Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V, Part 2

501.BB Palestine/7–948: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

top secret

London, July 9, 1948—7 p. m.

3096. Bevin assembled this morning his top Foreign Office advisors to consider road ahead Palestine. Following is report views expressed and my interpretation of them since I was present:

1. Bernadotte’s visit to Amman today is most hopeful event on horizon particularly if Abdullah, as he told British Minister Kirkbride yesterday he might do, takes bold step of accepting unilaterally Mediator’s truce proposals. Pros and cons of such action by Abdullah were discussed. There was one school of thought (Embassy’s 3055, July 6¹) which felt that Abdullah should be urged by His Majesty’s Government to take onus of going against decision of political committee Arab League and to accept unilaterally extension truce. Against this another school advanced view that if Abdullah takes this step as result British advice, and if Arab States turn against him, or if Jews as a consequence Arab Legion inactivity greatly expanded Israel by force of arms, consider a moral responsibility would rest on His Majesty’s Government for worsening Abdullah’s material and moral position. Bevin and McNeil opined that Abdullah is still only Arab leader capable of retrieving situation (Embassy’s 3056, July 8,² paragraph one) and that it was to be considered whether important asset of Abdullah’s tractability should be risked at this juncture without further appeal to Arab Governments to retreat over bridge which may be laid if British resolution passes SC (Embassy’s 3081, July 9, paragraph two). No final decision was reached this morning as to whether Abdullah should be given more His Majesty’s Government advice but later Bevin sent message given in my 3085, July 9.³

2. Bevin made following comments re Mediator’s proposals as basis for discussion if truce continued or if further UN action on them seems desirable:

a) In Bevin’s view it would be in interests of Arabs for Jerusalem to be under international regime policed by international force drawn from Belgium, France, US, et cetera; (I interjected in this regard that to my mind it is highly important that future regime for Jerusalem should not be fixed as Arab, but at least should be open for discussion in order that Jerusalem could be made international city. Bevin expressed agreement).

b) Frontiers Israel drawn under November 29 resolution are unsatisfactory: How much better are frontiers indicated by Mediator is question for examination;

c) It would be better, contrary to what may have been in Mediator’s mind, to have clearly defined Jewish state unconnected with Arab areas.

3. Bevin advanced thought that Arab leaders may be so committed to their unequivocal opposition to Jewish state that UN decision which would force state upon them might be welcomed to some degree by leaders.

4. Bevin raised question as to whether UNGA alone can change UNGA November 29 resolution unless the parties agree to a change under auspices Mediator (Paragraph five, Embassy’s 3080, July 9⁴).

5. If foregoing is not very coherent it is because conclusions of gathering itself did not have this quality. Clearly His Majesty’s Government has as yet not decided when to risk their trump card of Abdullah in an effort to persuade Arab states to accept a Jewish state as permanent feature Middle Eastern landscape (see Paragraph one above). My telegrams 3080, 3081 and 3085 show the results of meeting as sorted out by Foreign Office officials later.

6. If Abdullah would himself take decision to break, or to threaten to break with Arab League countries, thus freeing His Majesty’s Government from moral responsibility for consequences of this act, British Government would, I am sure, welcome this development.

7. Throughout this meeting the provisions of Chapter 7 were mentioned as the sword of Damocles hanging over Arabs: I detected no hint of any desire on part of those present to flinch from a fair share in imposition sanctions in unhappy event that this should be necessary.

We need have no worries, I think, on this score.

Douglas

1. Not printed.
2. Not printed.
3. Not printed; the message stated that the Arab Legion had borne the brunt of the fighting and that the recent Arab League decision meant that the governments which had made little contribution to the Arab war effort were dictating that the Arab Legion should again engage in hostilities. Under these circumstances, Abdullah might point out that the Legion had only a few days supply of ammunition and that, if the Arabs took the initiative in breaking the truce, it could not expect further supplies from the United Kingdom. Therefore, Abdullah should order his forces to stand on their present positions, not taking the offensive but resisting attack if necessary (501.BB Palestine/7–948).
4. Not printed; paragraph 5 read: “It will be clear no doubt to SC that under resolution Mediator would be recalled to report re operation truce and possible continuance truce and not on his proposals for resolution Palestine problem. In this connection SC is not empowered to change November 29 resolution UNGA which can be changed only (a) By agreement parties through good offices Mediator, or (b) By new UNGA decision.

   “Bevin states it may be necessary to ask SC refer this question back to UNGA and Foreign Office is examining possibility action to this effect. For time being, however, Cadogan should use all his influence to persuade SC to extend truce and to avoid any precipitate action which might make this more difficult.” (501.BB Palestine/7–948) He has asked UN Department Foreign Office to make special study of this question.