Office of the Historian

501.BB Palestine/8–2748: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

top secret
London, August 27, 1948—9 p. m.

3881. Following is text Foreign Office working paper entitled “Tactics for Putting into Effect the Mediator’s Recommendations” handed me by Bevin today (see my 3879, August 27 and Embassy’s 3851, August 25).

  • “1. Mediator would be advised by HMG and USG to make a recommendation to SC on lines draft attached. (This is quoted my 3880).1
  • 2. Reference of whole question for discussion by UNGA would much better be avoided. SC can properly deal with Mediator’s recommendation as a matter affecting international peace and security. Effect of SC endorsing Mediator’s recommendation and communication to all parties as proposed therein would be to enable Mediator to carry out task entrusted to him by UNGA, of seeking a peaceful solution of Palestine question.
  • 3. This procedure is in many ways less attractive than the alternative proposal under which Jewish and Arab leaders would be induced to negotiate within the general framework of the recommendations in order to work out a detailed settlement, particularly with regard to exact position of the frontier. The Foreign Office are convinced, however, that such direct negotiations are in present circumstance impracticable. It is cardinal point of the approach to the problem by the Foreign Office that neither party in Palestine is at all likely to make any positive act of acceptance of the kind of settlement to be proposed by Mediator, but that both parties might well acquiesce in it if it were put into effect with sufficient determination. They hold, therefore, that it would be useless to ask representatives of either party to negotiate on the execution of the Mediator’s recommendations. Both parties would have objections of principle to doing so. In particular, they do not favor the suggestion that Trans Jordan might be singled out from the Arab States to take part in such negotiations. They fear, in fact, that positive acceptance of any such scheme by Trans Jordan at an early stage would not predispose acceptance of it by other Arab States but would merely serve to make Transjordan’s already difficult situation almost intolerable.
  • 4. It is, therefore, suggested that when Mediator has made his recommendations, SC should be asked to endorse them and to issue necessary instructions. HMG and USG would explain situation fully to the Arab and Jewish authorities on the basis of Mediator’s report, but before this was published, and would make every possible effort to ensure that they would acquiesce in the adoption of Mediator’s recommendations. The two Governments would show that they were quite determined that these recommendations should be put into effect in shortest possible time and that they would not support any attempt to modify or infringe them.
  • 5. If it was impossible to obtain necessary majority in SC or the proposals were vetoed there, it would probably be necessary to take [Page 1359] matter to UNGA in the hope that they would recommend the adoption of Mediator’s proposals and ask SC to take the necessary action to see that they were put into effect, but it would be far better not to have the question discussed in UNGA until SC had acted, and, if favorably, the necessary measures were being put into effect.”
Douglas
  1. Supra.↩