Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V, Part 2

501.BB Palestine/8–648: Telegram

The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Jessup) to the Secretary of State

top secret
us urgent

New York, August 6, 1948—5:23 p. m.

1000. The views concerning the future settlement of the Palestine question, as set forth in London’s 3484, dated August 2, correspond broadly with discussions we had with Beeley before his return to London at the end of the special session, and recommendations set forth in USUN’s 831, June 29 [30], and 837, July 1, and subsequent telegrams.

Although in general agreement with British views, we have following preliminary comments on specific points of detail:

1. Referring to paragraph 5 of London’s 3484, we think it is essential that the British stop toying with the idea that Jerusalem might be placed under Arab sovereignty. It seems inescapably clear to us that the PGI would never agree to this, nor would it be possible for us to justify it to American public opinion generally. Maintenance of prior position favoring some international status seems desirable.

2. With reference to the territorial matters referred to in the same paragraph, please see paragraphs 7 and 8 of USUN’s 831. It is our impression that the Jewish position with regard to the transfer of the Negev to the Arabs has become much more rigid during the past several weeks than it was previously. We therefore feel confirmed in our opinion that if the PGI can be persuaded to consider any territorial transfers, they would expect not only all of western Galilee in return for the Negev, but probably also additional territories included within the Arab portion of Palestine under the November 29 resolution. Compare paragraph 4 below.

3. For our views on the status of Haifa, please see paragraph 9 of our 831. As indicated there, we feel that Haifa should continue to be considered as a Jewish city in the State of Israel, but arrangements might be made for a free port, and arrangements for the operation of the refineries. We are certain that the PGI would not accept the internationalization of Haifa.

4. In paragraph 8(c) of our 831, we suggested that Jaffa should be considered as included in the Jewish state. If we were, however, to concede this to the PGI, we should bear in mind that its bargaining value in terms of concessions from the PGI would be very substantial.

5. In considering the territorial question generally, the British “line-of-force” frontier appeals to us. We might contemplate a provisional settlement in the nature of an armistice based on the line-of-force frontiers, with provision for a boundary commission to assist parties in working out the details of the territorial settlement, subject, however, to some basic decisions on main problems such as those discussed in paragraphs 2 and 3 above.

6. We agree with the British view that some form of international guarantee of frontiers would be desirable. Our views on this question were set forth in paragraphs 10 and 11 of our 831. The British view that frontiers could only be changed by the UN and that any attempt to do so otherwise would be a breach of the peace seems to us unduly rigid. Presumably, any future change in the frontier brought about by peaceful means, that is, by agreement between the parties, should not require action by the UN. It might be provided that any attempt to alter the frontier, once determined, by other than peaceful means, would be considered a threat to or breach of the peace and a cause for action under chapter 7 of the charter.

7. Referring to paragraph 6 of London’s 3484, in the light of the SC debates in February and March on the question of enforcing the settlement envisaged in the November 29 resolution, it seems unrealistic to imagine that any future settlement could be enforced. We suggest that the Department will wish to review carefully our position with regard to the enforcement by the SC of a political decision in the light of the statements made in the council by the US representative under instructions from the Department.

8. Referring to paragraph 7 of London’s telegram, it is our hope that it will be possible to avoid a situation wherein the Mediator again makes proposals which are considered very unrealistic by both sides and rejected by them. This can be avoided, it seems to us, only by the development of a concerted US–UK position which would then be communicated to the Mediator and supported by our two governments with the principal parties.

9. We are inclined to agree that we are most likely to get acquiescence rather than clear agreement from the parties. It seems clear to us that Abdullah, on the Arab side, is prepared to acquiesce, if not actually to agree, in reasonable proposals. The major stumbling block, however, as we see it, consists of the extremists within the Arab League, principally Syria, Iraq, Azzam Pasha, and, on the outskirts, the Mufti. If, because of these extremists, we cannot even secure acquiescence by the Arab League in reasonable proposals, it would be interesting to know the British view as to the possibilities of agreement or acquiescence by Abdullah alone, supported by the combined diplomatic pressure of both the US and the UK.

