Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V, Part 2

501.BB Palestine/8–248: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

top secret

Washington, August 12, 1948—1 p. m.

3187. Dept appreciates provisional UK views on Palestine and desires present following informal reactions to numbered paragraphs urtel 3484, Aug 2:

1. Para. 3a and 4 imply abandonment Nov 29 resolution, which might complicate handling of question in UN and might cause sharp reaction in US on basis probable charges US–UK were attempting sabotage UN recommendations. We believe preferable approach is to continue to improve Nov. resolution, consistent with our efforts last regular session, to improve UNSCOP report, along functional or practical lines to make it more acceptable to parties. Within framework this principle modifications could be effected as result informal Arab-Jewish negotiations.

2. Para. 5: We concur in view that political or economic union is unrealistic and impractical. Re territorial recommendations, (a) we continue believe Jerusalem should not be placed under sole authority either Arabs or Jews (see our para. 9a); (b) we agree with free port proposal but believe internationalization Haifa and Lydda impractical; (c) inclusion Jaffa in Israel considered desirable if Arabs agree but its value as bargaining point should be retained for time being; (d) transfer of all or part of Negev to Arabs should include portion of Mediterranean coast line to provide access to sea; (e) some adjustment of eastern frontier Israel as defined Nov. 29 resolution desirable to effect more practical distribution and administration communications in frontier area. We believe transfer Jaffa and all or portion western Galilee to Israel in exchange for transfer all or part of Negev good basis for informal Arab-Jewish negotiations. We concur UK view that political future of Arab territory would eventually be for Arabs to decide but, in light of diversity views and interests of Arab states, believe PGI and Transjordan should undertake initial informal negotiations.

This Govt would indeed view with concern attempt by either Israel or future Arab state (whether Transjordan or Palestinian Arab State) to prejudice territorial integrity of other, and assumes such aggression would be raised in UN for consideration and action under Charter. We would not agree to UK suggestion concerning recommendation by Mediator that UN should lay down frontier which could only be changed by UN. Frontiers must be based upon agreement of parties, who could agree to changes. If such frontiers are violated by one party without agreement of the other, UN would presumably act, under Chapter VII if necessary.

3. Para. 5a; Dept believes it desirable avoid interjecting problem European Jewish DP’s into negotiations or settlement for Palestine, but considers solution Arab DP problem intrinsic to negotiations and settlement.

4. Para. 5b; See our para. 9g.

5. Para. 6–7: Dept agrees that Arabs and Jews would probably reject Mediator’s next set of suggestions if formally presented without intermediate steps. We feel that essential intermediate steps now called for are, first, US–UK agreement concerning basic recommendations, and, second, parallel general approach by US and UK to PGI and Arab states, informing them of general substance of our concerted views, in effort secure their cooperation in immediate informal discussions between PGI and Arab states looking towards development working basis for settlement. Such immediate discussions, we believe, should first be confined to PGI and TJ as most moderate and cooperative Arab League state. TJ might thereafter be expected to present them to other Arab states. Dept believes essential that we follow principle of similar approach to both Arabs and Jews by US and UK, rather than that of division of responsibility, which would weaken desirable position of neutrality set forth your para. 12. The objective facts are, as we see them, that the US has just as much interest as the UK in the development and maintenance of good relations with the Arabs, while the UK, on the other hand, has just as much interest as the US in the development and maintenance of good relations with Israel, both considered in terms of our mutual political, economic and strategic interests in the Middle East. We should not continue thinking, therefore, that it is the task of the UK alone to bring about Arab acquiescence any more than we should think that it is the task of the US alone to bring about Israel acquiescence in the future settlement. As we see it, both we and the UK have a joint and equal task in bringing about the acquiescence of both Arabs and Jews. If US–UK efforts result in Arab-Jewish acquiescence in working agreement, this could then be used by Mediator as basis for further action.

HMG reference para. 6 to enforcement unclear. US could not concur in military enforcement of imposed settlement. (See Austin speech in SC dated February 24.)¹ We would however be prepared make maximum efforts as outlined above to secure acquiescence both sides; if Arab-Jewish agreed settlement were obtained, we would be prepared to support such action in UN as might be necessary to insure maintenance of peace.

6. Para. 8–9: Dept sees no useful result from GA resolution at this stage and believes question of appropriate GA action should await development of negotiations. We have grave doubts desirability GA consideration Palestine in forthcoming session except on basis of an agreed settlement.

