501.BB Palestine/9–948: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State
top secret
London, September
9, 1948—noon.
4033. For the Secretary. I plan to take up subject of Department’s 3470, September 11 with Bevin personally at an early opportunity and to elicit considered British views, but I believe they are likely to be along lines of following reactions at Wright–Burrows level:
- 1.
- Announcement by PGI that its elections have been postponed from October 1 to November 15 in view Foreign Office officials may obviate dangers which they believe would be inherent in simultaneous de jure recognition by US of PGI and Transjordan during or before crucial period of discussion following announcement of Mediator’s proposals. Officials in principle welcome US intention to recognize Transjordan, see logic of US extending de jure recognition to Israel (Embassy’s 3878, August 27, Paragraph 5) and agree that there are advantages in simultaneous recognition both countries. In their view, however, timing of recognition in relation to action which US and UK have been discussing (Embassy’s 3962 September 3) is vitally important.
- 2.
- Foreign Office officials fear US recognition of Transjordan before acquiescence of Arab States to Mediator’s proposals is achieved would greatly weaken already shaky position of Transjordan in eyes of its Arab neighbors who would be quick to allege that US recognition of Transjordan is clear evidence of US-Transjordan “deal” by which former paid Transjordan with recognition for “selling out” Arab cause in Palestine. Foreign Office officials have no doubt that Arab press and public will in any case roundly denounce any proposals put forward by Mediator even though they believe that “acquiescence” of Arab States to proposals can be secured eventually. However, vigor of these denunciations would be greatly increased if local scapegoat [Page 1384] wearing horns of perfidy were available. UN has advantage of being an intangible villain but “Rabbi” Abdullah, upon whom we will have to rely so heavily at a later stage, is already on the spot and would be in even worse one if he were to appear prior to UN action as party to “deal”.
- 3.
- Officials believe it is essential that if Transjordan is to be useful in achieving a lasting settlement Abdullah must seem just as outraged as other Arab leaders with whom it is expedient that the [he?] display every evidence of solidarity.
- 4.
- In essence view of Foreign Office officials is that timing of US de jure recognition of both Transjordan and PGI should be decided on basis of progress actually made with regard to Mediator’s proposals.
- 5.
- Goldmann confirmed November 15 election date today.
Douglas