Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V, Part 2

501.BB Palestine/10–148

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Satterthwaite)¹

confidential

[Washington,] October 1, 1948.

Subject: Developments concerning the Bernadotte Report and the situation in Palestine.

Participants:	Mr. T. E. Bromley, First Secretary of the British Embassy
	NEA—Mr. Satterthwaite
	UNA—Mr. McClintock
	NE—Mr. Rockwell

Mr. Bromley called to state that the British Embassy had been instructed to convey to the State Department the sense of a telegram which the Foreign Office had sent to Mr. Bevin in Paris and which Mr. Bevin would take up with Secretary Marshall. The Foreign Office desired to inform the State Department of its concern over the delay in the discussion of the Bernadotte report in the General Assembly,² and to emphasize its conviction as regards the necessity of maintaining the Anglo-American unity which had now, after so many difficulties, been established as regards the Palestine question. The Foreign Office was apprehensive concerning the pressure of interests in this country seeking an alteration of the stand taken by the United States Government in this regard.

Mr. Satterthwaite stated that the Department of State was thoroughly in agreement with the Foreign Office as regards the necessity of maintaining a united front on this vital question.

Mr. Bromley then stated that the Foreign Office had again instructed the British Embassy to sound out the Department as regards the possibility of the Department’s instructing its representatives in the Arab states to impress upon Arab leaders the United States Government’s firm conviction that the most logical disposition of Arab Palestine would be its incorporation in Transjordan. Mr. Bromley said that the Foreign Office was concerned lest Arab leaders gain the impression that there was lack of unity between the United States and Great Britain on this question.

We told Mr. Bromley that Secretary Marshall had publicly expressed this Government’s support of the Bernadotte plan in its entirety, and that the Department was in complete agreement that the most logical disposition of Arab Palestine would be its incorporation in Transjordan. However, we did not believe it would be helpful to the achievement of this conclusion of the Mediator’s to have the United States Government make a specific approach to Arab leaders as desired by the Foreign Office. Rather, we felt that such course of action might dispose the other Arab leaders against Transjordan. In our opinion it was a question of timing, and the present moment was not opportune to make such a representation. We repeated that so far we had had no evidence from the field that Arab leaders believed there was any lack of unity between the United States and Great Britain on this issue.

Mr. Bromley then said that the Foreign Office hoped that the American Government would express to Arab statesmen its approval of British assurances that the various Anglo-Arab treaties would come into effect in the event of Jewish violation of frontiers established by the United Nations in Palestine. Mr. Satterthwaite said that this question had already been brought to the attention of the Department and was under discussion.

J[oseph] C. S[atterthwaite]

1. Drafted by Stuart W. Rockwell of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs.
2. High officials of the British Foreign Office deemed the delay a “major setback”, fearing that the delay greatly increased the danger of a serious breach of the truce by the Jews. They also expressed the fervent hope that the United States would exercise all of its influence to restrain the Israelis from embarking on military adventures (telegram 4344, October 1, 8 p. m., from London, 501.BB Palestine/10–148).