7. Para. 10: We believe informal US–UK approach to Mediator desirable, informing him of our agreed views concerning settlement, and of our desire use our joint good offices and influence with PGI and Arabs to encourage early working agreement.

8. Para. 12–13: We agree with UK view concerning mutual necessity maintaining neutral attitude vis-à-vis Arabs and Jews in effort achieve workable settlement and with view expressed your para. 13 concerning desirability giving Arabs evidence Western understanding of their position (see our para. 9 f–g) See also paras 1 and 2 above.

9. Additional tentative comments of Dept follow:

a. Status of Jerusalem. Pending establishment of Jerusalem police force, we believe Mediator-should endeavor convince PGI and Arabs of desirability contributing small well-disciplined military units, to which UN representatives should be assigned in observer capacity, to assist in demilitarization and to control possible extremist outbreaks. We are prepared make strong representations to PGI and TJ to provide such assistance (Deptel 3055, Aug 3²). (See Embtel 3567 Aug 6 to Dept from London to which reply is being prepared.)

Some degree of UN responsibility for administration of Jerusalem still appears essential, with provision for protection holy places, free access thereto, and guaranteed transit rights to city. In view special importance Jerusalem to both Arabs and Jews, however, US is giving some thought to possible advantages modified condominium principle under which Israel, future Arab state, and UN” would share administrative responsibility for Jerusalem. Administrative board might consist of three Israeli, three Arab, and three UN representatives under rotating chairmanship. Condominium might represent compromise politically for both Israeli and Arabs, and would place financial responsibility and responsibility maintenance law and order squarely upon peoples of Palestine rather than on UN. UK views re feasibility this solution would be appreciated.

b. Israel’s independence. Final settlement must be predicated on full acceptance Israel’s independence including full control immigration, subject during truce to Mediator’s supervision; once final settlement achieved and frontiers defined, it is probable that limiting geographic-economic factors would eventually check tendency to excessive Jewish immigration.

c. Arab Palestine. While we desire UK views concerning merits various proposals for disposition Arab territory, we hold provisional view that inclusion Arab territory into TJ (or among various Arab states) might be supported by US–UK as basis for proposed Arab-Jewish discussions. Palestinian Arabs should however have right of expressing their views in some manner. We would welcome UK views re means accomplishing this objective.

d. Boundaries. We believe initial PGI–TJ discussions should include attempt resolve boundary questions, taking into account principles of Nov resolution and present military situation; wishes of population; administrative convenience, emphasizing desirability compact administrative entities and avoidance of enclaves; relevant economic factors.

Concurrently discussions should include question of exchange of populations in certain cases, as well as desirability of permitting return of refugees so desiring, including assistance in effecting resettlement and property restoration, and appropriate civil rights guarantees.

e. Economic relations. Economic union or similar system of formal economic arrangements is impractical at this time. We believe gradual development of economic relations between the two states, arising out of common interests and needs, is more acceptable principle in effecting settlement. Certain working arrangements arising in this manner could be progressively extended, and might form basis for economic understanding at time of final settlement.

f. Recognition and UN membership. US is currently considering idea of extending de jure recognition concurrently to Govt of Israel and TJ in near future, in return for assurances of cooperation in truce observance and in actual negotiations for settlement. US believes recognition of Israel by UK in return for similar assurances would be important contribution to these ends. We would also welcome concerted US–UK action in supporting applications of both to UN as further means stabilizing NE situation.

g. Economic assistance. Following final settlement, US is prepared consider sympathetically Israel’s application $100,000,000 loan for resettlement of DP’s and economic projects in Israel in connection therewith. We believe Israel’s industrial capabilities should be encouraged in order establish it as manufacturing center and entrepot. Such development might ultimately lead to mutually advantageous economic relations with Arab states.

In connection with settlement for Arab Palestine, US–UK should consider problem of providing administrative aid and counsel as emergency measure during formative period. Possibilities of governmental and of international economic and financial assistance should be explored, with view to possibility providing assistance when evidences political stabilization emerge. We should also give early attention to problem of economic aid to NE on regional basis through UN agencies and through appropriate aid on basis Anglo-American discussions for cooperation in economic-social affairs in NE. We believe such assistance essential to development economic equilibrium and restoration political cooperation among Near Eastern peoples.

As soon as US–UK agreement on general principles of settlement obtained, we propose prepare instructions to our missions for early approach to Mediator, PGI, TJ, other Arab League states, and key UN members such as France, Belgium, Canada and China.

Sent London, repeated to New York.

Marshall

1. Ante, p. 651.
2. This was a repeat of No. 793 to Jerusalem, p. 1275.