501.BB Palestine/9–1448: Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Bliss) to the Secretary of State

top secret

4111. 1. Visit here of Jessup and Ross has been timely and helpful regarding Palestine. Meetings took place in Foreign Office September 13 and 14. Conclusions of informal and cordial conversations follow.

2. It was apparent from outset that on British side proposals which have been discussed between US and UK have been largely formulated at political level with only general consultation with Jebb’s UN Department. Wright and his subordinates readily agreed time had come to work out tactics and Jebb attended both meetings. On many points of procedure latter’s views were closer to those of Jessup and Ross than to those of other Foreign Office officers.

3. It was agreed that definite road ahead reference UN strategy would not be charted even tentatively without some indication Mediator’s reactions to talks with McClintock and Troutbeck, future plans, et cetera. It was further agreed that any plan of campaign which might be developed between US and UK would have to take into account likelihood sudden changes being necessitated by unexpected leaks, violation of truce, et cetera. Consequently, it was agreed that Foreign Office officials would remain in close contact with [Page 1395] GADel in Paris as well as with Embassy. Beeley will depart for Paris September 19 or 20.

4. While no definite conclusions were reached considerable exchange tentative thinking took place reference timing of publication of Mediator’s proposals. In view postponing major debate on Palestine for some weeks Jessup and Ross expressed thought that it might be wise for Mediator to begin by converting lines of truce into “lines of armistice” upon which SC report would be forthcoming. At later stage Mediator would make recommendations for Jerusalem, Haifa, Lydda, [garble] and recommend to UNGA that lines of armistice (with some modification, in particular elimination of Jerusalem corridor) should become permanent frontiers. General discussion, however, produced alternative idea that Mediator might pave way for his proposals, and at same time achieve a degree of delay calculated to keep Palestine out of UNGA until November, by sending SecGen in very near future factual report (Paragraph 1, Embtel 4076 September 121) in which Mediator would indicate that he planned to present to UNGA within a few weeks new proposals for a final settlement of Palestine problem. It was agreed that in intervening 3 or 4 weeks before Mediator publishes his proposals, Mediator would make details known to Arab and Jewish leaders with request that they be kept secret, and towards end period US and UK could quietly apply diplomatic pressure to Arabs and Jews. If between now and October 15 rumors of these proposals became public they would still be in nature of rumors and as such, perhaps would be less likely to bring down an avalanche of pressure upon US and UK from Arabs and Jews. It was further agreed that if this idea of timing was found reasonable in light of reports from McClintock and Troutbeck regarding their conversations with Mediator, US and UK should lose no time in putting their views regarding timing in this sense.

5. Americans expressed grave doubts that international contingents could be secured to assist UN governor Jerusalem (Paragraph 9 Embassy’s 3880 August 27). Jebb reported this point and conclusion reached after some discussion was that probably best plan would be for governor to have personal force of about 200 UN guards which would be the nucleus of a Jerusalem international police force to which PGI and TJ would be called upon in UNGA resolution to contribute contingents for service in the Arab and Jewish municipalities. It was thought that even though neither PGI nor TJ would possess sovereign rights in Jerusalem they would by this means be given definite responsibility for maintaining law and order in Jewish and Arab municipalities.

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6. Full agreement was reached that Arab acquiescence to existence of Israel would be hastened if it were apparent to Arabs that Israeli frontiers would be subject to special guarantee. Wright said that British obligations under treaties with Egypt arid TJ would automatically be extended to cover any areas added to Egypt and TJ. Consequently, a onesided extra guarantee would exist. Americans suggested and Foreign Office agreed that some guarantee of a more general character was desirable. The suggestion which was finally found apt was that there should be resolution on this subject recommending that, until frontiers were recognized by agreement between the parties concerned, lines drawn by Mediator should be considered to be an international frontier, and that any violation of it should be treated by SC as breach of peace.

7. Foreign Office, Embassy and USGADel, Paris would appreciate early comments Department regarding substance Paragraphs 4, 5, and 6 above.

8. Jessup and Ross returned to Paris today.2

Sent Department 4111, repeated Paris for Jessup and Gadel 604.

Bliss
  1. Not printed.
  2. A further account of the conversations with the British officials was sent to Mr. Satterthwaite by Mr. Ross in his letter of September 15 from Paris, not printed (867N.01/9–1548).