501.BB Palestine/10–448: Telegram
The Special Representative of the United States in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State
niact
161. Personal for President and Acting Secretary. A well-informed and influential Israeli official, during strictly personal confidential [Page 1451] conversation with Knox, expressed following opinion regarding Bernadotte proposal give Negev to Transjordan:
- 1.
- The US has firm friend in State of Israel, which is oriented toward the West politically and culturally, and which, up until now, is deeply grateful for US support.
- 2.
- The Arab states, weak, vacillating, and of dubious friendship toward the West and the US, as evidenced in World War II, have already been offended by the US support of the November 29 partition, and what has been done cannot now be undone.
- 3.
- US support of British proposal to give Negev to Transjordan
would be no solution to anything and can have only following
results:
- (a)
- It would not endear the other Arab states to the US.
- (b)
- It would create a miniature State of Israel, which would inevitably become embittered toward the US.
- 4.
- Thus, by forcing transfer of Negev, the US would gain no further friends in Middle East and lose one friend.
Furthermore, Transjordan would not be grateful to US for our support of what is considered to be a British gift of Negev to Abdullah. Abdullah has neither the population, capital, skill, nor desire to utilize the Negev and his position would be merely that of “holding” it for British.
Another factor enters the picture at this point. If British force gift of Negev to Transjordan in order secure air bases that region for use in event East-West clash, it will do so at cost of creating an embittered and hostile State of Israel directly adjacent. This doesn’t seem make much sense.
By British and US support of Negev feature Bernadotte report, an extremely difficult situation has been created. This has virtually destroyed any hope of Israel Transjordan direct reasonable settlement because Abdullah now can sit back and await developments; he will hardly be disposed settle for less than the proposals in Bernadotte report. The Jews once again see themselves in hopeless position of having their minimum position being considered maximum, and being whittled down from minimum.
In listening to above arguments of Jews there is, of course, no reaction indicated on part of Knox or myself. We do not know exactly what special reasons motivate US policy and in any event must firmly support that policy whatever it may be, or wherever it may lead. However, our confidential opinion is that although adoption of Negev Bernadotte proposals might serve British strategic interest, it would disproportionately entangle this situation and sow dangerous seeds of bitterness.
Sent Department 161. Department pass Paris 7 for GADel.