10. The parenthetical reference in paragraph 7 of London’s telegram to the possibility of the Mediator’s reporting either to the GA or the SC reflected, it seems to us, a persistent error in British thinking. It is our view that any report by the Mediator should be made to the GA, which created his position and set forth his functions with regard to the future settlement, rather than to the SC, which should be concerned not with the future settlement, but with the maintenance of peace and security in Palestine. As we have pointed out before, the Russians take advantage of any opportunity to disparage in the SC the Mediator’s function with regard to the future settlement as they were laid down not by the SC but by the GA. Moreover, we do not want to run any risk of impairing the chances of a future settlement by Russian support in the Council of an intransigent PGI position involving the possibility of a Russian veto. The same argument applies, although perhaps in lesser degree, to the British support of an intransigent Arab position.

11. Referring to paragraphs 8 and 9 of London’s telegram a positive resolution covering a definitive settlement would obviously, we feel, be preferable. Although we think the arguments in favor of a positive resolution, as set forth in paragraph 9, possibly reflect a certain amount of wishful thinking, we would urge strongly that every effort be made to achieve a definitive solution which could be acted upon by the GA this fall. Parenthetically, we feel that the negotiations involved should be conducted as quietly as possible with a minimum of publicity in order to avoid the risks and delays envisaged in a propaganda battle between the Jews and Arabs, with the mediator caught in the middle.

As a matter of calculated risk, we are not at all sure that the disadvantage of a positive resolution feared by the British is justified. It is our impression, from the various reports we have received, that the Arabs would welcome being “coerced” into acceptance of a resolution that would involve at least implicit recognition of the existence of a Jewish state.

On the whole, it is our view that there is a great deal to be gained, and very little if anything to be lost, by making a vigorous effort to arrive at a definitive solution in time for the GA this fall. If this effort should not develop successfully, we could still fall back on the idea of a provisional resolution, which might be developed in consultation with the British along the lines of London’s 3485.¹

Such a provisional resolution may be the minimum necessary to encourage the Mediator to continue with his task. On the other hand, both we and the British should bear constantly in mind that the situation in Palestine ‘and the status of negotiations for a peaceful settlement may be such as to warrant keeping the question of Palestine out of the GA altogether.

12. We agree strongly with the views set forth in paragraph 10 of London’s 3484. Bernadotte has himself given us an opening to express our views by his instructions to Bunche to discuss the future settlement with US, the British, and the French.

13. Referring to paragraph 11 of London’s telegram, we feel in strongest terms that it would be a great mistake for the British to bring question of the future settlement up in the GA, if for any reason, including “special difficulties”, referred to in paragraph 11, the USG cannot join with the UK in advocacy of a particular program. If there are any reasons which would prevent our joining with the British, it would be precisely those reasons which in all probability would cause us to oppose the British line, thus leading to a resumption of hard feelings between our two governments and impairment of the prospects of future settlement.

On the other hand, we do not think we should assume that there are any special difficulties which should prevent our getting together with the British on a joint program in the Assembly, if on the merits of the case such action should seem desirable. To be quite frank about it, both of our political parties are irrevocably committed to support of the PGI; there is not likely, therefore, to be any substantial change in our position with regard to the peaceful settlement in Palestine; we have an excellent opportunity to consult leaders of both our parties and the future would therefore be no better time than the present to work out with the British a joint policy if the circumstances in Palestine warrant.

14. London’s 3484, in particular paragraph 12, reveals what we feel is another persistent error in British thinking about Palestine. This is the idea that the British are the advocates for the Arabs, although prepared if necessary to “cold-shoulder” them, while the US is the advocate for the Jews. The objective facts are, as we see them, that the US has just as much interest as the UK in the development and maintenance of good relations with the Arabs, while the UK, on the other hand, has just as much interest as the US in the development and maintenance of good relations with Israel, both considered in terms of our mutual political, economic and strategic interests in the Middle East.

We should not continue thinking, therefore, that it is the task of the UK alone to bring about Arab acquiescence (paragraph 13) any more than we should think that it is the task of the US to bring about Israel acquiescence in the future settlement. As we see it, both we and the UK have a joint and equal task in bringing about the acquiescence of both Arabs and Jews.

The first step in this direction, we venture to recommend most strongly, would be to work out with the UK at the earliest possible moment the coordinated recognition by the US of Transjordan, and by the UK of Israel.

Jessup

1. Dated August 2, not printed; it outlined the tentative views of the British Foreign Office regarding the nature of a resolution which might be introduced into the General Assembly in September (501.BB Palestine/8–248).