Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, The Near East, South Asia, and Africa, Volume V, Part 2

501.BB Palestine/7–848

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)¹

secret

[Washington,] July 8, 1948.

Participants:	Mr. Lovett
	Mr. Epstein, Special Representative of the Provisional Government of Israel
	Mr. Mattison (NE)

Mr. Epstein stated that he had requested an urgent appointment in order to acquaint the Department with certain facts regarding the truce in Palestine.

He stated that the Israeli Government had accepted Count Bernadotte’s proposals for an extension of the truce, without condition.² Unfortunately, he had received word that the Arabs were not willing to accept the extension of the truce, and that Egyptian forces had, in fact, attacked Israeli positions south of Tel Aviv before the end of the truce.

Mr. Epstein expressed the hope that the U.S. Government would take action in the Security Council of the United Nations to put a stop to the conflict in Palestine. He pointed out that Israel needed peace in order to proceed with the development of the country and to put its own house in order. He indicated that the strong measures taken by the Israeli Government against the Irgun when the Irgun had attempted to break the truce by landing men and weapons at Tel Aviv had been successful. He implied that a renewal of the fighting with the Arabs might make it more difficult to control the Irgun.

I told Mr. Epstein that we were following the situation with the closest attention, that we earnestly desired a return to peace in the area, and that we were striving through the UN to achieve this objective.

Mr. Epstein mentioned that he had received “reports” that the British were encouraging King Abdullah to continue hostilities. I informed Mr. Epstein that we had documentary evidence to the contrary, and that to our knowledge the British were cooperating fully and were putting extremely heavy pressure on Abdullah and the other Arab States to accept the extension of the truce. Mr. Epstein stated that he was glad to have this news, and to learn that his reports were unfounded.

The conversations then turned to the question of recognition of the State of Israel. I took pains to explain our position in the matter. I pointed out that our recognition of the State of Israel was unqualified. We recognized that the State existed, and that recognition was not qualified in any way. The only qualification which existed was that we recognized the Provisional Government of Israel as the de facto Government of the State. The reason for this qualification was that the Government had come into being without the people of the State having had a chance to participate in the election of the Government. When it was possible for the people to elect a government by constitutional processes it would follow that de jure recognition would be granted. Mr. Epstein commented that their legal advisers had told him much the same thing and that he was endeavoring to explain this situation to his “American friends” who felt that de jure recognition should be extended.

In conclusion, I took occasion to remind Mr. Epstein of the friendly warning which I had given him and Mr. Shertok last fall of the possibility that the Iron-Curtain countries might seek to penetrate the dissident groups in Israel, and told him that our intelligence reports indicated that such penetration might be occurring. Mr. Epstein said that he was fully aware of the dangers involved, and that he felt that it would now be possible to do more towards controlling this danger. Last fall there had been no Israeli Government and the situation was more difficult to control. He then inquired whether it would be possible to have access to, and exchange views regarding the subject matter of the intelligence reports. I explained that many of the reports were of such high classification that it would be impossible to make such an arrangement. I suggested that undoubtedly his Government monitored the broadcasts of the dissident groups, and that these broadcasts alone were sufficient to give an indication of the thinking of those groups and their orientation.

Mr. Epstein concluded by saying that there were a number of other pending subjects which he hoped to take up with me at a later date.

L[ovett]

1. Drafted by Mr. Mattison.
2. Mr. Epstein, in note 322 of July 9 to Mr. Lovett, transmitted a message of July 8 from Mr. Shertok stating that the Provisional Government of Israel had decided on July 6 to accept extension of the truce and had so advised Count Bernadotte the following day (501.BB Palestine/7–948). For the formal notification of these developments by Mr. Shertok to the President of the Security Council in a cablegram of July 9, see SC, 3rd yr., Supplement for July 1948, p. 37.