern Refugees¹

[Washington,] October 5, 1948.

Problem

The conclusions of Part III of the Progress Report of the United Nations Mediator on Palestine point out that the temporary alleviation of the Palestine refugees is quite inadequate to meet any continuing need and suggests that responsibility for their relief be assumed by the UN in conjunction with the neighboring Arab states, the provisional government of Israel, the specialized agencies and voluntary organizations of a humanitarian and non-political character. The problem is to determine what kind of action should be taken by the General Assembly in meeting this responsibility.

Recommendations

1. It is anticipated that the Mediator will present an overall program of relief assistance for Arab and Jewish refugees for the period January 1 to September 1, 1949, which will take account of the assistance now being rendered or which may be furnished by UNICEF, the specialized agencies, members of UN, the neighboring Arab states, the provisional government of Israel and voluntary organizations; It is recommended that the governments having important interests in the Near East, particularly the United States and the United Kingdom, furnish a large proportion of the assistance required under the program and that the U.S. delegation announce that this government is prepared to present to the Congress, when it reconvenes in January 1949, a request for an appropriation for a contribution to such a relief program. The amount of the proposed U.S. contribution will be formulated after the Acting Mediator has presented such a program.

2. It is recommended in addition that the U.S. delegation initiate or support a resolution including the following points:

(a) Utilize, for a relief program for Arab and Jewish refugees, at least $6,000,000 of the residual funds of UNRRA allocated to UNICEF by the Central Committee of UNRRA, such expenditures to form part of an integrated program under the coordination of the Acting Mediator;^*

(b) Invite the IRO to render the fullest practicable assistance within its budgetary and constitutional limitations in line with the resolution adopted by the General Council of IRO on this subject;

(c) Invite the WHO to provide such medical personnel or other services as may be feasible in order to assist in the control of disease and in preventing the outbreak of serious epidemics;

(d) Invite the FAO to furnish such expert assistance on food supply and nutritional problems as may be requested by the Acting Mediator;

(e) Take note of the assistance being rendered by governments and non-governmental organizations and stress the necessity for full coordination of all such assistance with the program of the Acting Mediator;

(f) Provide the Acting Mediator immediately with a supplementary credit of not less than $1,000,000 for obtaining the services of such staff as he may require in coordinating relief assistance other than personnel detailed by specialized agencies or by governments and for emergency purposes, pending the receipt of aid from other sources.

Discussion

financial problem

The Mediator’s Report points up the action already taken to alleviate, the desperate condition of the 330,000 Arab and 7,000 Jewish refugees, and of the contributions in supplies and personnel furnished by governments, specialized agencies, UNICEF, and voluntary organizations, for the short term program, September–December 1948. Although reference is made to the need for a long-range program through August–September, 1949, and the hope is expressed that the General Assembly will assume responsibility for it, no concrete program has yet been presented for consideration by the General Assembly. It is believed, however, that such a program will be submitted as soon as the reports of the experts (supply, medical, nutritional) who have been surveying the situation have been completed. Preliminary estimates and suggestions have been forwarded to Paris by Sir Raphael Cilento,² but he has indicated that he would not have the full picture until the above-mentioned reports were submitted to him, which were due about October 1. Consequently the position outlined in the recommendations cannot be finalized until a program is laid before the General Assembly.

Whatever the size of the program, it is clear from rough preliminary estimates that it will cost not less than about $25 million, and that ways and means must be found for financing it. It is equally clear that the principal burden will have to be carried by those governments which have a strong, direct interest in the Near East, namely the United States and the United Kingdom, in addition to the Arab states themselves. The remainder would be raised on a humanitarian or welfare basis from UNICEF, certain specialized agencies, some governments, and voluntary organizations. An operation of such proportions cannot be financed under the UN scale of contributions, and therefore UN financial responsibility must be limited to a relatively small amount such as that suggested in recommendation 2(f). The position of the United Kingdom as outlined in Delga 158, September 29,³ is silent on the costs of expanding the present disaster relief operations, but indicates that the whole financial burden would be borne by the UN as its responsibility. This position is considered unrealistic because it would result in nearly doubling the contributions of all Members, without regard to their degree of interest or ability to contribute. (There are other financial implications in the Mediator’s report which will place a heavy burden on some, if not all UN Members, e.g., the Jerusalem police force, tentatively estimated by the Department to cost about $30 million.) If the UN scale is not practical, neither is any other scale applicable to all UN Members (such as the IRO) which carries with it a specific obligation. The only alternative, therefore, is for those governments having a strong interest in the problem to proffer voluntary contributions. Because of the important strategic and political interests of the United States in the Near East, it is considered that those interests would be advanced by announcing the intention of this government to seek an appropriation from Congress for the assistance of these refugees. The amount to be proposed will need to be determined after the relief program has been submitted, but it is tentatively suggested that about $10 million would be appropriate. If the United Kingdom were to contribute half that amount, the two contributions, together with $6 million from UNICEF would total $21,000,000. Contributions from all other sources would make up for the difference. In making any announcement of the intention of the U.S. to make a voluntary contribution, stress should of course be given to the humanitarian aspects of this problem rather than to the interests of the U.S. The statement should at the same time express the hope that other governments would likewise contribute.

