Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V, Part 2

501.BB Palestine/9–1248

Memorandum of Conversation Prepared in the Office of the Special Representative of the United States in Israel¹

top secret

[Tel Aviv,] September 7, 1948.

(Note: Mr. McDonald with the assistance of Messrs. Knox and Cummings² had a very carefully phrased statement, incorporating in paraphrase all of the important points contained in the Department’s TS No. 72 of September 2 [1], 5 [6] p. m., so that Mr. McDonald could read the statement to the Foreign Minister thus eliminating any possibility of misunderstanding or misinterpretation thru verbal lapse. A copy of this prepared statement is attached as Appendix A to this memorandum.)

After an exchange of amenities Mr. McDonald explained that he had something of primary importance to communicate from his government and that he preferred to read it, and that he would add nothing to it verbally, suggesting that the Foreign Minister might care to make notes as he proceeded.

Mr. McDonald read, slowly and clearly the contents of the prepared statement. Mr. Shertok took extensive notes.

When the reading was finished, Mr. Shertok commented as follows; first, he said he greatly appreciated that the U.S. was taking an active interest in the problem of a peace settlement; second, he thanked Mr. McDonald for the expressions of willingness on the part of the U.S. to assist Israel in establishing peace and in building the state into a constructive force for good in the Middle East; third, he stated that as regards Jerusalem he was pleased to note that the suggestion allowed for some flexibility; fourth, he stated that of course he was not prepared to comment at this time on the suggestion regarding an exchange of territory; fifth, as to the specific interrogation as to whether the PGI would give any assurance that any of the Arab States were willing to negotiate peace he went into a lengthy explanation, the substance of which is as follows:

That about two months ago the PGI had sent some officials to Paris in the hope of contacting some Arab representatives there. The efforts were not successful although the PGI agents did have discussions with the Ministers in Paris of Syria and Lebanon, and with the Transjordan Minister to Great Britain who made a special trip to Paris to see them; these conversations were in the most general terms and although very friendly did not progress to the “brass tacks” level. Also contacted were several prominent (though not official) Egyptians whose attitude was not unfriendly but who could not contribute anything concrete. As regards the Transjordan Minister in London it was anticipated by the PGI that he would come back to Paris for further discussions but he never returned, possibly owing to British interference.

One month ago, upon the conclusion of the Fast of Ramadan, the Belgian Consul General in Jerusalem sent the customary letter of congratulations to King Abdullah, concluding with a final sentence which hoped for peace. The Belgian Consul General informed Mr. Shertok that, to his surprise, the King seized upon the last sentence of the letter, asked the Belgian Consul General to visit him personally, and told him verbally that he was most anxious for peace with the Jews, making in that connection several complimentary remarks about Mr. Shertok and asking the Consul General to suggest to Shertok that the Jews and Arabs meet in Cyprus to talk matters over. Shertok sent word back to the King, through the Consul General, that the PGI was equally anxious for peace but suggested that Paris would be a better place to meet than Cyprus. The King is reported to have agreed to Paris as the rendezvous and stated that his representative would appear there in due course to meet with the PGI representatives. Shertok says that nothing has happened in the meantime although the PGI is waiting; Shertok felt that the British had probably gotten wind of the King’s move and advised him not to carry it thru.

Shertok then launched into an extremely brilliant historical summary of British policy in Palestine and stated that, although it was pure conjecture on his part, he was now convinced that the British were deluding themselves and the Arabs into believing that the truce if carried long enough would so soften up Israel that she would be forced to her knees before peace plans would be allowed to materialize. He stated that last week the British Consul in Jerusalem, Mr. Sherringham, stated informally to an Israeli official that the truce would be dragged out deliberately until Israel was on its knees and begging the Arabs for mercy. Mr. Shertok said he believes this attitude is the latest phase of immutable British policy to weaken Israel and that in reply thereto he could only say that the Jews were a determined and resistant people with a remarkable adaptability and that, if necessary, time would tell who would hold out the longest under conditions of truce.

Mr. McDonald said that he had instructions to discuss our government’s suggestions with the Prime Minister also and that he hoped for an early reply from the PGI. Shertok agreed to this procedure stating that the issues involved were very important and would have to be discussed in strict confidence with the government.

Appendix A

The Special Representative of the United States in Israel (McDonald) to the Israeli Foreign Minister (Shertok)

Memorandum: (Note: This memo was read verbally by Mr. James G. McDonald to the Foreign Minister on Sept. 6, 1948)

My Government has asked me to express: 1. its hope that Israel will become a great force for constructive rebuilding within Israel’s own territory and will be able to exercise a beneficient influence upon this whole area; and, 2, its desire to aid in every proper way in this creative development.

I am also requested to reemphasize in the clearest possible terms the statements which I made to Your Excellency and separately to Mr. Ben Gurion during our first talks more than a fortnight ago. The United States is determined to use all of its influence to prevent a violation of the truce and—should unhappily such a violation occur—will support in the Security Council immediate action, if necessary under Article 7, against the aggressor. My Government feels strongly that such violation must not be tolerated because the maintenance of the truce is an essential prerequisite to peace negotiations.

My Government would be grateful if the PGI would let it know through me if the Israeli authorities have any assurance that any one Arab state or group of such states is prepared to initiate peace negotiations.

In order to determine whether there is a basis for facilitating peace negotiations, my Government in the stictest confidence desires to learn the reaction of the PGI to the following suggestions—suggestions which, although tentative and in the nature of “trying on for size”, are put forward by my Government in its earnest desire to aid Israel in becoming a permanent force for the maintenance of peace and economic development in the Middle Eastern area:

The suggestions are advanced that:

1. perhaps a solution can be worked out as a feature of any final understanding with Transjordan which would exchange a large portion of the desert land of the Negev for that portion of fertile Western Galilee which Israel now occupies militarily.

2. while my Government believes that Jerusalem should be an international enclave along lines recommended by the GA resolution of November 29 or the TC resolutions of April and May, the U.S. would consider acceptable any other arrangement satisfactory to both Israel and Arab States, provided the safety of, and access to, the Holy Places is guaranteed.

3. The PGI consider some constructive measures for the alleviation of Arab refugee distress, which is a factor influencing world opinion.

It should be clear that my Government feels that demands which exceed the suggestions 1 and 2 would be prejudicial to the possibility of effecting a permanent peace in Palestine.

If the PGI is prepared at this time to make known to my Government constructive views in response to the above suggestions, the U.S. is willing to commend above program to Mediator and to British Government which, it is contemplated, can exert considerable influence on neighboring governments.

1. Transmitted in despatch 58, September 12. The conversation took place at 3:30 p. m., September 6, at the Israeli Foreign Office, with Messrs. McDonald, Shertok, and Knox participating.
2. Herbert J. Cummings, a career official in the Department of Commerce, detailed for temporary assignment to the Mission at Tel Aviv.