IO Files: US(P)/A/C.1/52

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. William I. Cargo

secret

Subject: Palestine—Future of Jerusalem

Participants: Sir Hugh Dow, British Commissioner in Jerusalem
Mr. Harold Beeley, United Kingdom Delegation
Mr. Morgan Mann, United Kingdom Delegation
Mr. Dean Rusk, United States Delegation
Mr. John C. Ross, United States Delegation
Mr. Fraser Wilkins, United States Delegation
Mr. Samuel K. C. Kopper, United States Delegation
Mr. William I. Cargo, United States Delegation

As proposed by Mr. Beeley the previous evening, Sir Hugh Dow, British Commissioner in Jerusalem, came with Mr. Beeley and Mr. Mann, to give us his own information and his views about the present situation in Jerusalem in relationship to the Bernadotte Report. A general discussion of the future status of Jerusalem ensued.

Sir Hugh stated the view that the Arab and Jewish communities in Jerusalem were now entirely separated and strongly divided. In point of fact, he added that there was a physical no-man’s land between the two areas. It was his misfortune, he observed, to live in that no-man’s land. In his opinion, Jerusalem was beyond the point where effective United Nations control could be established. Alluding to the fairly common suggestion that a United Nations authority should provide for the carrying out of “necessary common services”, he remarked that there were no “necessary common services”. The two communities lived essentially separate existences.

Sir Hugh felt that any realistic planning must start with the assumption that there would be in effect two separate municipalities with defined frontiers. He personally saw no objection to placing these separate areas under the respective sovereignty of the Jewish State and the State which would arise from or control the Arab area.1

In response to a question, Sir Hugh observed that United Nations control in Jerusalem might have been possible if it had been vigorously sought through the agency of the Mediator at the time of the first truce. He felt that the Mediator’s first suggestion for government of Jerusalem by the Arabs, as well as subsequent events, had made this now impossible. Expressly he believed that a force of 10,000 troops would be needed to maintain law and order in Jerusalem. The Irgun, he [Page 1441] pointed out, was extremely powerful in Jerusalem and maintained its existence separate from the Haganah. In reply to a further question, Sir Hugh expressed the view that the two communities in Jerusalem would provide revenue only for their own administrations and would not pay the expense of a United Nations administrative staff.

On the question of a land corridor for the state of Israel between Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, Sir Hugh regarded this as unnecessary. He characterized it as a “plan for war and not for peace”. He also pointed out that a land corridor under the sovereignty of one state not only connects two areas, but inevitably divides a third.

Mr. Beeley observed that outright sovereignty by the state of Israel and an Arab state over respective portions of Jerusalem was not compatible with the conclusions of the Bernadotte Report, which both the United States and the United Kingdom had endorsed. There was general assent to this comment.

Attention was turned to the question of the ultimate status of the City of Jerusalem. Mr. Rusk asked Sir Hugh’s opinion of the possibility of Jerusalem becoming a condominium under the joint control of the State of Israel and the Arab State. Sir Hugh expressed the definite opinion that this was not feasible because the two parties would not sit down together in a common council. The situation which must be contemplated, he felt, involved a practical separation of the two communities. Mr. Rusk asked what role the United Nations might play if sovereignty were held by the two states over portions of Jerusalem. Sir Hugh’s reply was that would depend upon the personality of the United Nations agent involved; he felt that the need was for a real municipal expert to be sent on behalf of the United Nations.

Mr. Rusk suggested that it might be feasible to work out arrangements whereby the state of Israel would become the administering authority of the Jewish part of Jerusalem under the terms of a trusteeship agreement, and the Arab State the administering authority of the Arab portion of Jerusalem. In the ensuing discussion it was observed that such a device offered attractive possibilities in that the terms of trusteeship could include guarantees for the Holy Places and that the Trusteeship Council could watch over the interests of the international community in Jerusalem through the examination of reports and petitions and the making of periodic visits in accordance with its usual procedures. Mr. Beeley stated the view that the United Kingdom Government, at an appropriate time, would be willing to give serious consideration to this possibility. He said, however, that they would not be willing to consider any departure from the Bernadotte Report at this Assembly since they had already endorsed it and particularly that they would not like to take any action which would suggest Jewish sovereignty over the Jewish portion of the City. It was indicated to Mr. Beeley that the discussion of trusteeship had not been [Page 1442] with a view to the possibilities of such a proposal at the present session of the General Assembly. Sir Hugh inquired whether the trusteeship suggestion just made was not the sort of thing which might be suggested to the next session of the General Assembly by a United Nations Commissioner for Jerusalem, if provided for by the present session and appropriately empowered to make proposals concerning the future discharge of United Nations responsibilities toward Jerusalem. It was agreed that this was the case.

William I. Cargo
  1. On September 9, Embassy London had brought to the attention of the Department Sir Hugh’s views regarding the division of Jerusalem into separate municipalities under the sovereignty of Arab and Jewish states and his belief that once the concept of Jerusalem as an international enclave were abandoned, there was no strong reason for external control of the Arab and Jewish municipalities (telegram 4044, 867N.01/9–948).