It is hoped that the Acting Mediator will not submit a plan for financing the program. Sir Raphael Cilento in a letter to M. Laugier⁴ September 21, made several suggestions on this subject which the Department considers unrealistic. For example, he anticipated that about $9,000,000 could be raised through voluntary organizations. Insofar as the U.S. is concerned, the response from the voluntary organizations and the oil companies to the Mediator’s appeal of August 16 is disappointing. The potentially large donors, including the oil companies, have indicated a reluctance to make contributions for purely relief purposes, especially food and have indicated a much greater interest in longer-range social development. The agencies which control CROP (Church World Service, National Catholic Relief Service, Lutheran World Relief) have not proven as cooperative as had been hoped in providing a contribution in wheat. Moreover, they are planning at this stage to launch a publicity campaign themselves to broaden the program of collections to include appeals for refugees from the Holy Land. The Department therefore considers that any program which relies so heavily upon contributions from voluntary sources from the U.S. is likely to fail, and that measures along the line recommended above are required. Similarly, contributions from private sources cannot take the place of a U.S. government contribution which is required to demonstrate U.S. interest. This position is a reversal of the earlier position set forth in the Memorandum of August 31 on “Plan of Action on Arab Refugee Problem”.⁵

[Here follow sections on possible UNICEF and IRO assistance.]

UN Budgetary Provision

The proposed UN allocation of $1,000,000 is to provide an adequate staff for the Director of Relief Operations for the entire period and to furnish him with a reserve for emergency purposes pending the receipt of aid from other sources. It would be desirable to vote a part, if not all, of this sum as a supplementary credit for the current fiscal year in order to enable Cilento to move in on the problem in a more effective way as soon as possible. Shortly before his death Count Bernadotte stated that he needed $100,000 immediately to provide staff for Cilento and informally inquired whether the U.S. could contribute that sum.⁶ As indicated in Gadel 31, September 21,⁷ the Department considered that such staff should be provided by the UN to the extent that personnel has not been detailed by specialized agencies, governments, or voluntary agencies.

[Here follows further discussion of UN budgetary provision.]

Organization

No recommendation has been submitted herewith with regard to the organization which should take the place of the Mediator insofar as the direction or control of relief operations are concerned. This matter is receiving further consideration in the Department and a separate paper will be forthcoming.

The foregoing recommendations assume that responsibility for relief operations will continue to be under the Director of Relief Operations. The British have suggested, as reported in Delga 134, September 28,⁸ that while the disaster relief operations should presumably work under the Conciliation Commission initially, it could be placed directly under the Secretary General as its responsibilities were expanded to include resettlement. Until further progress has been made concerning the role of the Conciliation Commission, the Department is not prepared to commit itself on the possible assignment of disaster relief operations to this body. In the second place it is conceivable that the governments or bodies (such as UNICEF) making substantial contributions for relief may wish to have some control over relief policies in spite of the relatively short time the program will be in operation. Similarly the Director of Relief Operations might wish to be responsible to such a group rather than to the Conciliation Commission whose functions as outlined in the Bernadotte report do not include supervision of relief activities. The principal objection to making the Director of Relief Operations responsible solely to the Secretary General is that the relatively small number of contributing governments would have little opportunity except at the next session of the General Assembly to see how their money had been spent or to exercise any supervision over the operations during the course of the year. It is also conceivable that Congress may wish in making an appropriation for this program to be assured that U.S. interests are adequately protected. A further paper on this subject will be forwarded as soon as possible.

Repatriation and Resettlement

No recommendations are set forth in this paper concerning repatriation and resettlement which the Department considers should be distinguished from relief operations. The Department is giving consideration to the repatriation and resettlement problems which will form the basis of a separate paper. To the extent that the matter has been discussed, there seems to be no reason why the relief operations should be expanded to include resettlement in view of the distinctly different nature of the problem. In the second place, the financing of resettlement is closely linked with the problem of compensation for the property of those who choose not to return. Furthermore, there is considerable doubt as to whether the UN should assume any direct responsibility for financing resettlement. In this connection it should be borne in mind that the IRO resettlement program does not involve the expenditure of funds for resettlement projects in the countries of reception and that its expenditures for resettlement are almost entirely devoted to providing overseas transportation and a small amount of pocket money. The UN, however, might undertake to provide experts in an advisory capacity to assist the Arab countries in the development of resettlement projects. These preliminary observations are tentatively put forward for discussions with the UK delegation pending the completion of the paper on this subject.

1. Transmitted toy Mr. Tomlinson to ten officers of the Department with a memorandum of October 5, which stated that the recommendation regarding a United States contribution would need to be cleared with Mr. Lovett and Congressional leaders.
2. When reference is made to the Acting Mediator, it is intended to include any body which may be designated by the General Assembly to succeed him, such as the Conciliation Commission or the Secretary General. (See section on Organization in the discussion.)
2. Director of Disaster Relief for the United Nations.
3. Not printed.
4. Henri Laugier, Assistant Secretary-General of the United Nations in charge of Social Affairs.
5. Ante, p. 1364.
6. As reported by Mr. McClintock in telegram 1327, September 16, 7 p. m., from Cairo, not printed.
7. Not printed.
8. Not printed.